How Will the Israel-Iran War End?

It can be said that U.S. President Donald Trump aims to weaken Tehran’s position at the negotiating table by permitting Israeli attacks on Iran—thus using the war as a kind of diplomatic instrument (diplomasi aracı). During this process, Iran is observed to be searching for a way out and closely monitoring the signals sent by Trump. Indeed, Trump’s veto of a decision to target Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is interpreted as an effort to create a political platform for Tehran’s return to the negotiation process, with the U.S. assuming the role of the “good cop” (iyi polis).

However, some security and foreign policy circles in Washington suggest that Trump is shifting away from seeking a diplomatic resolution and instead intends to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capacity entirely through direct military operations. According to this scenario, Trump aims to deliver a strong message—both to domestic public opinion and the international community—by portraying a decisive and aggressive leadership profile in foreign policy.

This approach, which aligns particularly well with Israel’s growing aggression (artan saldırganlık), also entails the risk of expanding the regional conflict and transforming it into a more complex crisis. In light of all these developments, while it is evident that the diplomatic potential between the parties has not been entirely exhausted, it is also clear that an effective and constructive negotiation process has not yet been initiated.

Strategic Goals and Military Capabilities

Israel’s comprehensive military operation against Iran is considered the latest phase of its strategy aimed at weakening or neutralizing regional rivals (bölgesel rakiplerini zayıflatma ya da etkisizleştirme stratejisi). This strategic orientation gained momentum particularly after the Hamas attacks of October 2023 and was reinforced through what has been described as a genocidal intervention (soykırımcı bir müdahale süreci) designed to completely sideline the Palestinian people as a political actor.

Israel has targeted Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon through airstrikes, assassinations carried out via electronic devices, and various asymmetric methods; launched attacks on the Houthis in Yemen; and attempted to destroy weapons depots and limit the influence of pro-Iranian groups in Syria by exploiting the power vacuum that emerged after the Assad regime. It is understood that Israel’s recent attacks on Iran are not limited merely to disrupting the country’s nuclear infrastructure.

From Israel’s perspective, a scenario in which Iran is recognized by the U.S. as a legitimate actor in the Middle East, establishes direct diplomatic relations with Washington, and thereby strengthens its regional standing by escaping economic and political pressure is seen as a serious strategic threat. In this context, even if a nuclear deal were to limit Iran’s nuclear program, it would still be impossible for Israel to consider the “Iran problem” (İran sorunu) resolved.

At this point, Tel Aviv’s view diverges from the Trump administration’s approach to Iran. For Washington, the main issue is Iran’s nuclear activities, whereas for Israel, the priority extends beyond the nuclear program alone. Israel aims to contain Iran’s regional influence, capabilities, and spheres of control.

For Israeli decision-makers, the ideal scenario is not a regime change that leads to a democratic order, but rather the destabilization, weakening, and—if possible—fragmentation of Iran (İran’ın istikrarsızlaştırılması, zayıflatılması ve mümkünse parçalanması). However, it does not appear easy for Israel to act outside the strategic framework drawn by the U.S. Therefore, it can be assumed that more advanced steps against Iran would only be taken in coordination with the U.S.

In the context of developments on the ground, Israel’s attacks on Iran are reported to have disabled a significant portion of the country’s air defense systems and weakened its missile launch capabilities. Israel is observed to have operational freedom (operasyonel serbestlik) within Iranian airspace, allowing it to directly target cities, civilian infrastructure, residential areas, and specific individuals.

These operations have concentrated on two main axes: First, the direct targeting of nuclear facilities; and second, attacks aimed at disrupting Iran’s capacity to plan and conduct war by striking the leadership of its security and military structures.

In this context, the neutralization of high-ranking generals—as well as key commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, Devrim Muhafızları Ordusu), the Chief of Staff, and the IRGC’s intelligence chief—is considered an operational success (operasyonel başarı) for Israel.

However, it is also noted that the damage inflicted by these attacks may be limited, as Iran retains the capacity to recover quickly and launch missile attacks against Israel. On the nuclear front, it is known that Israel has targeted a key facility in Natanz.

Nonetheless, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, Uluslararası Atom Enerjisi Ajansı), it remains unclear whether the underground centrifuge cascades have sustained significant damage. To reach a definitive conclusion on this matter, further field inspections and additional evidence are required.

The primary source of concern remains the Fordow nuclear facility, which is built deep inside a mountain. It is anticipated that an effective intervention against this facility would not be feasible through an operation carried out by Israel alone, and that U.S. support would be required. Despite heavy bombardment, the extent to which Iran’s ability to reconstruct its nuclear program has been degraded remains uncertain.

Internal Dynamics in Israel and Iran

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is under intense domestic and international pressure due to corruption charges, his attempt to dissolve parliament, and the ongoing attacks on Gaza. In this context, it is observed that internal political dynamics in both Israel and Iran play a decisive role in shaping the trajectory of the current conflict.

Despite increasing criticism within Israeli public opinion, it is understood that Netanyahu has long used the Iranian threat to consolidate his political legitimacy and would frame any potential military success within this strategic context. On the other hand, public discontent with the regime in Iran continues to deepen. Prolonged political repression, severe economic sanctions, and international isolation have had a significantly corrosive effect (ciddi bir yıpratıcı etki) on the Iranian population.

It is frequently emphasized that broad segments of society desire a state structure capable of establishing more normal relations with the outside world; however, this aspiration does not represent a pro-American or pro-Israeli stance.

Within this framework, internal tensions in both countries are considered key factors influencing the dynamics of the conflict.

While Netanyahu’s rhetoric occasionally addresses the Iranian public directly—seemingly with the intention of weakening the regime from within and encouraging a potential popular uprising—the tendency to “rally around the flag” (bayrak etrafında toplanma), a societal reflex against external intervention, should not be overlooked.

Claims that Israel aims to overthrow the current regime in Iran remain on the agenda. However, should such a scenario materialize, the absence of an organized democratic structure or leadership capable of governing the country in a stable manner would likely increase the risk of a chaotic transition process, as seen in the examples of Libya, Iraq, or Syria.

As such scenarios gain wider recognition within Iranian society, resistance to the idea of regime change driven by external intervention may also intensify.

Regional Power Dynamics and Türkiye

From the perspective of regional power balance, over the past two decades, Türkiye, Iran, and Israel have emerged as the three main military poles in the Middle East. However, current developments indicate that Israel has consolidated its military superiority in the region.

Within this framework, it is argued that Israel—now backed by U.S. support—has positioned itself as a regional hegemon (bölgesel hegemon), and that power relations in the Middle East are being restructured. Should Iran be entirely neutralized, it is anticipated that all balances in the region will shift.

The escalating conflict between Iran and Israel brings to the fore multi-layered and interconnected risk areas (çok katmanlı ve birbirine bağlı risk alanları) for Türkiye.

In terms of energy supply security, the possibility of an Iran-centered crisis causing disruptions in oil and natural gas flows could further undermine Türkiye’s already energy-dependent structure, making it even more vulnerable. This scenario may have negative repercussions on both energy costs and macroeconomic stability.

From a security standpoint, the U.S.’s direct involvement in a conflict with Iran could deepen existing instability in fragile neighboring regions such as Syria and Iraq. Such developments would place direct pressure on Türkiye’s border security, migration management, and domestic security strategies.

On the economic front, growing regional uncertainty has the potential to weaken Türkiye’s investment climate, disrupt foreign trade flows, and lead to a decline in tourism revenues.

From a geopolitical perspective, if the United States enters into direct conflict with Iran, the resulting security environment could evolve into a “Kurdish issue” (Kürt Sorunu) for Türkiye.

When considered alongside developments in northern Iraq and northern Syria, this possibility could give a new dimension to the ongoing debate on a potential “Kurdish state” (Kürt devleti). Should Kurdish movements in Iran receive support from entities in northern Syria or from the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, Türkiye may perceive this as a direct threat to its national integrity.

In this context, it is likely that Iran-centered developments will occupy a more decisive place in both Türkiye’s domestic political agenda and foreign policy in the upcoming period.

It is also worth emphasizing that the Gulf countries—Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia—currently perceive the tension primarily as a threat.

There are growing concerns that a potential conflict between Iran and the United States, or a broader regional war, could directly harm their economic interests. Due to their geographical proximity to Iran, these countries face greater security risks compared to Israel.

Furthermore, potential instability in Iran is believed to have adverse effects not only in the field of security, but also on high-tech investments and long-term development plans, which are among the strategic priorities of the Gulf states.

In this regard, it is inevitable that Türkiye, which maintains strong economic ties with the Gulf countries, would also be affected by such developments.