Israel and Turkey are no longer feuding allies; they are strategic rivals
What began as a diplomatic rupture has hardened into a regional power contest with direct consequences for US strategy from Gaza to the Eastern Mediterranean and to the Horn of Africa.
For years, the Israeli-Turkish split was dismissed in Washington politics as diplomatic theatre concealing an underlying strategic partnership. Such an assessment no longer applies. Beginning early 2026, a line had been crossed in Israeli-Turkish relations, transforming diplomatic alienation into a strategic rivalry with ominous implications that now extend into US regional calculus.
The sudden regional change is not an inter-state dispute but a struggle for the region’s pecking order. Israel is determined to retain its supreme position as the uncontested military hegemon of the Middle East and the powerhouse in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Turkey is reasserting its newfound confidence, based on its economy, large population, strategic nexus for energy transit, and military power, to challenge it.
Gaza: Ideology meets strategy
The Gaza Strip remains the most turbulent fault line capable of dragging the entire region into a substantial conflict. Israel considers Hamas an existential threat and must be destroyed. In stark contrast, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has named Hamas a “liberation movement.” Hamas may become the spark that will ignite a major confrontation between Ankara and Tel Aviv, especially if Turkish forces become part of the International Stabilisation Force.
At the forefront of post-war scenarios, Ankara is promoting a governance formula led by Palestinians, including the political wing of Hamas. The red line imposed by Israel is absolute against any form of Turkish involvement, civilian or security, in the future Gaza government. The latest round of this dispute concerns international institutions. Turkey is now the foremost outspoken country for UNRWA, establishing a liaison office in Ankara in January 2026 following the stripping of the agency’s immunity by Israel. The split vision couldn’t be starker; where Israel sees the enforcement of security, Turkey perceives a defiance of international law.
Syria: A crowded battlefield without rules
Syria may soon become the most dangerous flash point between Israel and Turkey. The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 created a power vacuum rather than stability. A robust, Muslim-dominated regime with the ability to block Kurdish autonomy in its vicinity is what Turkey looks for in Syria. And in sharp contrast, a diminished and decentralized Syria with a weak army capable of impeding Iran’s influence in Damascus would satisfy Israel’s Syrian policy.
Both countries now operate inside Syria by proxy or aerial means in buffer zones. The danger is not war by design but by miscalculation: the drone strike, the mistaken convoy, or the clash of proxy forces already poised to confront state actors.
Gas, sea power, and the Eastern Mediterranean
Competition for energy resources has further intensified the rivalry by including a “maritime” element. Israel, Greece, and Cyprus remain committed to constructing the “EastMed Pipeline,” which will transport energy from east to west to bypass Turkey altogether. Ankara views the project as another move “to encircle” Turkey economically.
Israeli arms sales to Cyprus, including the Barak MX defense system, have added to the rising regional tension. It reminds the Turks of the S-300 missile crisis of the late 1990s. Further, it reinforces the impression that Israel is aligning itself with Turkey’s regional adversaries, Greece and Cyprus, to constrain Ankara’s power.
Lawfare & economic retaliation
But unlike past conflicts, this dispute has escalated into measurable acts. The Turkish trade boycott against Israel, imposed in May 2024, remains in effect, with only a trickle of government-to-government trade continuing. More significantly, Ankara’s move in late 2025 to issue warrants for the arrest of high-ranking Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Netanyahu, for war crimes. Regardless of whether they ever materialise, these warrants have made normal relations impossible because they are now politicized.
Somaliland
In late December 2025, Israel officially recognized Somaliland’s independence, becoming the first UN member to do so. This move directly challenges Turkey, which maintains a deep strategic alliance and its most extensive overseas military base in Mogadishu. President Erdoğan condemned the recognition as an “illegitimate” violation of Somali sovereignty, viewing it as a deliberate attempt to undermine Turkish influence in the Horn of Africa.
As Turkey prepares to begin offshore energy drilling in Somali waters in 2026, the Red Sea has become a predominant arena for this rivalry. Israel seeks a foothold in the Gulf of Aden to monitor Houthi activity, while Turkey aims to protect its maritime dominance and the territorial integrity of the Somali state. The Israeli recognition of Somaliland transforms a local secessionist issue into a high-stakes geopolitical confrontation between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
Why Washington should care
The confrontation between two of the US’s allies is structural, shaped by competing ideologies, and sustained by military power. Israel’s goal is protection against threats and the free rein to act unilaterally. Turkey aims to have its growing regional influence acknowledged. Both visions and policies are irreconcilable across all critical areas of American security interests.
The threat to Washington is not war between Israel and Turkey but a string of escalations that involve American allies, shatter the unity of NATO, and cloud the actions of the United States from Gaza to the Red Sea. The era when the United States expected a self-correcting cycle of Israeli-Turkish tensions is over. The new reality will require considerably more US attention and applied pressure on Ankara and Tel Aviv.