Regional Fracture and Türkiye’s Strategic Test

The conflicts in the Middle East cannot be understood through conventional military logic. This is because the primary target here is not territory or the regime, but the state itself. In this approach, the target is the functioning of the state—from infrastructure to energy systems and economic circulation. The increasing pressure on Iran must also be understood within this framework. As it becomes clear that regime change is not feasible in the short term, a longer-term and more attritional path appears to be being pursued. The target is no longer the regime, but the state’s capacity to function. The logic of this strategy is simple: If you cannot overthrow the state, you render it incapable of functioning. Therefore, the target is no longer the regime, but the state’s capacity to function.

A dysfunctional state gradually loses its legitimacy in the eyes of society and becomes more vulnerable to external intervention. This method is not new; it has been tried repeatedly in countries experiencing civil war. What is clear is that weakening the bond between the state and society, paralyzing economic life, and rendering daily life inoperable produces more lasting results than military success. Such erosion processes directly target not only political power but the state’s entire organizational capacity.

The Belt of Weak States: The New Design of the Regional Order

The natural consequence of this strategy is the emergence not of strong and autonomous states, but of weak, fragmented, and intervention-prone structures. The past twenty years clearly demonstrate this trend. The new Iraq model designed by the U.S. after the occupation is the most concrete example of this. Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan are the most prominent examples of this pattern. These countries share a common picture: a collapsed central authority and a fragmented central structure, multiple armed actors competing for dominance on the ground, and states open to external intervention… These are no longer exceptional cases; they are the new norm of the regional order.

This situation directly affects not only the targeted countries but also their neighbors. Because weak states generate costs for surrounding countries across many areas, from border security to economic stability. Migration flows, the mobilization of armed groups, and economic fluctuations are the most visible consequences of these costs. From this perspective, the issue is not limited to the internal balances of Iran or any other country. The real issue is what kind of state system will be established in the region: strong states capable of preserving their own capacity, or fragile structures open to external intervention?

The answer to this question will determine the future of all actors in the region.

The countries of the region face two fundamental options. They will either succumb to the spiral of insecurity and instability produced by weakening state structures, or they will create a common ground that will reverse this trend. Strengthening regional cooperation mechanisms and increasing coordination across areas ranging from security to the economy could play a critical role in this regard. Lasting stability is possible not only through external cooperation, but also by each country strengthening its own internal order, the rule of law, and an inclusive political structure.

Within this framework, countries that will support regional stability and break the cycle of fragility will come to the fore. Türkiye occupies a unique position within this new order with the steps it has taken in recent years, and its strategy of strengthening its internal capacity carries critical importance in terms of increasing its regional influence. Within this broader picture, while some countries are more affected by this process of fracture, others stand out thanks to their internal capacity.

Türkiye’s Distinctiveness: The Capacity to Manage Internal Challenges

Türkiye’s distinction lies in the fact that it is not a country that merely observes this process from the outside, but one that confronts it by managing its own internal transformation. President Erdoğan’s resolve to solve internal issues was interpreted by some circles as a “weakness,” even portrayed as a concession. Yet today, the opposite has emerged, and this experience has provided Türkiye with a critical advantage. In particular, the PKK issue was not merely a security problem for Türkiye. It was a structural issue that directly affected citizenship with equal rights, democratization, political functioning, and state capacity. Because the problem produced an impact that consumed the country’s resources, narrowed the political sphere, and deepened social fault lines.

Indeed, this resolve became one of the most critical factors enabling Türkiye to enter regional developments better prepared.

What is striking is that President Erdoğan was able to demonstrate a new “solution” will despite the setbacks of the previous process. Issues brought to the agenda within the scope of the new process—such as disarmament, the dissolution of the PKK, and social integration—directly affect not only internal security but also the state’s overall operational capacity. In short, Türkiye’s capacity to manage internal issues makes it more resilient, particularly in the face of the growing fragility in its surrounding region.

What is truly important here is the proper definition of the relationship between security and politics. For a long time, Türkiye treated these two domains as if they were alternatives to one another. However, a lasting solution requires politics to be the determining factor across all areas of governance and for these areas to be managed in a balanced manner. To understand this relationship, one must look at the connection between security and political initiatives. For instance, security policies are not sustainable unless supported by social legitimacy, and political initiatives can lead to fragility when the security dimension is neglected. Türkiye’s success lies precisely in managing this relationship in a healthy manner.

Syria: The Balance Between Power and Politics

Türkiye’s capacity for internal transformation found its most concrete and tested manifestation on the ground, particularly in Syria. This arena was not merely a field where military operations were conducted, but also the center of a multi-layered power struggle. States, proxy actors, and international powers were all present on the ground simultaneously. Within this complex structure, Türkiye employed both military and political tools together. This process significantly enhanced Türkiye’s crisis management capacity. However, transforming this experience into a lasting advantage is not possible through military successes alone.

Türkiye’s demonstrated resolve to resolve the PKK issue domestically has strengthened its determination to address the PKK problem in Syria through dialogue and integration mechanisms established with Damascus. Priorities such as Syria’s territorial integrity, border security, and an inclusive political process have largely been placed at the center of the agenda. However, the full realization of these goals requires a process. The direction of the steps taken is positive. The next stage is to consolidate the gains achieved on the ground through political solutions. The way forward lies in integrating all existing social structures in Syria into political processes and strengthening local legitimacy. To better understand the value of the current situation, it is useful to consider a counter-scenario.

What If Türkiye Had Been Caught Off Guard?

To better understand the picture that has emerged today, it is necessary to ask the following question: What would have happened if Türkiye had not initiated this process of internal and regional transformation? In that case, internal security gaps would deepen, creating an exploitable opening for external actors. The weakening of political stability would increase economic vulnerabilities, and Türkiye’s strategic room for maneuver in the region would be significantly narrowed. In other words, the relative advantage possessed today did not emerge on its own. This advantage is the result of steps taken toward resolving internal issues.

However, it is useful to raise a critical point at this stage. This is that the issue is not solely about laying down arms and dissolving the organizational structure. What is even more important is to carefully monitor the process and to demonstrate the determination to fulfill its requirements. Ultimately, Ankara’s current strategic room for maneuver is the product of steps taken in the past. A positive outcome of the process, in the sense discussed here, will increase Ankara’s capacity to be a determining actor in regional balances. In other words, the most critical issue in the coming period is to ensure the process is brought to a safe and stable conclusion.

Advantage or Vulnerability? Türkiye’s True Test

The most critical issue facing Türkiye is how the initiated internal transformation and resolution process will be completed. The cessation of hostilities or the reduction of security risks alone is not sufficient. For the process to become lasting, a strong legal framework and a comprehensive democratic transformation are essential. Legal regulations constitute the institutional foundation of the process. Because if such processes are left to personal initiatives or temporary policies, it is clear that certain risks may emerge in the long term. Precisely for this reason, it is important that the legal infrastructure be clear, inclusive, and sustainable.

Social integration cannot be overlooked either. Because laying down arms and organizational dissolution resolve only one dimension of the problem. The primary objective is to create an environment in which all segments of society can come together on a common political ground for the future of the country. This is possible through strengthening equal citizenship, justice, and mechanisms of democratic representation. Therefore, the democratic transformation of the state is not a choice but a necessity. Because there is a direct link between strong state capacity and social legitimacy. Let us not forget that a state that does not derive its legitimacy from the consent of the people weakens rapidly in times of crisis.

Developments in the Middle East present both serious risks and opportunities for Türkiye. However, transforming these opportunities into a genuine strategic advantage depends more on the success of the internal transformation process than on foreign policy moves. Türkiye is in a more prepared position today compared to the past. However, this position does not mean that the process has been completed on its own. On the contrary, it indicates that the most critical phase has begun. If Türkiye can complete its internal transformation process and consolidate its legal-democratic foundation, it can become an effective actor capable of managing the risks created by regional fractures. Otherwise, elements that appear to be advantages today may quickly turn into new vulnerabilities.

Ultimately, what is decisive is not what is happening externally, but how internal processes are completed and whether the necessary steps are taken. Türkiye’s true test lies in the answer it gives to this question: Will it remain an actor that observes regional fractures from the outside, or will it complete its internal transformation and gain the power to shape these fractures?