Retired Major General İbrahim Aydın: Syrian Kurds Must Take Part in the Construction of a New Syria
The concept of Divide and Rule in imperialism is a policy aimed at weakening a state, a region, or a people by fragmenting them in order to dominate them. In contrast, Rule byUniting is an approach that seeks to eliminate internal discord that exploits social differences—if any—thus protecting a society from the weakness caused by division and ensuring itsunity. Türkiye has always pursued a unifying policy, not only for the Kurds but for the entire region.
Interview and Presentation: Mustafa Ekici
Mr. İbrahim Aydın is a retired soldier who served in the Turkish army for 37 years, retiring with the rank of Major General. Throughout his career, he primarily worked in the fields of counterterrorism and intelligence. Currently, he conducts academic studies on theMiddle East at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM). With 37 years of field experience in military and intelligence operations, Aydın’s work offers a unique perspective that blends academic knowledge with practical expertise.
Our interview with Mr. İbrahim Aydın about his book The Kurds in Syria provides a calm and rational perspective, free from rhetoric, on one of today’s most debated topics: the SyrianKurds, the YPG/SDF, and the role of Kurds in Syria’s future. In his book, Aydın compiles information on the historical background of Kurdish presence in Syria, along with insights into their social, demographic, cultural, and socioeconomic structures.
The book focuses on the political structures of the Syrian Kurds, the organizations and parties they have established, the political axes these groups are based on, their relations, struggles, interactions with the Baath regime, their stance during the Syrian civil war, and the alliances they have formed. Written while the Syrian civil war was still ongoing (2023), Aydın’s book analyzes the post-war situation of the Kurds and the future of the PYD/SDF in Syria.
With MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli’s call, which sparked widespread debate in society, the“Kurdish issue” has once again become a hot topic. In this context, the issue of Syrian Kurds is undoubtedly one that attracts public interest across all segments of society. As a significant component of Syrian politics and society, the Syrian Kurds remain a matter that Türkiye cannot remain indifferent to, as history has repeatedly demonstrated.
Concrete developments—such as the PKK’s long-standing patronage under the Baath regimefor geopolitical interests, the cultural and political transformations triggered by this relationship, the mass migrations that occurred during the Syrian civil war, and the October6-7 events—have all shown that Syrian Kurds are not as “distant” as they may seem.
Similar to the dynamics of all nationalist spheres, Kurdish nationalism is also rapidly pushingKurds living in different countries into an imagined world where they share a common emotional experience and produce unified political reactions. With the increasing accessibility of communication and transportation, this process is advancing even more quickly for theKurds. Moreover, this imagined universe, which is naively romanticized through the argument of a “Kurdistan divided into four parts” and detached from reality, serves as a fertile ground for numerous fanatic terrorist networks and professional militants operating on behalf of foreign powers.
A new game is being played on the world stage. Regimes once considered unshakable are collapsing within days. The Middle East, in particular, is on the brink of alarming developments. In this process, it is evident that the security– and development-based relationsTürkiye is striving to strengthen with its two closest neighbors, Syria and Iraq, will deepen and gradually evolve into a form of alliance. It is no secret that the Kurds living along the borders of these three states—who are highly integrated into these societies and fluent in multiple languages—will play a significant role in this alliance.
It is clear that the Syrian Kurds do not live far from Türkiye, nor just beside it, but rather within it. In this regard, Mr. İbrahim Aydın’s work holds special significance, particularly from the perspective of a retired soldier.
Happy reading.
Mustafa Ekici/Kritik Bakış
“Syrian Kurds Can Become a Founding Force by Breaking Free from PKK/PYD Influence“
Mustafa Ekici: Your book, The Kurds in Syria, is one of the few significant studies on SyrianKurds worldwide. Moreover, the fact that it was written in 2023—at a time when a sudden change in power in Syria was still seen as a distant possibility—adds special value to your work. First of all, why focus on Syrian Kurds?
İbrahim Aydın: First of all, thank you for your kind words about my book. Why focus on Syrian Kurds? The issue of “Kurds in Syria” is a matter of current relevance. However, it would be more accurate to say that this book is a product of over 40 years of my professional life and personal research rather than a response to a temporary situation.
To better explain the purpose of this book, let me expand on my answer.
When the PKK terrorist organization launched its first large-scale attacks on August 15, 1984, I was just a first-year officer. From my earliest assignments until my retirement as a majorgeneral, counterterrorism operations formed the core of my military career. (This was not unique to me; almost all my colleagues who started their careers during that period took on the same responsibility.) After retiring, I continued working on this subject, and I still do today. My military career allowed me to experience both theory and practice in counterterrorism, while my post-retirement studies enabled me to examine the broader aspects of the issue beyond terrorism. This is the foundation of my interest in the topic.
The issue we are addressing is an age-old matter that has carried over from the OttomanEmpire to the Republic of Türkiye and now into the second century of the Republic. We have personally witnessed at least the past half-century of the state’s efforts and the price it has paid in this regard. May God protect our state. However, the lack of an acceptable and sustainable “Strategic Roadmap” on this issue has always been a topic of discussion. Our research has shown that developing such a roadmap is only possible if the issue is fully understood in all its dimensions. Our efforts have been based on this comprehensive understanding, and The Kurds in Syria can be considered a product of this learning process.
The Kurds, as the primary subjects of this historical issue, do not live only in Türkiye. Moreover, imperialist plans and motives concerning the Kurds are not limited to Türkiye alone. Additionally, developments driven by internal dynamics have a high potential toinfluence neighboring countries. Therefore, our research also covers the surrounding countries where Kurds live.
The reason for prioritizing Syria in this study is the impact of the recently concluded civil waron the Syrian Kurds. From Syria’s separation from the Ottoman Empire until the pre-civil war period, the Kurdish population remained politically powerless and largely isolated due to various social, geographical, political, and administrative factors. However, the civil warprovided an opportunity for them to emerge as an active force. I wanted to analyze and explain the “multiplier effect” that enabled this transformation.
Mustafa Ekici: When we examine the political organizations established by Syrian Kurds, the scale of their political presence appears disproportionate to their historical and demographic reality in Syria. In your book, you highlight both external and internal factors influencing this phenomenon—such as the Ottoman administrative system’s careful handling of Kurdish tribal structures, imperialist interventions, the policies of the French mandate administration, as well as Kurdish migration and political activities in regional countries. Given the existence of dozens of parties spanning the entire political spectrum, what is the source of this remarkablediversity in Kurdish political organizations and activism in Syria? Furthermore, how do you interpret the transformation of this political pluralism into a single dominant voice underPYD rule in recent years?
İbrahim Aydın: Fundamentally, the emergence of Kurdish political movements in Syria is not a new phenomenon. Even before the civil war, there had long been a Kurdish movement shaped by its internal dynamics and influenced by regional developments. However, it is difficult to say that these movements were well-organized or strong structures. Rather, they presented a fragmented, weak, and directionless appearance, lacking a clear and unified political vision.
Nevertheless, certain developments contributed to the political mobility and diversity withinKurdish politics. As is well known, after World War I and the redrawing of borders, a certain number of Kurds remained in Syria, which was placed under the French mandate. Additionally, following the suppression of uprisings in Türkiye during the 1920s and the establishment of the Hoybun Society in Beirut—then under Syrian control—in 1927, a wave of Kurdish migration to Syria took place.
Under the “policy of creating diversity,” the French accepted these migrants as Syrian citizens and, along with other minorities, granted them a disproportionately large share of positions in the military and police. This arrangement continued without major issues for a short time after the French left the country. However, from the late 1950s onward, with the rise of theBaathists and the surge of Arab nationalism, various restrictions were imposed on the Kurds, including bans on Kurdish-language education and Kurdish publications.
In 1958, following the unification of Syria and Egypt to form the United Arab Republic, Arab nationalism surged dramatically. As a result, hundreds of Kurds, including high-ranking military officers, were expelled from the army. These developments played a crucial role in the politicization of the Kurds.
Subsequently, under the influence of the Iraqi KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party), the SyrianKurdish Democratic Party was founded. However, in 1960, its Secretary-General and several senior party members were arrested. Over time, the Syrian government increasingly viewedKurds as a threat to the country’s territorial integrity and Arab identity. This perception led to several restrictive policies, including:
•The redistribution of land owned by local Kurdish landlords in the agriculturally rich north eastern region, as part of a land reform program aimed at Arabizing the area.
•The 1962 census in Hasakah, which required proof of residency in Syria since 1935. As a result, approximately 120,000 Kurds lost their Syrian citizenship, effectively rendering them stateless.
These measures further fueled Kurdish political activism. Additionally, from the late 1970s onward, Kurdish political movements in Türkiye began to influence Syrian Kurds. In particular, the Syrian regime’s support for the PKK provided an opportunity for the organization to gain traction among Syrian Kurds.
All these factors shaped the political structures of Syrian Kurds, leading to the emergence of numerous parties, even though they were not ideologically or politically distinct from one another.
As for the transformation of this political pluralism into a single dominant voice under PYD rule, several key factors contributed:
1.The most significant factor is that the PYD was built upon the influence network established by the PKK, which, since 1979, had positioned itself as the dominant Kurdish political force in the region through the support of the Syrian regime.
2.The weakness and fragmentation of other Kurdish parties in Syria made the incapable of attracting widespread Kurdish support, creating an opportunity for the PKK/PYD to consolidate its power.
3.The Syrian regime’s initial support for the PYD, especially at the beginning of the civil war, helped it establish dominance over Kurdish regions.
4.The direct involvement of the United States in the conflict and its military and political support for the PYD/YPG further strengthened its position, ultimately making it the undisputed leader among Syrian Kurdish factions.
As is well known, Hafez al-Assad, due to structural disputes with Türkiye, such as the Hatay issue and water resources, provided a significant operational space for the PKK terrorist organization in Syria from 1979 onward, allowing the group to survive at a time when it wasnearly eliminated in Türkiye.
By permitting the PKK to organize among the Kurdish population in Syria—for both strategic and other reasons—the Syrian regime enabled the group to develop new organizational models in the region and facilitated recruitment efforts.
Although the PKK lost direct support from the Syrian regime in the early 2000s, following improvements in Türkiye-Syria relations, it continued its activities in Syria through the PYD, a front organization established among Syrian Kurds.
In this context, the PYD—unlike the fragmented and ideologically inconsistent Kurdish parties—managed to expand its base and exert greater influence over the Kurdish population, despite its inability to formulate a clear and unified political discourse for many years.
During the civil war, the PYD was the only Kurdish group that enjoyed the privilege of direct support from the Syrian regime. From the very beginning of the conflict, the PYD leveraged this support to establish councils in Kurdish-populated areas, open language schools and cultural centers, and expand its network of party offices, creating a significant space for propaganda and mobilizing support.
Additionally, the PYD was the only Kurdish group with an armed wing, which allowed it to expand its influence and consolidate control more effectively than other Kurdish factions.
While other Kurdish parties struggled to establish a unified organization or coalition, the PYD both clashed with some of these parties and positioned itself as the defender of Kurdish rights. At the same time, it managed to control Kurdish discontent toward the Assad regime byportraying itself as an advocate for Kurdish interests and filling the administrative and security vacuum left by the state, thereby gaining further legitimacy.
The most decisive factor, however, came in 2014, when the United States directly intervened in the Syrian civil war and began supporting the PYD/YPG under the pretext of fighting ISIS (DAESH). This elevated the PYD/YPG to an unrivaled position among Kurdish groups, solidifying its dominance in northern Syria.
Ultimately, the political pluralism that had characterized Syrian Kurdish groups for many years has now transformed into a singular dominance under PYD rule, supported by both local and global power centers.
Kurds do not live solely in Türkiye, nor are imperialist plans and external influences targeting them limited to Türkiye alone. Moreover, developments driven by internal Kurdish dynamic shave a significant potential to interact with and influence neighboring countries.
For this reason, our research also covers the surrounding countries where Kurds reside. However, we have prioritized Syria in particular due to the recent conclusion of the civil war and its direct consequences for the Kurdish population in Syria.
Mustafa Ekici: In your book, you describe the Ottoman administrative system’s approach to ward the Kurds as “ruling by uniting.” Could you elaborate on this concept?
İbrahim Aydın: I believe the best way to explain the concept of “ruling by uniting” is by contrasting it with its opposite—the “divide and rule” policy.
The divide and rule strategy is a policy aimed at weakening a state, a region, or a people by fragmenting them, making them easier to control. Within this framework, if ethnic, cultural, or religious differences exist within a society, they are exploited and used to incite conflict. If such differences do not exist, discord is deliberately introduced to create divisions. Once the sefactions are formed, external actors infiltrate and manipulate the divided groups to serve their own interests. (This is closely related to the well-known “Controlled Tension” strategy.)
Additionally, this technique involves controlling different interest groups that might collectively resist authority, preventing them from organizing effectively against the ruling power.
The divide and rule strategy, which has been used since the Roman era as a method to eliminate small states, can be seen as an imperialist project or action aimed at making entire regions easier to dominate and absorb.
In the 19th century, this strategy was extensively applied during the formation of colonial empires, where it was used to foster animosity between different ethnic and tribal groups in Asia and Africa, making them easier to govern.
At the end of World War I, the artificial drawing of national borders in the Middle East, without regard for ethnicity, tribal affiliations, religion, or language, led to the creation of multi-ethnic states prone to fragmentation—a direct result of this strategy.
Today, ongoing imperialist strategies aimed at redrawing borders in the Middle East still follow a divide and rule model, whether it is called Neocolonialism or New Imperialism. In this modern form, instead of relying on direct military or political control, this strategy employs capitalism, globalization, and cultural imperialism to influence and manipulate developing nations.
Professor Teoman Duralı, in his analysis of the divide and rule strategy, explains how theBritish-Jewish education system was used to disrupt the Ottoman Empire’s social and national cohesion, ultimately weakening its unity and integrity. He argues that the same method wasapplied to various cultures and civilizations, leading to their gradual erosion and collapse.
As an example, he cites India, where the British employed a dual strategy:
•On one hand, they granted privileges to the upper castes.
•On the other hand, they indoctrinated the lower castes with the Christian theological idea that, since all humans were created in the image of Jesus, there should be nodis crimination among them.
The ultimate goal of this manipulative approach was to divide Indian society and prevent it from uniting against colonial rule.
Based on this perspective, “ruling by uniting” can be defined as an approach that aims to eliminate internal discord that exploits social differences—if any—thus protecting a society from the weakness caused by division and ensuring its unity. This approach can be seen as a necessity for security and stability, but at times, it may also be based on pragmatic considerations. In fact, the concept of “ruling by uniting” as presented in our book contains a degree of pragmatism.
For instance, in the work we referenced—Hakan Özoğlu’s “Kurdish Nationalism in theOttoman Empire”—it is noted that the primary reason behind the Ottoman Empire’s adoption of this policy was its need for the support of Kurdish nobles, who sought to legitimize the irrule by tracing their lineage back to Arab ancestors.
A notable example of this can be found in Şerefname, where the ruling family of Cizre claimed to be descendants of Khalid ibn al-Walid, while the leaders of Çemişgezek andHakkari traced their ancestry back to the Abbasid dynasty.
Mustafa Ekici: The 12-point action plan drafted by a Baathist intelligence officer in 1963 contained implementation recommendations that were considered quite radical for that period. It is believed that intelligence-driven provocations, such as the Amuda cinema fire and the Qamishli stadium incidents—which had severe traumatic effects on the Syrian Kurdish community—were used to terrorize the Syrian Kurds. Could you explain the impact of such practices and provocations by the Baath regime on the political structures of Syrian Kurdish organizations?
İbrahim Aydın: The events mentioned in the book are referenced in general terms, as they have been passed down over time and as they appear in sources, without delving into their absolute historical accuracy or the question of who was right or wrong in these incidents. As you can appreciate, analyzing these events in detail within this book was neither possiblenor the book’s primary objective.
Our main aim here is to highlight how internal developments have been used as material for political Kurdish propaganda, turning them into a driving force for the politicization of Kurdish identity. Moving the discussion toward the claim that Kurds were systematically terrorized through provocations represents a much more advanced stage of interpretation.
The key point here is that these events did not merely contribute to identity-based politicization within Kurdish society. Rather, they were instrumental in shaping Kurdish identity as a main oppositional force against the ruling regime.
In fact, this phenomenon is not unique to Syria; similar processes have been observed in all countries where Kurds live, following the same political trajectory.
This issue also highlights the internal dynamics within the broader scope of political Kurdish activism, beyond the influence of imperialist powers, which act as the pioneers and patrons of Kurdish nationalism.
In this context, rather than limiting the discussion to external imperialist motives, it is essential to also consider how domestic developments were transformed into propaganda material by political actors and became a primary tool for perception management.
As a result of the Syrian regime’s repression and infiltration efforts, Kurdish parties in Syria became increasingly divided and fragmented. Additionally, during the civil war, the exclusion of Kurds by Arab opposition forces further contributed to this fragmentation.
These factors played a significant role in making Iraq- and Türkiye-based Kurdish organizations and parties more appealing to Syrian Kurds, leading many to gravitate toward these external structures.
Mustafa Ekici: From your book, it is evident that almost all Kurdish organizations in linked to parties and movements established in Iraq and Türkiye. How do you interpret this deep dependency of Syrian Kurds on Kurdish political movements in Iraq and Türkiye?
İbrahim Aydın: This issue can be analyzed chronologically.
At the beginning of the last century, before some Kurdish nationalists from Türkiye migrated to Syria, there was hardly any political Kurdish national consciousness among Syrian Kurds. However, following the Kurdish uprisings during Türkiye’s War of Independence and later the suppression of the Sheikh Said Rebellion after the establishment of the Republic, someleading Kurdish tribal figures and members of Kurdish clubs in Istanbul—who no longer feltsafe in Türkiye—moved to Syria.
As a result of the cultural movements initiated by these individuals, Kurdish identity awareness grew in Syria, and Kurdish symbols and identity markers began to be embraced.
The most significant outcome of the political reorganization efforts initiated by the seind ividuals in Syria was the establishment of the Hoybun Society in cooperation withArmenian groups, supported by Britain and France.
Aiming to establish an independent Kurdish state, Hoybun provided many Kurds with a political identity and helped lay the foundation for a homegrown Syrian Kurdish cultural and political movement.
From the late 1950s onward, the Iraqi KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) began exerting influence over Syrian Kurds. The tensions between Arab nationalists and Kurds, which started in the mid-1950s and have persisted to the present day, created an opportunity for the IraqiKDP to play an active role in the political struggle of Syrian Kurds.
Indeed, under the influence of the Iraqi KDP, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party (SyrianKDP) was founded in 1957. However, due to regime pressures and internal divisions, the first official split occurred in 1965, and subsequently, over ten different Kurdish parties emerged, all breaking away from the original Syrian KDP.
Since these Kurdish parties were considered illegal in Syria, they began conducting their political activities in the Iraqi Kurdish region from 1991 onward.
Following the Qamishli incidents in 2004, a wave of Kurdish migration from Syria to northern Iraq took place. These Kurdish refugees were settled in two separate camps near the city of Duhok, where their administration and security were overseen by the KurdistanRegional Government (KRG).
From this point onward, the KDP sought to strengthen its influence over Syrian Kurdish affairs, and its efforts to unify Kurdish political factions under a single umbrella led to the establishment of the Kurdish National Council (KNC) in October 2011. This was largely the result of the KDP’s initiatives.
Likewise, during the Syrian civil war, the KDP continued to organize Syrian Kurds who had fled to northern Iraq.
The second Türkiye-based influence that shaped identity-driven politics among Syrian Kurds began with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan’s arrival in Syria in 1979 and continued into the2000s through the PYD. We have already discussed these influences in general terms above.
However, it would not be accurate to attribute this dependence solely to the activities of theIraqi KDP and the PKK/PYD. Several other factors contributed to this dynamic, including:
•The Syrian regime’s repression and infiltration of Kurdish political parties, leading to internal divisions and conflicts.
•The exclusion of Kurds by Arab opposition forces during the Syrian civil war, which further pushed Syrian Kurds toward Iraq- and Türkiye-based Kurdish organizations.
While it was reasonable to speak of a dependency on external Kurdish movements until recently, it can now be argued that Syrian Kurds have gradually gained the capacity to act more independently.
This, in turn, could provide an opportunity for Syrian Kurds to feel more integrated withinSyria and to focus on finding a solution within the framework of Syria’s territorial integrity.
Mustafa Ekici: You argue that, historically, Syrian Kurds have been a relatively small and“peaceful” minority and that, unlike Kurdish organizations in other countries, they have not established political or armed groups with maximalist claims. How do you explain the existence of the PYD within this framework?
İbrahim Aydın: Indeed, before the Syrian civil war, aside from internal factors specific to the Kurdish population, state-driven policies played a significant role in shaping Kurdish political behavior. Measures such as the resettlement of Arab populations among Kurds to alter the demographic balance and other strategic economic and social policies led the majority of Kurds to adopt an approach that was not separatist but rather oriented to wardmaintaining close relations with the central government. Consequently, there was no significant armed Kurdish movement in Syria.
While this situation may appear paradoxical when compared to the existence of the PYD, it is essential to emphasize one key fact: the PYD is not a Syrian organization. It was neither founded by Syrian Kurds nor governed by them. The decision to place a Syrian figure at its helm was purely a strategic choice by the PKK.
The evolution of Syrian Kurds and the PYD into a militarized political force is precisely whatthis book defines as the “Multiplier Effect”—a combination of imperialist interventions and internal dynamics that transformed the political landscape.
However, it would also be incorrect to say that Syrian Kurds had never previously expressed political demands. As discussed earlier, certain key developments played a dominant role in the politicization of Syrian Kurds. While these demands did not necessarily advocate separatism, they did emphasize identity-based political rights.
At this point, we can highlight two key events that had a strategic impact on Kurdish political demands in Syria:
1.The Qamishli incidents of 2004
2.The events of July 19, 2012, when Kurdish parties—primarily the PYD—seized control of Ayn al-Arab (Kobani), followed by the rapid takeover of several other towns and cities within a few days.
One of the most significant outcomes of the Qamishli incidents was that some Kurdish youths began forming underground organizations, preparing for armed struggle for the first time. In this context, we can mention two organizations that were established in March 2005:
1.The Kurdish Youth Movement
2.The Kurdistan Freedom Movement
In particular, the Kurdistan Freedom Movement initiated armed actions in March 2008 and was reportedly responsible for killing several members of the Syrian Police and IntelligenceService.
Apart from the Kurdistan Freedom Movement, which became the first Kurdish group in Syria’s history to engage in armed struggle against the regime, no other Kurdish parties had ever pursued military confrontation.
In fact, the formation of the YPG can also be traced back to the anti-government demonstrations of 2004. However, the YPG’s official establishment was only declared later, during the Syrian civil war, after regime forces withdrew from Kurdish-populated areas andYPG units moved into government buildings and administrative centers.
The most crucial outcome of the second major event (July 19, 2012, Ayn al-Arab takeover) was that it laid the foundation for the long-term goal of establishing a Kurdish region in Syria.
Thus, the existence of the PYD and the impact it has created can be understood within this broader historical and political framework.
Mustafa Ekici: How did the Syrian Kurds respond to and participate in the uprisings against the Baath regime? Could you explain how their stance evolved throughout the process?
İbrahim Aydın: When the protests began in March 2011, the Kurdish population initially adopted a cautious approach. The main reason for this was the uncertainty surrounding the identity of the opposition and its strategy toward the Kurds.
It has been argued that the Arab opposition’s failure to sufficiently address Kurdish demands for a decentralized political system alienated Kurdish parties from the main opposition groups.
Nevertheless, during March and April 2011, demonstrations were held in Qamishli, Amuda, Dirbasiya, Derik, and Serekaniye in solidarity with protests in other parts of the country. However, since these demonstrations did not generally involve violent clashes, they did not attract much attention.
Some analysts have disputed the perception that Kurds remained distant from the earlyprotests. According to this view, Kurdish political actors reacted differently to protests in Arab-majority regions. However, Bashar al-Assad’s decision in early April to grant citizenship to stateless Kurds—announced through a decree on April 7, 2011, granting citizenship to all ajanib (foreigners)—was a clear attempt to pacify the Kurdish regions, and this move initially weakened the momentum of Kurdish protests.
The most striking aspect of this period was the regime’s tolerance toward protests in Kurdish regions. Although Kurds did participate in the demonstrations that helped spark the uprising in Syria, the Assad regime displayed significant leniency toward them.
Unlike other opposition strongholds, Kurdish-populated areas were not subjected to the regime’s large-scale, destructive attacks. This relative immunity not only made these regions safer compared to other conflict zones but also provided Kurdish groups with an opportunity to strengthen their position and expand their influence.
In reality, unlike the broader Syrian opposition, Kurds lacked a strong political movement and leadership capable of directing them at the beginning of the uprising. However, despite being based outside Syria, the PKK and KDP—due to their organizational structures and historical influence over Syrian Kurds—were able to quickly assert control over Kurdish communities through their affiliated groups.
Additionally, the Kurds’ distrust of Sunni Arabs and their initial reluctance to engage in armed struggle worked in favor of both the PYD and the KDP. As a result, both groups seized the opportunity to fill the political vacuum, positioning themselves as the primary forces guiding the Kurdish population.
The new conditions that emerged in Syria, particularly the regime’s withdrawal from Kurdish-populated areas, created a power vacuum that led to profound changes in Kurdish politics. This situation allowed Kurdish political movements to step into the legitimate political arena and take more confident steps toward securing Kurdish rights.
In fact, these circumstances presented an unprecedented opportunity not only for Kurds to assert their own rights but also to gain political influence within the country’s broader political landscape. However, every step taken in this direction was perceived as separatismby non-Kurdish opposition groups.
This negative perception was largely shaped by the well-known separatist agenda of thePKK/PYD. Nevertheless, the Arab opposition’s rejection of Kurdish demands ultimately pushed Kurds away from active participation in mainstream opposition groups. As a result, they gravitated toward forming an independent Kurdish political bloc, aimed at representing and protecting Kurdish interests.
During the Syrian civil war, as various coalitions and political formations emerged, the PYD and KDP played a decisive role in shaping the Kurdish struggle. These two groups formed the backbone of alliances among Kurdish organizations, positioning themselves as the dominant forces in Kurdish politics.
By the fifth year of the civil war, Syrian Kurds had split into two major blocs:
•On one side, the Kurdish National Council (KNC), led by the KDP.
•On the other, the Democratic Society Movement (TEV-DEM), with the PYD as itsmain component.
Additionally, at the beginning of 2016, a third independent Kurdish bloc was formed—theKurdish National Unity Coalition (Independents)—which brought together five differentSyrian Kurdish parties.
Among these groups, the PYD emerged as the dominant force, primarily because it was the only faction with an armed structure. Initially, it benefited from the regime’s support, and later, it gained backing from the U.S.-led coalition under the pretext of fighting ISIS.
Ultimately, in March 2016, under the leadership of TEV-DEM, which operated under its control, the PYD declared a political entity called the “Democratic Federation of Rojava andNorthern Syria.” With this move, it began to function as an independent opposition force within its own autonomous region.
Mustafa Ekici: Could you explain the “canton” system established by the PYD in Syria? What kind of effects will this system have on the structure of Syrian Kurdish society in the short and medium term?
İbrahim Aydın: As is well known, when the term canton is mentioned, Switzerland comes to mind first. Thus, the concept has become closely associated with the Swiss administrative-political system. However, canton-based governance or autonomy is not exclusive to Switzerland; it is also implemented in countries such as Bolivia, France, CostaRica, and Bosnia-Herzegovina as an administrative division model.
In this sense, there is no single, uniform model of canton governance. For example:
•In Switzerland, cantons function as part of a federalist system.
•In France, cantons are administrative units integrated into a highly centralized state structure.
Despite these differences in practice, the canton concept is generally defined as an administrative division associated with decentralization, local autonomy, and federalism. It prioritizes local governance, democracy, and autonomy over centralized state institutionalization.
In Switzerland, which is considered a successful model of canton governance, four official languages (German, French, Italian, and Romansh) are spoken. Since there is no single Swiss nation based on a common ethnicity or language, the local autonomy and cultural pluralismprovided by the cantonal system and strong federalism are widely regarded as the key factors maintaining national unity.
However, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the canton system was introduced after a bloody ethnic waras a way to ensure power-sharing between Croats and Bosniaks. Instead of fostering unity, it has deepened ethnic divisions, entrenched political identities along ethnic lines, and left little room for non-ethnic political or social movements.
Therefore, it would be incorrect to assume that cantonal governance is a universal solution that always promotes cultural pluralism and democracy under all conditions.
For the Middle East, the Lebanese model has often been cited as an example of a cantonal system. In this system, government positions are distributed among representatives of specific ethnic and religious communities according to fixed quotas. While this model was supposedly designed to reduce sectarian tensions and ensure power-sharing, in reality, it has compartmentalized ethnic and religious groups, reinforcing their isolation from one another.
The ethnicization or sectarianization of democracy in this manner makes political demands that go beyond cultural identities invisible, solidifies ethnic-religious identities, isolates the secommunities within themselves, and greatly reduces interaction and mobility between different groups.
When it comes to the cantons established by the PYD in northeastern Syria, although their governance structure appears to include a Legislative Council (Parliament), an ExecutiveCouncil (Government), and a Justice Commission (Judiciary)—along with additional bodies such as the High Election Commission and the Constitutional Court—a closer look at the irorigins and operational methods reveals that they cannot be compared to existing decentralized or autonomous governance models worldwide in terms of participation and local self-rule.
For instance, the primary function of these canton administrations has been defined as implementing and enforcing the decisions made by the Democratic Society Movement (TEV-DEM), which serves as the social arm of the PKK-KCK system established in Syria. This means that these cantons were created to serve the system imposed by an external organization—namely the PKK/KCK—rather than being an organic or locally driven governance model.
Furthermore, the Kurdish population in the region makes up less than 20% of the total population, meaning that the system itself is disconnected from the region’s broader demographic reality. In fact, these cantons have not been widely accepted by the local population. To address this lack of legitimacy, efforts were made to include religious and ethnic minorities in the governing structures by assigning them nominal representation, in an attempt to create a more balanced and inclusive image for the administration.
Beyond all this, the new Syrian administration has consistently emphasized that it will never allow any autonomous structures within Syria. Therefore, it can be predicted that this systemwill have no lasting presence or influence on the future of Syria or the Kurds.
The canton model is often presented as a system designed to reduce ethnic and religioustensions and ensure power-sharing. However, in practice, it fully confines political representation to ethnic and religious groups, effectively compartmentalizing them within the political system.
The ethnicization or sectarianization of democracy in this manner renders broader political demands invisible, solidifies ethnic and religious identities, isolates these groups with in themselves, and significantly reduces social and political fluidity between different communities.
Mustafa Ekici: You describe the PYD’s disproportionately large and overgrown structure—one that has established territorial control over nearly half of Syria’s landmass despite its geographic, demographic, and economic limitations—as “the Kurds‘ test with terrorism.” Initially appointed as a proxy force by the Assad regime in the early stages of the Syrian uprising, and later deployed as the ground force of the U.S. and the international coalition in the fight against ISIS, how would you assess the PYD-led political structure’s relationship with Syrian Kurdish society? What are its mechanisms for generating legitimacy and publicconsent, and what are its prospects for long-term continuity?
İbrahim Aydın: The relationship between the PYD and Syrian Kurds is directly tied to its inheritance of the PKK’s network and influence. Therefore, to fully understand the PYD’sposition, we must first examine how the PKK built its relationship with Syrian Kurds.
The PKK’s presence and expansion among Syrian Kurds dates back to the 1980s and 1990s, when the Syrian regime allowed the organization to establish itself among Kurdish communities. Taking advantage of this privilege, the PKK expanded its influence over SyrianKurds throughout the 1990s, structuring the population into separate factions—women, youth, and children—and completing its Front Organization model. Through these youthorganizations, the PKK managed to recruit large numbers of militants into its armed units.
The largest recruitment base for the PKK within Kurdish society consisted of families of those who had either died in combat or were actively engaged in armed struggle.
Additionally, during the 1980s and 1990s, Syrian Kurdish parties failed to present a compelling and well-defined political project for Kurdish communities, leaving a vacuum that the PKK was able to fill. This allowed the PKK to organize effectively, recruit militants, and establish a strong financial network.
This dynamic continued until 1998, when Öcalan and PKK militants were expelled fromSyria. However, the organizational structure and influence the PKK had built were later transferred to the PYD in the 2000s, allowing it to maintain and expand its control overSyrian Kurds.
Until the Syrian civil war, the PYD did not operate with the same level of intensity or influence as the PKK in previous decades. However, with the outbreak of the war and the”proxy rule” arrangement you mentioned, the PYD found itself with an unprecedented opportunity.
Moreover, the Syrian civil war brought Kurds closer together emotionally and politically. Despite this, the PKK/PYD—having secured backing from both the Assad regime and theU.S.-led coalition—pursued a strategy of total dominance in the region. Instead of fostering cooperation among Kurdish groups, it sidelined and even declared other Kurdish factions as enemies, making any form of Kurdish political collaboration impossible.
As a result, there was a significant wave of Kurdish migration from Kurdish-populated areas, while those who remained became deeply divided. The entire society was militarized, and thousands of young Kurdish fighters lost their lives in combat.
Meanwhile, educational, cultural, and other social activities were reduced to near zero. Not only were unity, solidarity, and collective decision-making severely damaged, but hope forthe future was also nearly extinguished.
Furthermore, numerous human rights violations committed by the PYD have been documented in reports by various international organizations. These violations include:
•Forcing opposition-aligned Kurds into displacement by burning their lands and compelling them to flee.
•Acts of repression, including killings, kidnappings, arbitrary detentions, and executions targeting opposition Kurdish figures.
•Torture of detained activists in PYD-run facilities.
•Violence against women and children, including the recruitment of child soldiers.
•Collaboration with Syrian regime militias and intelligence agencies.
Given all these factors, it is difficult to argue that the PYD-led political structure has successfully built a legitimate and consent-based relationship with the entire Syrian Kurdish population.
The fact that hundreds of thousands of Kurds have fled PYD-controlled areas, seeking refugein Iraq and Türkiye, is perhaps the clearest indicator of this situation.
However, it must also be acknowledged that, despite these challenges, the PYD remains an influential actor among Syrian Kurds, largely due to:
•The military and political support it has received from the United States.
•The internal dynamics it has consolidated over the years.
That said, this influence is highly fragile, particularly due to its dependence on the PKK andits ongoing legitimacy crisis.
If the PYD experiences any significant loss of power, it is likely that the entire balance of power in northern Syria will shift dramatically.
Mustafa Ekici: Do you consider the Kurdish presence in Syria a political and military threat from Türkiye’s perspective? Additionally, could you analyze the recent “process” debates in Turkish politics by focusing on the Syrian Kurds?
İbrahim Aydın: My nature and beliefs do not allow me to harbor hostility toward any individual or group solely based on their identity. No one is inherently a monster because of their identity, nor is any other identity our executioner. Acting under such paranoia would only lead one to become an oppressor themselves.
Reason and conscience dictate that we must seek ways to coexist and stand together. This is not only the most effective but also the least costly and most definitive approach to solving conflicts.
Beyond this general perspective, I personally believe that Türkiye should develop both direct and indirect relations with Syrian Kurds and increase dialogue. In this regard, I also think thatTürkiye should support the proper integration of Kurds into the new Syrian system.
Regarding the relationship between Türkiye’s internal “process” debates and Syrian Kurds, we can assess it as follows:
It is clear that the instrumentalization of Syrian Kurds by the PKK/PYD under imperialist motives—with the aim of neutralizing Syria as a threat to imperialist interests in the region—will bring no benefit to either Syrian Kurds or Syrian society as a whole.
If Syrian Kurds continue to be used as a tool in regional imperialist plans through the PYD, negative repercussions for Türkiye will be inevitable.
Therefore, rather than waiting for developments in Syria to impact Türkiye domestically, Türkiye has sought to initiate internal developments that will, in turn, influence Syria.
If the “process” succeeds and the PKK disarms and dissolves, then the PYD will also break free from PKK influence. Consequently, the PYD will find it easier to reposition itself as a genuine Syrian political party, viewing Syria as a whole rather than as a fragmented entity.
At the same time, I do not see Türkiye’s approach to the new process solely as a maneuver targeting Syria. Instead, I believe this is a strategic initiative driven by the recognition that both domestic conditions and the international climate are now conducive to resolving a chronic issue.
Mustafa Ekici: The geopolitical balance within the Iran-Russia axis has shifted suddenly dueto the capacity losses and strategic distractions both countries have faced in the Ukraine andIsrael wars. As a result, key actors that previously relied on this balance—most notably theAssad regime and Hezbollah—are gradually being pushed off the stage. Given this changing dynamic, how do you assess the likelihood of the YPG maintaining its position on the ground?
İbrahim Aydın: It is clear that the YPG, in its current form, cannot remain on the stage for long. How sustainable can the presence of a group that has settled for acting as the U.S.’soil guardian in the region really be?
Therefore, I believe that the future of the YPG depends on whether it can break free fromPKK influence and control and seek a reasonable place for itself within Syria’s territorial integrity.
Mustafa Ekici: How do you foresee the future process in Syria? As a major regional power, how should Türkiye assess the risks and opportunities that a new Syria will bring? Where do you position the Syrian Kurds within this equation?
İbrahim Aydın: All expectations regarding the reconstruction process in Syria share a common understanding: the process must be led exclusively by Syrians, guided by a peaceful, inclusive, and non-violent approach that prioritizes Syria’s territorial integrity, unity, and social cohesion.
In this sense, the way Syria’s reconstruction will unfold and how beneficial it will be for theSyrian people largely depends on the extent to which the actors driving this transformation aregenuinely Syrian.
At this point, it is also crucial to analyze which groups and external powers have been involved in the war and who has played a decisive role in shaping its outcome—and this is no secret.
It has become evident that Iran and Russia are not the ultimate decision-makers in Syria. Likewise, the U.S.’s PKK/YPG policy has collapsed, as the PKK/YPG is now in survival mode.
Meanwhile, Türkiye’s firm stance against developments that negatively impacted its national interests during the Syrian civil war—through military interventions and engagement with the opposition—has played a decisive role in shaping the current outcome.
However, this does not necessarily guarantee that Türkiye will have an equally influential role in Syria’s reconstruction.
If we recall that over a century ago, imperialist powers forcefully expelled us from the region, we can say with confidence that they will not willingly allow our return.
That being said, I must also emphasize that many of Türkiye’s strategic moves during the civil war were carried out despite opposition from these same powers.
The 61 years of Baathist authoritarian rule and 13 years of civil war have deeply exhausted and worn down the Syrian people. Today, people long for peace and stability.
Syria’s new leadership is working with a more moderate administration to rebuild a unifiedSyria. Nearly all internal factions have adopted a positive stance, and neighboring countries, particularly Türkiye and Arab states, are making efforts to support the new government with a similar approach.
All of this points to a significant foundation for progress, making it possible to look towardSyria’s future with cautious optimism.
We also hope that Western countries will genuinely commit to ensuring that Syria does not once again become a base for terrorism or a threat to its neighbors.
However, there is no doubt that caution, patience, and time are essential in navigating this process successfully.
A step has been taken toward a free and peaceful Syria west of the Euphrates. However, the last remaining obstacle in Syria’s path is the PYD/YPG’s terrorist presence east of theEuphrates.
While nearly all groups are making efforts to support the new administration, the PYD/YPG seeks to carve out a separate territory from Syria and even expand its control over more land.
The PYD/YPG—a group with limited support even among Kurds and a history of conflictwith Arab communities—insisting on a role in the new Syria will not only complicate the resolution process but also lead to new conflicts.
Therefore, it can be said that the inclusion and acceptance of Kurds in Syria’s reconstructiondepend on their ability to break free from the PKK/PYD’s influence and motivations.
Mustafa Ekici: Thank you very much for your time.
İbrahim Aydın: I also thank you once again and wish you health and well-being.