Post-Revolution Syrian Policy: Security, Ideology, or Politics?

Following the Syrian revolution and the leadership of Ahmed al-Shara, the debates in Turkey regarding Syria appear more as a reflection of ideological positions in Turkey than the reality on the ground. While international actors interpret the issue through the lens of security and capacity, the debate in Turkey is largely conducted based on ideological reflexes, the closeness established with the Assad regime, and domestic political calculations. However, the new political order that emerged in Syria after Assad is not merely a change of power. This order is a multi-layered transformation that simultaneously affects the balance of power in the Middle East, the strategic priorities of the West, and Turkey’s internal political debates. The broad international acceptance that Shara has received demonstrates that this transformation is shaped not ideologically, but to a large extent on pragmatic grounds.

The recognition of Shara by the United States, Russia, the European Union, the United Kingdom, China, and regional countries is not based on a presumption that the structure he represents has a democratic or liberal character. On the contrary, this recognition is the result of the perception that the structure led by Shara is the actor with the highest potential to generate state capacity in the power vacuum that emerged following the collapse of the Assad regime. In other words, the international system prioritized the capacity to produce order over ideological purity. Put differently, the core question is: “Who can establish order?” Because in Middle Eastern politics, the fundamental source of legitimacy is often not democratic representation but the ability to produce order. In geographies where the state has collapsed, the value of social actors is measured not by ideological “purity” but by the extent to which they can control chaos. Therefore, the international recognition of the new Syrian administration under Shara is a pragmatic endorsement of its capacity to build a state and bring about positive change.

 

Different Interpretations of Ahmed Shara

Discussions about Shara essentially proceed from two distinct mental frameworks. The difference between these two interpretations emerges not only in political preferences but also in the way reality is perceived. One is based on an ideological perspective, the other on a strategic one. The first perspective reflects the reading of the opposition in Turkey and those who identify themselves with the Assad regime. The second is the Western assessment of Shara. In fact, the difference between these two interpretative approaches also reveals the extent to which certain segments in our country use an ideological filter when evaluating events and actors.

It is not accurate to claim that security concerns alone are the determining factor behind the negative stance of the opposition in Turkey and those who associate themselves with Assad towards Shara. It is evident that a deeper and more historical concern plays a role in the positions taken by this segment. This reflex is not merely ideological; it also relates to the historical memory of Turkey’s modernization. For the Turkish left, actors in the Middle East who emphasize their Muslim identity are not only foreign policy actors but also symbolic extensions of the domestic debates on secularism.

There are two main sources of this fear. The first is the fear of the secular Republic being sociologically encircled in the Middle East. The second is the relationship and ideological affinity these groups have established with the Assad regime. From this perspective, a Salafi-rooted actor governing the Syrian state is not seen merely as a foreign policy issue but rather as a symbolic threat to the “modernization” project in Turkey. For this reason, the name Shara has, for some circles in Turkey, transformed from a foreign policy actor into a symbolic object in domestic political identity debates.

The approach of states toward Shara is realist. For Western actors, Shara’s ideological background is a secondary matter. What truly matters is his capacity to generate stability on the ground and his ability to reactivate the machinery of the state. For this reason, the West views Shara not as an “ideological actor,” but as a potential source of a manageable order. In other words, actors are evaluated based not on their ideological identities but on their strength and capacity in the field.

The tendency of the opposition in Turkey and those who identify with the Assad regime to evaluate actors based on what they represent rather than what they do has little equivalence in many other countries. In fact, the difference we are talking about leads to the same phenomenon being seen as a strategic necessity in the West and as an ideological threat in Turkey. What is particularly noteworthy here is that the strongest objections to Shara do not come from the West but from Turkey’s domestic politics. Some political actors have great difficulty accepting the new Syrian order. When assessing the new Syrian administration, they do not consider the oppressive, murderous, and torturous nature of the Assad regime. Instead, they choose to interpret and evaluate people based on their pasts. There are even those who express longing for the Assad regime, which was responsible for killing over a million people.

Assumptions Underlying Opposition to Ahmed Shara

This ideological reading is constructed upon three fundamental assumptions that shape the discourse and attitudes toward the new Syrian administration.

The first assumption is the treatment of Idlib-centered structures as a homogeneous bloc. The ideological and strategic differences between organizations are largely blurred within this discourse. The new administration in Syria is portrayed as a potential ISIS regime. Thus, the complex power dynamics on the ground are reduced to a simplistic category of “radicalism.” However, the actual situation on the ground reveals that there is both intense competition and deep divisions among radical organizations.

The second assumption involves the reproduction of security threats through historical traumas. The ISIS terrorist attacks that occurred in Turkey in recent years are directly associated with the new order in Syria, establishing a strong emotional connection. Interpretations suggesting that these acts were operations aimed at influencing Ankara’s Syria policy further reinforce this perception. This discourse produces a political language that mobilizes social memory, rather than providing an analytical security assessment.

The third assumption is the positioning of the new order in Syria as an absolute threat to Turkey. Yet the real paradox is this: while the structure Turkey has been fighting for years is now retreating on the ground, the actor who made this outcome possible is being coded as a threat within Turkey. Nonetheless, the distanced stance of some political actors in Turkey toward Shara can be explained more by ideological and political positioning than by security concerns. As a result, the new reality in Syria is interpreted not through the dynamics on the ground but through the ideological codes present within Turkey.

Being Trapped in Old Ideological Patterns

Considering the three fundamental assumptions discussed above, the core issue that emerges is the opposition’s attempt to interpret the new reality in Syria through old ideological templates rooted in Turkey. To this, one must also add the desire to gain short-term advantages in domestic politics. Ultimately, we are faced with a mindset confined to the narrow political molds of the past. Yet the transformation in Syria is neither a complete democratic advance nor an entirely radical regression. It is rather a pragmatic outcome of the search for order following chaos. However, the debates in Turkey fail to analyze this complex reality, reducing it instead to a simplistic good-versus-evil dichotomy.

In truth, the real question that should be asked is this: What matters more for Turkey—Shara’s ideological background, or the extent to which the new Syrian order aligns with Turkey’s security and regional interests? International actors have given a pragmatic answer to this question and clarified their positions. In Turkey, however, the same question is often debated under the shadow of domestic political calculations. Perhaps for this reason, there has been no confrontation with the massacres committed by the Assad regime, and efforts to deny the existence of the new Syrian administration have materialized in a disparaging language centered around the term “Coloni.”

At this point, it is also necessary to address the attitudes of certain actors outside of the main opposition. However, their stance is far more complex and contradictory. The attitude of those who overlook the massacres carried out by Iran in Syria in the name of Shiite expansionism and support the torture regime established by Assad can be explained not only by political rationality but also by identity-based and emotional dynamics. The similarity between the language used by certain circles aligned with the PKK and the rhetoric of this group is another subject of debate. Thus, the Syrian issue has become less a matter of foreign policy and more a mirror reflecting the ideological polarization within Turkey—a mirror that exposes the political and moral stance of those who support the Assad regime while hundreds of thousands of people are being massacred.

The Real Meaning of the Syrian Issue

In conclusion, the issue of Syria after Shara is not merely a matter of foreign policy—it is a renewed reflection of the tension between ideology, security, and politics within Turkey. Unless this tension is approached within an analytical framework, it will continue to produce new polarizations instead of solving problems. Within this framework, the core of the debate is not about Shara’s identity, but about the widening gap between ideology and reality in Turkey.

Post-Shara Syria is less a foreign policy issue for Turkey and more a mirror that compels it to reconsider its own political and ideological map. It is a debate about Turkey itself rather than about Syria. Therefore, interpreting the new reality in the Middle East through outdated concepts from Turkey generates reflexes, not analysis. On such a basis, it is impossible to produce rational and consistent policy. Ultimately, the debate on Syria after Shara is, in reality, a debate about Turkey more than about Syria.