Russia Is Shrewdly Playing the Long Game in Africa

What if Moscow’s most dangerous moves right now aren’t in Europe, but along the Gulf of Guinea?

With its resources sunk deep into Ukraine, the Russian military has weighed carefully whether and when to engage elsewhere, standing aside amid recent conflicts in the South Caucasus and Middle East. An exception to this pattern of inaction is in West Africa. After the failed mutiny of Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin in June 2023, the Russian government established a new paramilitary group called Africa Corps, tethered closely to the military chain of command. The unit then progressively took over most of Wagner’s operations in Africa and expanded into Burkina Faso and Niger. It now seems to be eyeing a presence in Benin and Togo next. These activities suggest that Russia is seeking a West African foothold on which to build once an end to the war on Ukraine frees up additional conventional military forces. Russia may then try to further extend Africa Corps’ presence.

In pursuit of these ambitions, the Kremlin follows a deliberate strategy. Africa Corps’ expanding footprint is low investment, low risk, directed by the Russian government, and embedded in broader political efforts. It is accompanied by Russian state corporations looking to secure business deals. In choosing target countries for Africa Corps’ deployments, the Russian government seems focused on obtaining port access in the Gulf of Guinea, a region rich in hydrocarbon resources and an important maritime transit hub. At present, Africa Corps’ presence may be modest and appear of limited consequence to U.S. and European security. But as it expands, Russia may be able to gain access to valuable mineral resources and entrench authoritarian governance while projecting maritime power into NATO’s southern flank. U.S. and European policymakers should watch these developments closely and check Africa Corps’ influence through a coordinated response.

Origin Story

Following Prigozhin’s failed mutiny, the Russian defense ministry created Africa Corps after the Russia-Africa summit in late July 2023. Structures closely linked to the defense ministry and military intelligence, among them “Redut” and “Konvoy,” were conduits for initial recruitment. Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov and General Andrei Averyanov, commander of Russian military intelligence’s Special Action Service, are publicly in charge of the new outfit. While its operational command is not documented in open sources, Africa Corps claims that its leadership is drawn from elite Russian military units and unspecified private military companies. After failing to meet the original goal of enlisting 40,000 recruits into the unit, Russia lowered its target. In May 2024, the U.K. Ministry of Defense assessed that Africa Corps consisted of “more than 2,000 regular soldiers and officers.”

But Africa Corps is keen to expand. It has taken over some of Wagner’s former social media recruitment infrastructure. Africa Corps recruiters have touted its operations in media interviews, and its official website provides details about the application process, including educational, legal, and medical requirements, and salary and benefits. The unit seeks recruits for a wide range of positions, including motorized rifle troops, tank and drone operators, technical and engineering support, and translators, among others. According to the Russian defense ministry, those serving in Africa Corps are treated as equal to those who fight in Ukraine and receive the same benefits.

Enter Africa Corps

Since its emergence two years ago, Africa Corps has shown a particular interest in the Sahel, a region swept by military coups and a wave of anti-French sentiment. In Mali, it operated alongside Wagner even after Prigozhin’s death. Wagner’s disastrous push into separatist territory at Tinzaouaten in July 2024, which left its forces exposed to a deadly ambush, gave Africa Corps an opportunity to assert itself in Mali. That process accelerated in spring 2025 with a visit by Yevkurov and culminated with Wagner’s “mission complete” announcement in early June 2025. Later that month, Mali’s interim president Assimi Goïta flew to Russia, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Defense Minister Andrey Belousov, and even visited the Kazan Helicopters plant in Tatarstan, indicating a desire to further deepen defense ties.

Africa Corps has also moved into neighboring Niger and Burkina Faso. In Niger — where the U.S. military had operated a drone base and deployed roughly 1,000 troops — a coup brought to power a military junta that tilted closer to Russia through fall 2023 and spring 2024, expressing its interest in defense cooperation. Yevkurov and Averyanov engaged the new leadership repeatedly, and by April 2024, the first one hundred Africa Corps troops arrived in country. Footage from the deployment shows them training Nigerien troops on using first-person view drones and operating from the same base where soon-to-depart U.S. troops lived.

Burkina Faso — ruled by Captain Ibrahim Traoré as interim leader since the September 2022 military coup — received Yevkurov in Ouagadougou in September 2023 for initial discussions on an Africa Corps deployment. An initially modest contingent of one hundred instructors arrived later that year, but Russian officials soon hinted at a desire to scale up. In July 2025, a high-level Russian defense delegation visited Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to discuss the expanding Africa Corps’ presence in the three countries.

Africa Corps has also looked for openings elsewhere. There have been reports of its instructors present in Equatorial Guinea, protecting senior officials and training local forces. Russian officials have hinted at an interest in defense cooperation with Cameroon. Yevkurov has also engaged the Togolese government, and in late July 2025, the Russian Duma ratified a Russian-Togolese military cooperation agreement that foresees joint military exercises, Russian training for Togolese soldiers, and intelligence exchange. About a week later, the Russian ambassador to Benin told Izvestia that Russia planned to sign an agreement on military cooperation with the country: “We hope the calls of Russian warships at Benin and Togo will become a good tradition and promote the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation in the security and defense spheres.” Benin and Togo appeal to Russia given their perceived geostrategic location on the Gulf of Guinea. The Russian navy has already used the Conakry port in Guinea to transport weapons into the Sahel. Access to Togo’s port of Lomé or São Tomé and Príncipe’s port could additionally help Russia sustain its Sahelian operations

Low Risk, Long Game

Thus far, Africa Corps’ eschewal of high-risk missions and focus on training of local military and law enforcement has kept manpower requirements to a minimum. Mali is the exception. Deliveries of heavy equipment, including tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, earlier this year foreshadowed participation in counter-insurgency operations, and Africa Corps is since reported to have suffered casualties at the hands of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin. At least for now, there are no indications that Africa Corps is prepared to take on such risks elsewhere.

The Russian government has also engaged in efforts to ensure sustainable logistics for Africa Corps’ operations. Even though the military has thus far managed to preserve its access to its main Syrian bases, Russian observers called for diversifying military logistics soon after President Bashar al Assad’s downfall. Russia has continued to expand its bases in Libya, another refueling hub. At the same time, construction activity has continued at an airport in Bamako beside the Africa Corps headquarters, likely indicating a desire to expand military logistics in Mali. A recent Royal United Services Institute study concluded that the Tobruk and Benghazi naval facilities in eastern Libya would be Moscow’s most likely alternative to the Tartus port in Syria, should the need arise, but that it might also seek access to Algeria’s ports for maintenance. The appointment of General Sergey Surovikin as Russia’s military point person for Algeria and a December 2024 visit by Yevkurov — just days after Assad was overthrown — suggests an interest in exploring such options. Africa-based logistics nodes could enable Russia to expand Africa Corps’ operations in the future.

That Africa Corps plays an integral part in Russia’s foreign policy objectives in West Africa is also apparent in its approach to the Alliance of the Sahel States, a mutual defense pact between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Over time, Russia has increasingly engaged the three countries in concert, seeking to strengthen this pro-Russian bloc economically, politically, and militarily — possibly in the hope that other states may join it. In September 2024, all three countries signed a joint deal with Russian aerospace agency Roscosmos to acquire surveillance satellites and secure communications technology. Rosatom has discussed cooperation on nuclear energy with all three states. In April 2025, their foreign ministers jointly visited Moscow, where Foreign Minister Lavrov announced that the Russian military would support a new Alliance of the Sahel States joint military force. By some accounts, Russia wants Togo, a country where Africa Corps may hope to deploy, to join the alliance.

Africa Corps’ consolidation of a foothold in the Sahel is part of a broader Russian government effort that goes beyond promoting the Alliance of the Sahel States. Its forays into target countries are usually preceded by a flurry of other activities, including the reopening of consulates, embassies, or cultural “Russian Houses,” as well as initiatives involving the State Duma, the Russian Foreign Ministry, and Russian universities. Earlier this year, the Russian foreign ministry inaugurated a new Department for Partnership with Africa, a recipient of resources redirected from engagement with Western countries. African Initiative — a new Russian media organization born shortly after Prigozhin’s death — has maintained a news website and Telegram channels that promote pro-Russian government content, and is highly active in organizing cultural events on the ground, especially in the Sahel.

Russia’s information campaigns have linked the country’s efforts in West Africa and its war against Ukraine into one meta-narrative, portraying them as parts of an overarching “anti-neocolonial” struggle against an exploitative West. In this telling, Russia is a “sovereignty provider” to these countries. The recent shift in U.S. foreign policy may provide additional openings for Russia to project soft power. Following the Trump administration’s announcement to gut the U.S. Agency for International Development, once the world’s largest aid agency, the Russian House in Bangui posted pictures of its director distributing boxes of HIV medicine to local officials. As Washington reduces its presence on the continent, Moscow stands ready to exploit the void, building on the efforts of its Russian Houses, propagandists, and Africa Corps.

Looking Beyond the Ukraine War

It remains an open question to what extent the Russian government can leverage Africa Corps to increase commercial gains. Recent developments suggest that Moscow is trying hard. In April 2025, Burkina Faso reportedly offered a license for a gold mining project to Nordgold, a Russian firm. Rosatom has sought access to Niger’s uranium assets and Russia’s Yadran Group has started work on a gold refinery in Mali. Rosoboronexport has advertised drones, electronic warfare systems, and small arms to African clients. But Russia is competing in an increasingly crowded field in Africa as countries like China, Iran, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates are stepping up their own engagements with friendly regimes.

Some observers argue that Africa Corps poses a low-priority problem for the United States, which has few national security interests in Africa and should therefore end its legacy counterterror and counterinsurgency operations, even if Russia (or China) fills the vacuum. Others rightly point to Africa Corps’ inability to stem escalating violence and terrorism in the Sahel, which may raise questions over its effectiveness. But as authoritarian leaders in Africa look to consolidate power, demand for Africa Corps’ muscle may still increase. The Russian government may therefore well be interested in Africa Corps increasing its presence after the Ukraine war frees up resources. Raphael Parens previously wrote on these pages that even if only a fraction of Russian regular army or volunteer forces were to join private military outfits after Ukraine, it could usher in a “mercenary shock” in Africa.

With its favorable demographics and natural resource wealth, Africa represents an area of potential growth for the Russian economy, and one where Russia has a solid Soviet-era foundation on which to build. Russia will likely seek to turn more African players off cooperation with the West by savvily exploiting longstanding grievances with Europe and the United States, and use those openings to introduce Africa Corps. Port access in the Gulf of Guinea and Southern Mediterranean will also enable Russian maritime projection on NATO’s southern flank.

Since its inception in 2023, the Kremlin has used Africa Corps to help expand Russian power and influence across the continent, especially in West Africa and the Sahel. Despite this, it remains to be seen whether Russia will have the resources in the future to materialize its ambitions. But at the same time, it is dangerously complacent to assume that Russia’s recent forays into West Africa are purely opportunistic and that its appeal as a partner may soon enough fade. Western capitals run serious risks by letting Africa Corps expand unimpeded. Just before U.S. President Donald Trump took office, the United States was right in shifting its focus to Africa Corps’ next frontier: states on the Gulf of Guinea, particularly Benin. It should continue that effort, but avoid replicating the military-led, governance-agnostic engagement that previously failed in the Sahel. Just like Africa Corps’ forays are embedded in a Russian whole-of-government approach that leverages propaganda and diplomatic influence, so should U.S. Africa Command’s operations be nested in a comprehensive Africa strategy. Considering the Trump administration’s shifting global priorities, Europe should have a growing role in stabilizing coastal West Africa — its direct neighborhood. It should pursue a coordinated West Africa strategy that streamlines aid, empowers regional solutions, builds trust through joint civilian-led initiatives, and counters Russian disinformation.

 

* Hanna Notte, Ph.D., is director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and a nonresident senior associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Her work focuses on Russia’s foreign and security policy, the Middle East, and nuclear arms control and nonproliferation.

 

Source: https://warontherocks.com/2025/09/russia-is-shrewdly-playing-the-long-game-in-africa/