Interview With Senior Hamas Leader Mousa Abu Marzouk

In a wide-ranging interview with Drop Site, Abu Marzouk discussed the core issues at the center of the indirect negotiations in Sharm El-Sheikh, Hamas’s view of Trump, and how he sees the future of Hamas.

 

Jeremy Scahill: We’re joined now by Dr. Mousa Abu Marzouk, who is a senior leader of the Hamas movement, has been a member of the movement from its very beginning and was the first head of its political bureau. Dr. Abu Marzouk, thank you so much for being with us at Drop Site News.

Mousa Abu Marzouk: You’re welcome. Thank you very much.

Jeremy Scahill: So the first question I want to ask you is that the negotiations and meetings are just beginning now in Egypt, and Israel is making clear that it is not going to agree to link withdrawal of Israeli forces, in any real way, to the exchange of captives. Donald Trump released a map, and it showed only a very small redeployment of Israeli forces, and the Israelis are saying they are not going to agree to a full withdrawal at this stage. What is your response, and how will the movement approach that issue? Because these 48 Israeli captives, being held by the movement, represent the leverage in the negotiations that you have right now. What’s your response to this position of Israel?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: We know that during the period of dialogues, discussions, and understandings, especially at this time, the Israelis will place many obstacles in front of it. We spoke clearly when we agreed on President Trump’s vision, thanking him for his initiative, that the paragraph which concerns us is the one we will address. Therefore, the first paragraph, which deals with prisoner exchanges—or the withdrawal of Israeli forces, because it is impossible to have a prisoner exchange while Israeli forces are present in the area. There must be a significant and sufficient Israeli withdrawal for us to carry out this exchange. Because without the withdrawal of Israeli forces, it would be very difficult to carry out this process.

Therefore, in previous operations, we would cease fire permanently, aerial activity would stop, and there were no Israeli forces in the area. This allowed us to carry out exchange operations, which was beneficial for the success and security of the operation itself. Because we cannot guarantee that there won’t be any security breaches while Israeli forces are present, especially leading to prisoners being harmed. We want to preserve the lives and security of the prisoners to the greatest extent possible, in addition to the safety of the people and those involved in the exchange process. Therefore, it is difficult for the negotiators or participants in the current discussions to accept the presence of Israeli forces in the area while carrying out prisoner exchanges.

Jeremy Scahill: If Israel is insisting that it will not negotiate its withdrawal as a part of the discussion of the exchange of captives, will Hamas, under any circumstances, agree to release Israel’s captives If Israel says we will not link withdrawal to it? Will the movement under any circumstances agree to release those Israeli captives if those are the conditions?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: In my opinion, this issue will be very difficult, as it will be difficult to have a prisoner exchange without the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the area. The area of withdrawal may be a matter of debate. However, they withdraw from all the areas that… especially [the areas] where the prisoners are located—and we don’t know exactly where the prisoners are. Even the negotiators in the current dialogues do not know their locations. Therefore, they must withdraw from populated areas. There cannot be an exchange [if the forces remain], and the process will not take place. This would mean that Israel does not want Trump’s plan to be implemented.

Jeremy Scahill: Well, according to Trump’s plan, there are three separate stages of withdrawal. The first would be that Israeli forces pull back a little bit, and then there’s the exchange of prisoners and captives. And then they say an international force will come in, and then Israeli forces will pull back to a second line, but only if an international force is there. And then the third line is this buffer zone that is supposed to encircle Gaza. And there, there isn’t a clear roadmap for the Israelis ever leaving. So even in Trump’s plan, the full withdrawal of Israeli troops does not have a structure like the deal from January—which the Israelis violated. So you’re facing a situation where there’s a game sort of being played by Trump with this proposal, because even his withdrawal plan doesn’t envision a total withdrawal of Israeli troops until some vague certification that Gaza doesn’t represent a “threat” to Israel anymore.

Mousa Abu Marzouk: I want to tell you a story that was shared with me by the chief Egyptian negotiator, Major General Ahmed Abdel Khaleq. He spoke with his Israeli intelligence counterpart about the map in the American proposal. He asked him, “Do you understand anything from this?” The Israeli replied, “No.” Why? Because this map has no meaning. It is hand-drawn, with no spaces, distances, locations, or anything. While in previous discussions, the text was clear: Israeli forces should withdraw from residential areas and from the Salah al-Din line by a certain number of meters.

The Gaza Strip in some areas is only 4000 meters wide. Therefore, it must be clear that if Israel wants to disrupt the [negotiations], they can do so from the first moment, through unclear and undefined maps—maps that are not drawn professionally, meaning they weren’t drawn by a cartographer or a military expert. These maps were drawn by people who are used to camel races. They don’t know the basics of map-making. You shouldn’t send maps like this; drawn like a rainbow.

Maps must have defined distances in meters in the Gaza Strip. Every space must be considered, because for example, when we talk about the east of Rafah, the width of the area is 14 kilometers, and when we talk about areas like Netzarim and Nuseirat, we’re talking about 4.5 kilometers, or 4500 meters. This is 14 kilometers, and this is 4.5 kilometers. Therefore, the maps are drawn in an unprofessional way. And if Israel wants to sabotage these [negotiations], the key to their failure lies in the maps, because they can say anything about them. I mean the negotiations.

Therefore, I believe the first point now must be to define the maps. As I told you, neither the Israelis nor the Egyptians understood the maps at all. Consequently, this will be the main obstacle. I believe—I’m not on the negotiating team now but—that this issue will not move forward without those maps being specified. The negotiators are clear that [the Israeli forces] must withdraw completely from residential areas. We cannot carry out an exchange while Israeli forces are present, as this is to ensure the security of the Israeli prisoners themselves.

Anticipating Israeli Sabotage of a Deal

Jeremy Scahill: As you know, the Israelis are masters of violating ceasefire agreements, not just with Palestinians, but also we see in Lebanon. There was supposedly a ceasefire in Lebanon, and the Israelis are violating it almost every single day and continuing to bomb Lebanon. The resistance—the Palestinian resistance—is taking a big risk, if you hand over all of the Israeli captives in one batch. What guarantees are you looking for that Israel doesn’t just get all of its prisoners back, and then immediately resume the genocide again after you hand them all their prisoners?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: You are absolutely right, and I think there is a risk. Israel does not honor signed agreements nor respect commitments. Of course, this was very clear in the targeting of the negotiating delegation in Qatar. A country that respects its commitments and obligations would never target the people it is negotiating with for assassination, especially when it needs those negotiators. The same happened in Lebanon, and it is happening now. It also is happening now in Syria—there are the 1974 understandings about disengagement zones with Syria—yet Israel still respects nothing.

This is a risk, but we trusted President Trump to be the guarantor of all the commitments made. President Trump acted when he halted a war with Iran—then [Netanyahu] wanted to resume it and sent planes to strike targets in Iran. President Trump recalled those planes while they were en route to strike targets in Iran. So we know that President Trump is capable of fulfilling his commitments and honoring his pledges, and he is the primary guarantor of everything he says. And he stated clearly that the war would stop, the Israeli army would withdraw in three stages, and then a prisoner exchange would take place. Therefore, these guarantees are sufficient for us to say that President Trump has committed to these matters, allowing us to move forward in this direction. Had there been no commitment from the American president, we would never have agreed to take the risk, because we do not trust Netanyahu or his extremist right‑wing team in the current Israeli government. We have seen many previous Israeli governments and how they often honored their words. However, I do not see this government as being committed to anything.

Therefore, I say, when President Trump said he wanted the prisoners released all at once—yes, it is possible the prisoners will be released over a defined period of time, because doing it all at once would be difficult. But there will remain a larger number of dead. The Israeli dead are more than…We are talking about at least 28. These are in areas where Israeli forces are currently present. Therefore, they must withdraw, and we will need time to search for them. Frankly, we will also seek the help of the Red Cross and many other resources, because the Israeli army has altered the landmarks of the Gaza Strip through destruction, digging, searching for tunnels, and the destruction of all existing cemeteries. I am one of those people whose parents were buried in a cemetery that now lies under the road that was paved—the Philadelphia line. The entire cemetery is beneath that line. Israel has completely changed the landmarks of cemeteries. Consequently, there are dead in tunnels, people buried, and others under rubble. This is a very difficult matter and will take time and may take months. They also want their dead returned. So I do not think this will be something that will be resolved in a few days.

Jeremy Scahill: You know what may be a little bit different in this agreement versus the January ceasefire agreement or the earlier temporary truces where there were captives exchanged, is that Trump now has all of these Arab and Islamic countries that are very involved right now. But, Dr. Abu Marzouk, we’ve watched for two years as no Arab country or Islamic country except Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Ansar Allah in Yemen have dared to use any military force against Israel. All of these countries have stood on the side and watched the genocide of the Palestinian people in Gaza. And the most they’ve done is issue a strong statement. Even when Qatar was bombed in an attempt to kill the Hamas senior leadership, no Arab country launched a missile at Israel.

If Israel violates this agreement with the Palestinians and resumes the genocide, how can you trust that these Arab countries will do anything other than issue a press release condemning it? In other words, you have these countries that you’ve been dealing with in mediation, and they’re giving you assurances that they’re going to make sure that Trump and Israel keep the agreement. But they’ve watched a genocide for two years and they’ve done nothing to stop it. So how can you trust even those countries that are involved with this process?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: I do not want to talk about the extent of Arab and Muslim support or abandonment of the battle in the Gaza Strip. But the Arab and Islamic position recently has been aimed towards putting heavy pressure on the U.S. administration to stop the genocide in Gaza.

If I want to speak historically, remember after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the breakup of Yugoslavia into Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia—you’re talking about several new states. In the war between the Serbs and Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia, the war lasted three years. What stopped it was the intervention of Arabs and Muslims before Europe, saying that if things stayed as they were we would export weapons and help the Muslims in Bosnia to stop the extermination. Then the Americans intervened at that time and produced the Dayton Agreement, if I recall correctly, dividing Bosnia into three entities and appointing a governor.

I believe that in stopping the genocide, there is a responsibility on the Arabs and Muslims. As for them not fighting Israel—I’ll speak frankly here. When the Arabs became friends with America, especially in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Qatar, Jordan—and now Syria is on the way—the main weapons of those armies became American weapons. American weapons are also present in Israel. It makes no sense for American weapons to face American weapons. So the prospect of wars in the region that pit those states against Israel becomes difficult. The evidence for that is what happened in Qatar. When Iran struck the U.S. base in Qatar with missiles, Qatari air defenses were able to intercept them. But when F‑15s entered Qatari airspace and struck the negotiating delegation, Qatari defenses could not engage American aircraft because they are friendly planes. So how do you expect the Egyptian army to fight the Israeli army when both use weapons that won’t engage one another?

Therefore I tell you the Arabs will not intervene militarily, because all their weapons in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon and Egypt are American. How do you fight American weapons with American weapons? So a real responsibility falls on America—it must act in this regard. It cannot let Israel control the whole region like this—that cannot happen. When Egyptian weapons were Russian, they were able to wage the 1973 war. When Russian weapons were present in places like Iraq, they were able to deter. But now the weapons are American. How can these U.S.-friendly states that possess American weapons confront Israeli aggression when their defenses cannot engage Israeli aircraft? Here a great responsibility lies with the United States: to protect its allies and friends in the region, or the Arabs will find another path.

I think the Pakistan lesson for America on the world map is clear: when the U.S. failed to resolve the problem between India and Pakistan and placed restrictions on Pakistan, Pakistan turned to China. It turned out China has weapons that surpass the American or Russian weapons that India had. Pakistan ended the battle within hours with Chinese air power and air defenses. Consequently, the Arabs will find themselves looking for a third option. I say Turkey at one stage turned to Russia and imported the S‑400 so it would have respectable air defenses. When the United States is unable to supply its allies with what they need to defend themselves, the picture changes. Therefore America must pay attention and take responsibility in this regard. It must compel Israel to a full withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

Hamas’s View of Trump

Jeremy Scahill: Well, you were educated in the United States. You lived in the United States for quite a long time. I want to get your assessment of Donald Trump as a president, but also how the Hamas movement has viewed the difference in dealing with Trump versus dealing with Joe Biden.

Mousa Abu Marzouk: Dealing with Trump is dealing with a person. Meaning, Trump’s ego is very high. He likes to be unique and receive a lot of praise. He is very eager for the Nobel Peace Prize, and therefore he wants the problem solved today or tomorrow so that the vote on Friday will be in his favor for receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. I advised him on Al Jazeera the day before yesterday, I told him, “If you want the Nobel Prize, don’t bring Netanyahu with you. Because Netanyahu is a man wanted by international justice, Netanyahu is a war criminal, and Netanyahu will ruin your chances of getting the Nobel. Just keep Netanyahu away and tie him down.”

Moreover, he does not adhere to the rules. The rules that America established after World War II for it to be the country that leads the world towards American principles. I believe that today Trump has changed many of these rules and no longer respects many of the existing norms. No international law, no bilateral agreements, no international agreements, no United Nations and its charter. He does not respect the rules on which this system was built, but has not provided an alternative. Therefore, it is difficult to predict what he will do. But we have to deal with this reality, and I believe it is not just a problem for me alone—it is also a problem for Netanyahu and his team. It also creates a dilemma for him. That’s why when Netanyahu wanted to object to the agreement, [Trump] said, “you are bound by it. Take it as it is,” and he bound him to it. He can bind Netanyahu to the vision he sees, especially in the first stage, which is the stage of Israeli forces withdrawing, ending the war, providing aid to the Palestinian people, and releasing prisoners.

Jeremy Scahill: Does the Hamas movement and your leadership, do you assess right now that you believe Trump actually wants to end this war and that he is willing to essentially order Netanyahu to stop it? Because Trump is the only person in the world that can stop Netanyahu at this point. Do you think—do you really believe that he wants this war to end?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: Even if I assume that Netanyahu wants to continue the war for other goals related to the Palestinian people and their forced displacement and other similar matters, I believe that the whole world is now against the war. I think the statistics in American society, specifically within the Republican Party or among the Jews in the United States, generally show that most of them want the war to stop. I believe that Trump cannot stand with Netanyahu in opposition to the Republican Party, Jews in America, and the entire world. Because, is there anyone in the world today standing with Netanyahu in continuing the war?

The war in Lebanon lasted two months, the war in Syria lasted two days after Assad’s collapse, the war in Iran lasted two weeks. Today, we will have been in the war for two years. There has never been in history an open war, a genocide broadcast on television like this war, a war in which starvation is used as a weapon, the killing of children is used as a weapon, and the blocking of medicine is used as a weapon. Is it possible that Trump is devoid of humanity to this extent? Is that possible? I find it highly unlikely that Netanyahu—I mean Trump—would accept the war to continue.

Hamas’s Fight to Free Palestinian Prisoners

Jeremy Scahill: I want to ask you about the issue of Palestinian captives being held by Israel. We understand that as many as 15,000 Palestinians are now being held in Israeli jails, military camps, administrative detention, including many women and children. And that thousands of Palestinians, maybe 4,000 or more, were taken from Gaza since October 7. And in Trump’s plan, in return for returning the 48 Israelis—28 deceased and 20 living—that 250 Palestinians currently serving life sentences in Israel and 1,700 Palestinians from Gaza, including all of the women and children, would be freed in this exchange deal. Now, in previous negotiations, Hamas was also negotiating to try to get more of those Palestinians taken from Gaza after October 7th freed, as well as prisoners who were serving long sentences but not life sentences. This deal says 250 life sentence prisoners. Are these numbers acceptable to Hamas right now in these negotiations, or do you want to see more Palestinians freed as part of this negotiation?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: I don’t think that when President Trump set those numbers he meant that those exact figures are how many Palestinians will be released in exchange. I believe he doesn’t even know how many Israeli prisoners are still alive. Nor do we—speaking for myself, I don’t know either. I don’t know the number of [Israelis] deceased in Gaza, I don’t know how many. He doesn’t know how many prisoners are held by Hamas versus others, nor the number of Israeli dead held by Hamas versus others. These are all estimated, undefined numbers. Therefore this issue must have criteria, dates, and details, and I think this is one of the items that should be discussed in the first phase.

Jeremy Scahill: There were reports this week that Netanyahu has told Ben Gvir and others that under no circumstances will he free Marwan Barghouti, Ahmed Sa’adat, Abdullah Barghouti, and other very well known Palestinian political prisoners. I know that in each of these rounds, Marwan Barghouti, Ahmed Sa’adat, Abdullah Barghouti have always been a demand of the Palestinian resistance in these negotiations. Do you believe you can achieve the freedom of Marwan Barghouti, Ahmed Sa’adat and Abdullah Barghouti?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: Believe me, these individuals will be at the top of the priorities in the current talks. This is because they are a necessity for Palestinian unity and solidarity, and for their history and symbolism in the struggle. They must be among the prisoners to be released. But in the past we included them in every prisoner exchange, and they always refused to release those leaders. I don’t know about this matter, and I cannot discuss it because anything related to prisoner exchanges is open to negotiation, meaning it will be part of the discussions at present. Also, both parties must agree to anything to reach an agreement. One side can’t unilaterally decide to release a certain number without an agreement—there must be one. It will also be a top priority for us that these leaders are released.

Jeremy Scahill: There were reports in earlier negotiations that there were officials from the Palestinian Authority, working under Mahmoud Abbas, who told the mediators that they did not want Marwan Barghouti freed. Are these reports true that the Palestinian Authority, or anyone representing it, interfered to try to stop Marwan Barghouti from being released in earlier exchange deals?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: If the one saying this… I haven’t heard [anything official], I’ve heard analyses. But I don’t think anyone from Fatah would officially dare to say such a thing. Marwan Barghouti, in all opinion polls, is number one—number one for the Palestinian presidency, number one in popularity, number one if there were elections. So I don’t think anyone would officially say, “we don’t want to release Marwan Barghouti from detention.” But as an analysis based on people’s opinions—yes, there could be such a view.

On Disarmament

Jeremy Scahill: I want to ask you, I’m going to ask you also a couple of historical questions because you’ve been a leader in this movement for so long. But just one brief question about the current negotiations. This issue of disarmament. You know, the Israelis focus on this a lot and they, if you listen to the Israelis, you would think that Hamas has tanks and aircraft and massive artillery, when the reality is that with the exception of the rockets, most of the weapons in the hands of the resistance are manufactured in Gaza. They’re small arms, including on October 7th in Operation Al Aqsa Flood, these were mostly small weapons that were used, not big conventional tanks or anything like this. But they’re making this the issue, and in a way it’s a proxy issue because they want the Palestinians to surrender. That’s clear.

But on this issue of the weapons, how can Hamas navigate this? Because the Israelis are demanding disarmament, but they know very well that Hamas, that Qassam Brigades and Saraya Al Quds, they have homemade weapons. How are you going to be able to navigate this? Are you, is there some openness to saying, “Okay, we’ll give you these weapons?” I know that the resistance has said it’s a red line, “We will not accept disarmament. This is about the survival of Palestine and the rights of self defense and self determination.” But is there some tactical configuration that you’ll entertain to address this issue, if you understand what I mean?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: First, anything that is up for discussion or negotiation now in Sharm El-Sheikh is difficult to speak about publicly in the media from any leadership level. However, I am very surprised at those who keep raising the issue of disarming Hamas. The Israelis themselves said they eliminated most of the Qassam brigades in Gaza—in the north, in Khan Younis, and in Rafah—and that there is essentially no one left from Qassam Brigades. President Trump said 25,000 members of Qassam were killed, and their numbers are roughly of that order. Israel also recently announced that most of Hamas’s military capabilities were destroyed—they said 90% of Hamas’s capabilities were wiped out. So if they destroyed 90% of Hamas’s military capabilities and killed most of Qassam’s fighters, as President Trump says, whose weapons are you going to disarm and where are the weapons you claim you’ll remove when you already destroyed them?

Frankly, statements of this kind are often rhetoric that does not reflect reality—rather, the purpose of them is to accept defeat in the battle. If you fought for two years against a resistance movement and still could not decisively end it, is it possible that you will get what you want at the negotiating table on this issue? I think that is very difficult. Therefore they need to lower their expectations a lot in this regard. Also, we are talking about the future and shaping it. Weapons may come and go, but the commitments and adherence to them are what must be honored and discussed. If you have a pledge from a party that it will not use weapons, or that it is under a truce or a ceasefire, that should, without doubt, be more important than searching how many rifles Hamas has or what missiles or “nuclear bombs” it might possess. We don’t even have… What weapons do we have to be talking about this at such level?

Responding to Trump While Preserving the Right to Self-determination

Jeremy Scahill: When Hamas responded to President Trump, it did so after consulting with a wide range of Palestinian political parties and factions and leaders, as well as the ground leaders inside of Gaza. And your response was split into two basic sections. One was saying that Hamas and Islamic Jihad have a right or a mandate to negotiate the end of the war because they’re holding the captives and they’re fighting. But the other was about Palestinian national questions. And so your statement was quite crafty because it didn’t reject Trump, but it said you need to negotiate with all Palestinians. Explain that strategy that you opted for in responding to Trump, sort of saying, “Yes, the resistance can negotiate these issues about the captives, the withdrawal and a ceasefire, but these other issues are a national question.” Talk about that strategy.

Mousa Abu Marzouk: This strategy began when we met the mediators and they presented the proposal. I told them right away that a large part of President Trump’s proposal is something Hamas is not authorized to agree to. We are not mandated to decide the Palestinian people’s future. There are factions, civil society forces, the Palestinian Authority, the PLO, and the entire people who will determine their future, choose their leadership, and decide how they position themselves geographically and politically. We are not authorized to do that, so we proposed that we speak only for what we do have [authority over]. And what we do not have [authority over] and cannot speak on unilaterally, we will deal responsibly with. From that came the idea of having the response on two aspects: one aspect concerns the movement of Hamas—issues tied to the fighting, prisoners, aid, withdrawal from Gaza, and all those substantive issues related to Hamas.

The other aspect of our strategy is dealing with the whole Palestinian homeland: the factions, Fatah, the Popular Front, all factions, the Palestinian Authority, and the PLO—and it’s acceptable for the PLO to be the umbrella, we have no problem with that. But all Palestinians must be the ones to address all issues concerning the future of the Gaza Strip.

For example, when we discussed Gaza’s future, we Palestinians agreed there should be an independent technocratic committee, non-partisan and competent, that would come to govern Gaza. And they would be from Gaza itself, with their primary affiliation to the Palestinian Authority. We agreed to that. We have no problem with some of our Palestinian brothers from any political direction being the ones on the ground in Gaza the day after.

Therefore, this strategy was developed to enable us to unite the Palestinian homeland so it can decide Gaza’s future: international emergency forces, areas, the “buffer zone”—all of this must be discussed because it belongs to all Palestinians, not just to Hamas. That is how the idea emerged. The first aspect—which President Trump announced—is withdrawal and an end to the war in exchange for the prisoners. The second aspect is how we build all civil institutions and the political community that exist in Gaza.

Mousa Abu Marzouk, left, speaks alongside Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh during a visit with families of Hamas officials killed by Israel in Gaza, May 2, 2014. Haniyeh was assassinated by Israel in Tehran, Iran in July 2024. (Photo by Mohammed Talatene/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

The Future of Hamas and the Legacy of October 7th

Jeremy Scahill: How do you see the future of Hamas? You know, of course Netanyahu says, oh, he’s going to destroy Hamas. And, and often in the American media, Hamas is written about as though it’s almost like a foreign body that came into Palestine and needs to just go home. But the reality is that and you know, you were in Hamas from the very beginning of the movement. Hamas is part of the fabric of Palestinian society. And yes, it’s a resistance movement, but it also was a governing authority for two decades in Gaza. And I’m wondering, even though Hamas is saying that it is willing to relinquish governance of Gaza, what is the future of Hamas in your view, Dr. Abu Marzouk?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: If you look at the last elections, Hamas won the majority, nearly 66 seats out of 120 or 130 seats. This means Hamas won most of the seats in the legislative council, while the other factions, including Fatah, won fewer than 34 seats. Hamas is no longer a small organization that any great or small state can remove from Palestine. Hamas is present in the West Bank—it is the strongest organization there—it exists abroad, everywhere, inside in the ’48 territories. Hamas is everywhere—no one can cancel its existence. But Hamas is no longer [simply] an organization. Hamas is now hope. Hamas is an idea. So don’t be surprised that most Arab and Muslim masses chant for Hamas.

Today, when the U.S. decided to pursue Hamas financially and Arab countries cut their aid to Hamas, they still couldn’t erase its presence. You are talking about more than a billion Muslims who see Hamas as hope for them, because Hamas defends the holiest sanctities of Muslims—al‑Aqsa Mosque. For every Muslim, Hamas is seen as defending al‑Aqsa. Therefore, Hamas has become an idea that exists across this wide swath of Arabs and Muslims.

When I was imprisoned in Manhattan, New York, I used to receive mail from across the Islamic world—I was then head of the political bureau. I would get a huge mail bag every day with more than 300 letters. Even the warden was surprised, “Who is this receiving 300 letters every day?” Letters from Russia, Canada, Australia, and throughout the Islamic world. The FBI began to investigate: “If we keep him detained, what will happen to Americans?” They conducted hundreds of interviews of people in different parts of the Islamic world, asking “do you know so‑and‑so? Do you know Mousa Abu Marzouk?” “If he is arrested or handed over to Israel, what will your reaction be?” They were talking about a person, not about Hamas as a movement, across the entire Arab and Islamic world—and even across larger communities in the U.S., Canada, Australia, and Britain.

So you are talking about Hamas that defends the holiest sanctities of Muslims—al‑Aqsa Mosque. Hamas that defends the most sacred land—Palestine. Hamas has become an idea present in the entire Islamic world, not only present in the Gaza Strip or the West Bank or occupied Palestine or abroad—it exists across the whole Arab‑Islamic world. What are they talking about? Hamas is not al‑Qaeda. Al‑Qaeda was created by U.S. intelligence for other purposes, but Hamas is a different creation. A different creation—a creation of the conscience of all Muslims. Therefore, Hamas is not like any other Palestinian organization either. The best way to deal with Hamas is to understand it and to deal with it responsibly.

Otherwise, look at what you see across the world today and the steadfastness you have witnessed for two years while Israel fights—is Israel really fighting Hamas? Think a little when you talk about Hamas as an armed organization like any other Palestinian organization. Israel has failed to eliminate this organization in two years of war. It has killed more than 100,000 people and wounded more than 150,000 or 200,000—it has killed over 12% of the Palestinian people. And Hamas still stands, does not raise the white flag, and will not raise the white flag. Why? Is there a people who embrace a movement to this extent while considering it something foreign?

Therefore, political understanding about the future and security with Hamas is a thousand times better than current attempts to isolate Hamas. Isolating Hamas is impossible. Hamas is not just the names known to Israeli intelligence or the Shin Bet—those people can be eliminated and no one remains of them, but Hamas is an idea planted in the entire Palestinian people. Do you want to expel the entire Palestinian people, whether in the West Bank, Gaza, or abroad? I think that’s impossible. So the best approach is to reach an understanding with Hamas regarding security, safety, and Palestinian rights.

Jeremy Scahill: Last question for you, Dr. Abu Marzouk. This week there’s going to be a lot of focus on the two year anniversary of October 7th. And much of the western media coverage is going to be focused on what took place in Israel on October 7th. And I wanted to ask you, what you think the legacy or the impact of Operation Al Aqsa Flood? What you think the impact of those operations carried out by the Palestinian resistance groups against Israel two years ago? How is history going to view Operation Al Aqsa Flood and what was its impact?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: This is a big question. There are always events that are huge and have a massive impact, but their strategic implications are small. And sometimes a small event can have huge strategic implications. For example, when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and destroyed the U.S. fleet. The operation was obviously, to the Japanese, well-planned. But strategically, Japan lost the war because it brought America into the conflict.

Today, in this war, Israel exploited this small, limited war in the Gaza Strip to fight the Palestinian people and displace them, pursuing goals that are far-reaching and connected to the Zionist project itself. Israel used tools without restraint such as genocide, starvation, random killings, destruction, and collective punishment—violating every law that humanity has civilly developed over time. In reality, Israel has lost its global support, which it once had in abundance.

The second point is the Israeli narrative—meaning, Israel was the solution to the Jewish problem in Europe, and the sympathy came because of European crimes against Jews and that the Zionist movement solved the Jewish problem. Israel received immense sympathy from Europe and the United States. Today, what Israel has done to the Palestinian people has completely undermined this idea: the notion of victimhood, the idea of fighting anti-Semitism, and the moral sympathy for Israel. Now, Israel is exposed to pressure, to the International Criminal Court, to boycotts, and massive protests in the West. Israel once gained support for its narrative from the people and governments of the West. Today, governments are hesitant, and the people all support the Palestinian cause.

This shift in narrative is the creation of Netanyahu. This is what Netanyahu has made, not what was made on [October 7th]. It is a reaction, a desire for revenge, a desire to kill the other—the Palestinian people. Netanyahu is the one who created this situation, while [October 7th] is a narrative that was not as Netanyahu and his Israeli team have portrayed it to justify the killing of the Palestinian people. [October 7th] was a group of no more than 1,200 to 1,500 Qassam fighters who fought the Gaza Brigade. The Gaza Brigade collapsed, and these fighters had no choice but to rush into the frontline settlements. In these settlements, they barricaded themselves, and then the Israeli army came. They tried to save themselves by confining [Israeli] civilians to escape and return to Gaza. They were bombed by planes and artillery, and many were killed. The people who died at the music concert were killed by planes and tanks, not by the 1,500 men who entered with light weapons. Light weapons, limited cars, and gliders that were as if a joke. They couldn’t have killed so many, as they had no ammunition or weapons [to cause such casualties]. This number was killed [by Israel] and was proven by Israeli accounts.

Now, they’ve come up with different images, claiming there was rape. This is not true. Even if there were some testimonies here and there, if you examined them—and this is what we asked. Just examine the cases, man! Let a neutral team come and say that there was one rape case. I’m telling you with certainty, there wasn’t. And they claim there were beheadings and such. Where are the beheadings? And burning children? These are lies they’ve manufactured and turned into a narrative similar to the Holocaust narrative. They now say Hamas created a Holocaust on October 7th, but this is not true. I tell you, the operation was much simpler than that. There is no way that an operation consisting of 1,500 men could have launched to destroy Israel and for them to consider it an existential war. Let people think for a moment. Is it possible that 1,500 people who entered were planning an existential war against Israel? This was a movement for the liberation of prisoners. That’s the whole story.

The prisoners hold immense value for the Palestinian people. Therefore, it is impossible for [Marwan] Barghouti to spend his entire life in prison, having fought for his people, while people do nothing to save his life. This is October 7th. As for what followed, it is very clear that Israel cannot defend itself. That’s why it called upon the U.S., Britain, and France to defend it—against Iranian missiles as an example. The entire West came with its tanks and fleets to help Israel.

Do you know that October 7th, because of the blind stance taken by the Western countries, was a huge opportunity for major strategic changes in the entire region? The Russia-Ukraine war, the strategic shift that occurred in favor of Russia, because the entire West, instead of supporting Ukraine, ended up supporting Israel, causing Ukraine to lose the battle. America’s strategy was to counter the expansion of China, and that’s why China was very happy for two reasons. It was happy with America’s strategic mindset when it made bin Laden the central enemy, chasing him everywhere, while China was growing and thriving, producing now what the U.S. is not able to produce. Then, after bin Laden, America adopted ISIS, which it created, as the central war target, and let China grow and flourish.

Now, America’s plan was to focus on China once everything was done, but suddenly, all of this shifted to focusing on protecting Israel. From whom? From whom are they protecting Israel? All the countries surrounding Israel are allies. The landscape doesn’t allow for the destruction of Israel—the geographical landscape. Neither Jordan nor Egypt would allow the destruction of Israel. So, how about you? You changed your entire policy and redirected all your strategic resources to support Israel. Consequently, China is among the happiest with this war, and Russia is also among the happiest. The U.S. lost strategically for the support of one madman named Netanyahu. This is October 7th.

Jeremy Scahill: Just briefly, what’s your message to President Trump and the American people right now?

Mousa Abu Marzouk: I have one sentence to say to President Trump: Thank you for your efforts, and for your promise to stop the war and release the prisoners. We are committed to it. Just stop the war. Stopping the war means a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. I want Trump to fulfill his pledge and promise.

Source: https://www.dropsitenews.com/p/senior-hamas-leader-mousa-abu-marzouk-gaza-ceasefire-israel