Iraq PM Al-Sudani: Baghdad Is Ready for a New Chapter With Washington
Last November, millions of Iraqis cast their ballots in a free election, and my coalition won the highest number of votes of any list. That result was more than an electoral victory. It was a public endorsement of a difficult but necessary course: preserving Iraq’s stability through a period of extraordinary regional danger while building the foundations for stronger institutions and long-term economic renewal.
But elections alone do not define a government. Actions do. Over the past two-and-a-half years, through three cycles of regional escalation, my government kept Iraq out of war, protected international personnel on our soil and held the state together under conditions that tested every institution we have. At the same time, we brought ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP and GE Vernova back to Iraq with billions of dollars in new energy commitments, and attracted over $100 billion in investment. That record is the foundation of what I am proposing today.
That is why this is the right moment to redefine Iraq’s relationship with the United States.
For too long, Iraq has been viewed in Washington primarily through the lens of crisis: war, terrorism, armed group violence and regional rivalry. Those realities are part of our recent history, and some continue to shape our present. But they no longer tell the whole story. Iraq today is not simply a country to be managed when conflict escalates. It is a state that has demonstrated resilience under immense pressure and now offers strategic, economic and political value that the United States should recognize more clearly.
Since October 2023, when the war in Gaza triggered a wider cycle of regional escalation, my government has faced one overriding challenge: keeping Iraq from being drawn into a conflict not of its choosing. That demanded more than restraint. Armed groups launched attacks on American military positions from Iraqi territory. Regional powers exchanged fire. Public anger was intense, and pressure to escalate came from multiple directions. In such conditions, the easier outcome would have been drift, fragmentation and eventual collapse into another round of proxy conflict. That did not happen.
My government acted through direct engagement, security directives and sustained political management to prevent Iraqi territory from becoming an open arena for regional war. When fighting expanded between Israel and Iran in June 2025, Iraq made clear that its territory and airspace could not be used in attacks against neighboring countries. When the conflict intensified again with Operation Epic Fury in early 2026, the pressure multiplied. Missiles struck Gulf capitals. There were attacks against diplomatic missions and U.S. interests that underscored the volatility of the moment. Armed factions called for Iraq to enter the war. Yet even under those conditions, our objective remained the same: to contain escalation, protect Iraq’s stability and prevent the country from being drawn into a broader regional confrontation.
This was not passivity, nor was it the absence of danger. It was the exercise of sovereignty in the face of forces that sought to pull Iraq into a wider war.
Iraq understands, perhaps better than any country in the region, the cost of becoming a battlefield for the calculations of others. Our task was to protect Iraqis, preserve the state’s institutions and prevent the country from being consumed by a broader confrontation that would have endangered not only our own stability, but also the interests of our partners, including the United States.
That does not mean Iraq’s security challenges have disappeared. They have not. The Popular Mobilization Forces emerged in response to the threat of the Islamic State group (ISIS), and many Iraqis associate them with real sacrifice in a moment of national peril. But no serious state can accept a permanent fragmentation of authority. The long-term objective must be clear: a sovereign security order in which decisions over war, peace and the use of force rest firmly with the state.
My government has pursued that objective with realism, not illusion. We have strengthened oversight, channeled resources through formal institutions and resisted efforts to turn exceptional security arrangements into permanent alternatives to the state. Progress has been uneven, and the work remains unfinished. But Iraq’s direction must be unmistakable: toward stronger institutions, clearer legal authority and a more coherent national command structure. That direction should matter to every international partner that genuinely wants Iraq to succeed.
The economic record reinforces the case. Iraq has been rebuilding its economic position, and the scale of what has been achieved is visible in concrete terms. ExxonMobil returned to develop the Majnoon supergiant oil field, one of the largest in the world. Chevron signed a management agreement for West Qurna 2. BP activated a major contract covering four fields in Kirkuk. GE Vernova committed to adding 24,000 megawatts of electricity generation capacity. TotalEnergies and QatarEnergy are advancing a $27 billion integrated project in Basra spanning gas, solar and seawater treatment.
These are not gestures of goodwill. They reflect a larger shift. Iraq is becoming more competitive, more investable and more strategically relevant. My government has worked to improve contractual terms, restore confidence and create an environment in which long-term investment is possible. Companies do not return to a market of this scale out of sentiment. They return when they judge that stability is improving and that the state is serious about making partnership work.
That should matter in Washington. A country with the world’s fifth-largest proven oil reserves, occupying a pivotal geographic position at the center of trade and connectivity routes that will shape the region’s next phase, should not be treated as a secondary file in American policy. It should be understood as a strategic opportunity.
Iraq’s partnerships will remain broad. China is an important economic partner, particularly in the upstream sector, and that relationship will continue. But Iraq’s future cannot rest on dependence on any one external actor. Our long-term interests require diversified partnerships with the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, the Gulf and our wider neighborhood. That is not a balancing tactic for its own sake. It is the natural strategy of a country whose geography, economy and political position demand breadth rather than dependence.
That same logic applies to Iraq’s regional role. Few countries in the Middle East sustain working relations at once with Washington, Tehran, Riyadh, Ankara and the Gulf states. Iraq does, and that breadth of engagement represents one of its strategic strengths. Our geography places us at the heart of the region, and the diversity of our society gives us a unique ability to engage across its competing political centers. Iraq has always been more than a front-line state. At its best, it is a connecting state, linking political systems, trade routes and regional interests that others too often view only through the lens of rivalry.
This is why projects such as the Development Road matter. Linking the Faw Grand Port through Iraq to Turkey and onward to Europe, the project has the potential to make Iraq one of the most consequential commercial corridors in the region. It is not merely an infrastructure plan. It is part of a broader vision in which Iraq serves as a bridge for trade, energy, and diplomacy rather than a theater for conflict.
The United States should respond to this moment with a more mature strategic framework for Iraq.
The first step is economic. Washington should protect and encourage the expansion of American investment in Iraq, especially in energy, power generation and infrastructure. The presence of U.S. companies creates a durable American stake in Iraq’s long-term stability.
The second step is institutional. Baghdad and Washington should establish a more structured dialogue on security sector development, focused not on temporary crisis management but on the long-term strengthening of state capacity. Iraq does not need externally imposed formulas. It does need serious cooperation with partners who support the consolidation of state authority.
The third step is strategic. Intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation between Iraq and the United States has been built over two decades of hard experience. It should now be formalized and updated in ways that make it more resilient, more professional and less vulnerable to political fluctuations in either capital.
Iraq today is not asking to be viewed through nostalgia, fear or the assumptions of an earlier era. It is asking to be seen clearly: as a country that has held competitive elections, maintained a plural political system under severe strain, rebuilt cities destroyed by war and worked to prevent regional escalation from consuming its future.
We still face serious challenges. Our institutions must become stronger. Our economy must diversify further. The relationship between the state and armed actors must continue to be resolved in favor of the state. None of that should be minimized. But neither should it obscure what Iraq has achieved or what it now offers.
What Iraq is proposing to Washington is not dependency and not alignment at any cost. It is a partnership grounded in mutual interest and mutual respect: a relationship with a sovereign Iraqi state that has demonstrated resilience, commands major energy wealth, occupies a central geographic position and is determined to build a more stable and connected future.
The opportunity is real. The door is open. And the region will not wait.
*Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is the prime minister of Iraq.