How is the Balance of Power Changing in Sudan’s Civil War?

Since April 2023, ongoing conflicts in Sudan have led to one of the bloodiest civil wars in the country’s recent history. This war has manifested as an increasingly complex struggle for power between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). TheRSF, a long-standing influential actor in Sudanese politics, was institutionalized by formerPresident Omar al-Bashir in the 2010s. However, its origins trace back to the Janja weed militias of Darfur.

Recent developments indicate that SAF has made significant territorial gains, while RSF has begun to retreat. Notably, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has provided military, financial, and diplomatic support to RSF, is now struggling to achieve its expected outcomes, and its involvement has become an increasing source of international controversy. The Sudanese government has even formally filed a complaint against the UAE at theInternational Court of Justice (ICJ), accusing it of direct complicity in crimes committed within the country.

Meanwhile, Türkiye’s deepening ties with the Sudanese government have introduced a new dynamic to the conflict. In particular, Türkiye’s military assistance and drone sales to Sudan’s army have significantly altered the balance of power on the battlefield in favor of SAF.

The Origins of RSF and Human Rights Violations in Darfur

Understanding the origins of RSF is crucial to grasping the long chain of human rights violations that began in Darfur and continues to this day. RSF largely evolved from the Janja weed militias, which played an active role in what the international community has labeled the “Darfur Genocide” between 2003 and 2005. These militias operated outside the control of the central government and became infamous for ethnic cleansing and widespread human rights abuses. In 2013, Omar al-Bashir’s administration formally transformed the Janja weed into an official force under the name Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The local communities of Darfur, particularly African ethnic groups such as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa, have suffered systematic attacks, looting, sexual violence, and forced displacement. According to reports from international human rights organizations, RSF’s crimes against civilians include widespread rape, executions, deliberate starvation, and the burning of villages. This legacy suggests that RSF has continued employing the same tacticsin the 2023 civil war. Since the conflict began, massacres targeting civilians have been reported in cities such as El-Fasher, Nyala, El-Geneina, and Zalingei. This cycle of violence, which has reached the level of ethnic cleansing, has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, mass displacement, and a deepening humanitarian crisis.

Ongoing Crimes in Khartoum and Gezira

RSF’s human rights violations have not been confined to Darfur but have also had devastating consequences in major cities. From the very first days of the conflict, the Khartoum metropolitan area—comprising Khartoum, Bahri, and Omdurman—became the epicenter of paramilitary attacks. Reports frequently document the looting of strategic buildings, civilian homes, and infrastructure, as well as indiscriminate violence against civilians.

More recently, numerous testimonies and documents have emerged detailing RSF-led villageraids and mass killings in Gezira State. In villages such as Alseriha, RSF has allegedly carried out systematic rape, torture, looting, and the execution of hundreds of civilians. These attack sare widely interpreted as part of RSF’s broader terror strategy, deliberately targeting areas perceived as “easy prey” where Sudanese army control remains weak. At the same time, this wave of violence reflects a form of retaliation, as RSF has increasingly turned to attacking civilian settlements following the defection of Abu Akla Kikal, a high-ranking RSF commander in Gezira, who switched allegiance to the Sudanese army.

United Nations reports provide further evidence that RSF has used sexual violence as a deliberate weapon of war. These findings indicate that RSF employs a calculated strategy aimed at spreading fear among civilians. Documented cases include mass rape of women and girls, the forced conscription of children, and the denial of humanitarian aid to the elderly and disabled—violations that contravene multiple international legal norms.

UAE’s Intervention and the ICJ Complaint

In recent months, the Sudanese army has officially accused the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of continued support for RSF and has taken the case to the International Court of Justice(ICJ). The Sudanese government has prepared a comprehensive dossier alleging that the UAE has played a direct role in genocide and crimes against humanity. The document reportedly contains evidence detailing how heavy weapons, armored vehicles, drones, and logistical supplies originating from the UAE have reached RSF forces.

The UAE has long maintained an active role in Sudan, aiming to expand its strategic influence along the coastal regions and the Red Sea. Particularly in the aftermath of military coups, numerous reports indicate that the UAE has taken advantage of power vacuums by investing in paramilitary groups. In addition to military and financial aid, the UAE has also utilized diplomatic channels to shield RSF from international pressure. However, recent massacres in Darfur and systematic attacks on civilians elsewhere have rendered the UAE’s support increasingly indefensible on the international stage. The United States and severalWestern countries have reportedly warned the UAE to restrict arms sales, though no enforcement mechanism has been put in place.

Serious allegations suggest that the UAE has collaborated with paramilitary groups across a wide geographic span, from the Horn of Africa to Libya. Military assistance to Khalifa Haftarin Libya and interventions in Yemen serve as prominent examples of this policy. The UAE’s backing of RSF in Sudan appears to be a continuation of this broader strategic approach. However, the Sudanese government has labeled these actions as a direct violation of the country’s sovereignty.

Sudanese Army Advances: Is the Course of the War Changing?

Since mid-2024, the Sudanese army has intensified its military operations in and aroundKhartoum, in parts of Darfur, and in the eastern regions of the country. Reports indicate that in central Khartoum and the Omdurman area, RSF has suffered significant setbacks compared to its dominance in previous months, largely due to SAF’s coordinated air and ground operations. Similarly, in northern Darfur, particularly in El-Fasher, SAF has recently managedto secure strategic positions despite being surrounded by RSF forces.

In Gezira State, reports suggest that the army has reinforced its defensive positions in some areas while launching counteroffensives in others. The acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs/drones) and other technological support from countries such as Türkiye has reportedly given SAF a significant military advantage. According to field reports, Turkish-made armed drones have carried out precise strikes on RSF supply lines and ammunition depots, significantly weakening RSF’s logistical capacity.

At this stage, the long-term military balance between SAF and RSF remains uncertain. There are still claims that RSF may receive material assistance—albeit indirectly—from the UAE and other external actors. Additionally, RSF’s ability to infiltrate civilian areas and open new fronts prolongs the urban conflict. Nevertheless, recent developments suggest a growing advantage in favor of the Sudanese army.

Türkiye’s Role and Military Support

Since the outbreak of Sudan’s civil war in the spring of 2023, Türkiye has positioned itself diplomatically in support of the Sudanese government. Historically, Türkiye has maintained cooperation with Sudan in various sectors, particularly in agriculture and defense. These ties have remained intact and even expanded despite the fall of the al-Bashir regime in 2019. Meetings between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Sudanese President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan indicate a deepening of defense cooperation between the two countries.

Several sources confirm that Türkiye has supplied Sudan with military equipment and technology. Publicly available reports indicate that Turkish-made armed drones have provided significant air support to Sudanese army forces, limiting RSF’s maneuverability in urban areas. Additionally, Türkiye is said to be assisting the Sudanese state in logistics andintelligence operations. This support is widely interpreted as part of Ankara’s broader strategy to expand its influence in Africa.

Türkiye’s presence in the region has drawn the attention of regional powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Although Türkiye insists that its involvement in Sudan is at the invitation of the legitimate government and in accordance with international law, some regional actors view this as part of a larger power struggle. Consequently, international mediaoften portray Türkiye’s role in Sudan as a geopolitical competition. From Ankara’s perspective, however, Sudan represents both a strategically significant partner along the RedSea corridor and a long-term economic opportunity.

Conclusion and Evaluation

At this stage of Sudan’s civil war, the widespread violence and crimes committed by RSF have provoked strong reactions both nationally and internationally. The mass killings, systematic sexual violence, and forced displacement of civilians, particularly in Darfur and Gezira, have been described as acts of genocide in reports by human rights organizations. Inresponse, the Sudanese government has brought the issue before the International Court of Justice, accusing the UAE of direct complicity in these crimes. However, given the UAE’s considerable political and economic influence on the global stage, the outcome of the case remains uncertain.

Meanwhile, the course of the war is gradually shifting in favor of the Sudanese army. Although the United States and several Western countries have sought to end the conflict through diplomatic efforts, a permanent ceasefire has yet to be established. The declininglegitimacy of RSF among the Sudanese population, decreasing support for the paramilitary group, and increasing scrutiny over its external financial backing have provided SAF with significant tactical advantages. At the same time, Türkiye’s provision of armed drones and intelligence support has substantially strengthened the Sudanese army. The growing frequency of meetings between President Erdoğan and President Burhan further signals that this defense cooperation is set to continue.

In conclusion, the conflict in Sudan remains unresolved, but the international backlash againstRSF’s human rights violations—particularly in Darfur, Khartoum, and Gezira—paints a bleak picture for the future of the paramilitary group. The UAE may be forced to withdraw its support for RSF, or at the very least, face serious political consequences for its involvement. Meanwhile, Türkiye’s role in supporting the Sudanese army is slowly but steadily shifting the balance on the battlefield. This trend could significantly shape the trajectory of the war in the coming months, potentially leading to the reestablishment of military control. However, this remains a long-term process, and peace efforts, humanitarian aid, and diplomatic pressure from the international community will continue to play a decisive role.