Is It Time for a Change in the Leading Actors in the Middle East?

Over the past two centuries, Middle Eastern politics has witnessed two significant shifts in its leading actors. The first of these transformations began in the late 19th century with the decline of the Ottoman Empire. During this period, Britain and France rose to a decisive position in regional politics. The second shift occurred after World War II, when the power vacuum created by the waning global influence of Britain and France was filled by the United States. Thus, the U.S. became the new leading actor in the Middle East and began to reshape the region’s political balance.

In studies analyzing the change of dominant actors in the region, the strong relationship between these transformations and military capacity is frequently emphasized. According to this approach, actors that are able to increase their military capacity gain a distinct advantage in rising to leadership in regional politics. Indeed, states that become dominant actors in the region also expand their access to regional resources. This is because the Middle East is a geography that harbors geopolitical, theopolitical, and geoeconomic opportunities capable of elevating a global actor to superpower status. However, although the impact of military capacity on the goal of becoming a leading actor is indisputable, reducing the transformation solely to this axis is insufficient. For the soft power dimension of the process, while not as decisive as military capacity, offers a complementary and crucial analytical framework.

The Political-Psychological Dimension of the Change in Leading Actors

The concept of soft power is defined as the capacity of an actor (a state, supranational structure, or large corporation) to shape the preferences of others through attraction and persuasion, without resorting to coercive means. Conceptualized by Joseph S. Nye, this type of power is nourished by three fundamental sources: culture (values and practices that generate appeal in domestic and international public opinion), political values and institutions (normative appeal such as the rule of law, democracy, and human rights), and foreign policy style (legitimacy, consistency, and multilateralism). Unlike hard power, soft power does not rely on military and economic coercion but rather on the construction of legitimacy, trust, and reputation. Ultimately, soft power provides actors with sustainable influence in international competition through their ability to generate consent and set the agenda.

The entry of colonial powers such as Britain and France into the Middle East, which had remained under Ottoman rule for nearly four centuries, did not occur through direct military force projection. Despite the political and economic instability and social unrest that emerged with the weakening of Ottoman administration, these countries gained significant influence in the region through the soft power they developed by promising economic development, political stability, and social welfare. Especially towards the end of the Ottoman era, anti-Ottoman nationalist movements began to turn toward Britain and France, believing that the values represented by these countries would make “unique contributions” to the future of the region.

The British and French mandate regimes institutionalized at the San Remo and Paris conferences in 1920 clearly demonstrated that these systems were incapable of meeting the aforementioned social demands. The colonial style of governance implemented by Britain in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine, and by France in Syria and Lebanon, provoked a marked sense of anger and backlash against these countries in the Arab Middle East. Throughout the 1920s, uprisings against the mandate administrations—particularly in Syria and Iraq—were expressions of this discontent.

During the same period, the socialist principles disseminated by the Bolshevik Revolution in the Soviet Union attracted attention among the region’s intellectual and political circles. As soon as the region’s major countries gained independence, they began turning toward Soviet influence. At the same time, socialism’s anti-imperialist rhetoric found significant social resonance in the region. This trend was a direct reflection of the accumulated resentment toward the mandate administrations. The Soviets’ “clean record,” having not yet acted as a colonial power in the region, also played a role in the masses’ turn toward socialist ideology. However, despite the broad social base that socialist ideology acquired in the region and the clear orientation of many regimes toward the Soviets, the Soviets failed to establish lasting and strong influence in the region.

The power vacuum created after World War I by the weakening of Britain and France and the Soviets’ inability to establish lasting influence was also closely linked to the perception of the United States’ “clean record.” In contrast to the colonial legacy of Britain and France, the U.S. initially stood out with its rhetoric of non-interference in the internal affairs of regional states and its approach of offering regional countries a fairer share of oil revenues. This stance served as a significant rationale and source of legitimacy that strengthened the U.S.’s political influence in the Middle East. Indeed, the British and French mandates began to be replaced by “equal” relationships between the U.S. and the regional states that gained independence after World War II.

After World War II, a deep-rooted sphere of influence based not on coercive tools but on U.S. soft power came to the fore in the region. During this period, the United States established a lasting sphere of influence by penetrating the mental landscape of Middle Eastern societies through elements of soft power such as culture, cinema, sports, foreign policy discourse, and lifestyle. The expansion of U.S. influence encouraged anti-Soviet bloc formation in regional countries and gradually created a political atmosphere in which the U.S. became virtually unrivaled across the region.

The Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion of a Muslim country like Afghanistan further strengthened anti-Soviet tendencies in the region. These anti-Soviet sentiments had already been supported by the U.S. During this process, the United States positioned itself as a “reliable ally” protecting Muslim countries against the Soviet invasion, thereby increasing its legitimacy and appeal in the region. In doing so, it succeeded in consolidating its soft power through strategic communication and alliance management, deepening its regional influence.

The erosion of U.S. soft power in the region did not take long, and by the early 2000s, this decline had become even more apparent. The invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks triggered deep political and economic crises in the region. This situation encouraged both the political elites and the societies in the region to search for new balances and common ground. In this context, the tendency to align more closely with China and Russia emerged as a natural extension of these pursuits.

However, in the 2010s, the wave of street uprisings that spread across the region and Iran’s moves to expand its ideological and political influence once again heightened the importance of U.S. relations in maintaining regional stability. Faced with an internal wave of uprisings and Iran’s maximalist, revisionist policies, regional countries repositioned the U.S. as a reliable counterbalancer and ally. This trend also resonated at the societal level. It can be argued that the region’s ethnic and sectarian divisions contributed to this societal support. Despite the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the perception of the U.S.’s cultural appeal and its role as a provider of security in the region remained above a certain threshold. As a result, although U.S. soft power experienced serious erosion in the early 2000s, the internal turbulence and Iran-driven regional competition dynamics that emerged in the 2010s once again rendered cooperation with the United States a rational and attractive option, both among political elites and at the societal level.

U.S. Influence in the Shadow of the Israeli Genocide

The erosion of U.S. soft power became visible once again in the late 2010s. During this period, one of the primary reasons for this erosion was the United States’ support for status quo actors in response to the social movements and demands for change known as the Arab Spring. The stance adopted after October 7 markedly accelerated this process. During this time, the U.S. provided almost unconditional political and military support for Israel’s maximalist demands and the genocide it carried out in Gaza. In addition to this support for the destructive operations in Gaza and the West Bank, the U.S. effectively approved attacks on Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Yemen that were considered to be in violation of international law, and at times even carried them out in coordination with Israel.

This approach severely eroded the normative legitimacy and soft power of the U.S. in the region. The accumulation of negative experiences over the past quarter century made the U.S. record even more contentious and paved the way for the strengthening of anti-American sentiment across the region. In particular, the failure of numerous ceasefire attempts and Israel’s continued attacks on Gaza despite the ceasefire declared on October 9 deeply shook confidence in the U.S. Ultimately, the course pursued by the United States in its regional policy not only accelerated but also entrenched the erosion of its soft power.

Backed by the political, economic, diplomatic, and military support of the U.S., Israel’s genocide in Gaza and its expanding attacks across the region visibly undermined U.S. normative legitimacy and soft power in the Middle East. Meanwhile, China’s pragmatic discourse centered on “peaceful coexistence” and its non-confrontational posture generated a new moment that shifted the balance of soft power in the region.

When the accelerated erosion of U.S. legitimacy following the events in Gaza is considered together with China’s non-interventionist, benefit-oriented pragmatism, a preference architecture emerges that prioritizes “stability and development” over “hard security.” This trend indicates a gradual shift in the balance of soft power in favor of China while also increasing the balancing capacity of countries in the region. However, whether this will evolve into a zero-sum transformation in which China completely replaces the U.S. remains a debated issue.

Indeed, recent developments offer concrete examples of these two contrasting approaches. While the U.S.’s position in supporting Israel’s direct attacks on Iran and Iranian proxy elements reinforces a security-centric and partisan stance, China succeeded in easing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia through diplomatic channels in Beijing in March 2024, thereby strengthening its profile as a “mediator, non-interventionist, and benefit-oriented” actor.

The ongoing power shift in the Middle East points to a new geopolitical reality shaped not by classic military rivalry, but by soft power. Throughout history, the region has served as a stage for global actors to test their legitimacy and appeal. In the second half of the 20th century, the United States rose to become the leading actor through the soft power framework it created with its promise of democratic values and development. However, in recent years—especially following the genocide in Gaza—its policies have caused this legitimacy to erode severely. The U.S. is now perceived not as a provider of security in the region, but as an actor that deepens the crisis. In contrast, China is increasingly becoming a center of attraction in the eyes of regional countries through its discourse of “peaceful coexistence,” “non-intervention,” and “mutual benefit.” China’s role in the Saudi Arabia–Iran reconciliation is a concrete example of this soft power strategy. While it seems unlikely that China will fully replace the U.S. in the near future, it is foreseeable that its balancing power in regional politics will grow. Therefore, the Middle East is no longer unipolar; it is transforming into a space of multi-centered power competition. In this new era, the actor that most effectively utilizes soft power will possess the capacity to shape the region’s political future.