From battlefield to boardroom: Turkey’s grip on Libya

Over the past 14 years, Turkey’s involvement in Libya has shifted from a narrowly focused military intervention to a complex, multi-layered engagement that intertwines security, economic, mediation and political interests. Initially aimed at protecting allied factions and safeguarding strategic corridors, Ankara’s approach has gradually expanded to include Libya wide energy deals, infrastructure contracts, and direct influence over local governance—turning Libya into a testing ground for Turkey’s broader regional ambitions. Effectively, Turning Libya into a platform for Ankara’s ambitions across the eastern Mediterranean and into Africa. That posture complicates European policy choices: Ankara now deploys leverage in migration, energy and arms contracts that EU capitals struggle to counter.

Back in 2011, Ankara’s role in the NATO-led campaign to oust Gaddafi was hesitant and cautious, with then-prime minister Erdoğan warning of the dangers of foreign intervention while contributing naval assets. The caution was all the more striking given that, only months earlier, Erdoğan had flown to Tripoli to accept the Al-Gaddafi International Prize for Human Rights, praising Turkey’s “dignified stance against all sorts of injustice” and pocketing a generous cash award. He even conferred with Gaddafi on Libya–Turkey relations — a cordial scene that critics now recall with disbelief. Yet within months, the prize winner had become the adversary: Erdoğan was publicly urging Gaddafi to quit Libya, offering him “guarantees” of safe exile, and soon after lending Turkish weight to the NATO air campaign that helped seal his fate. Few episodes capture the speed — and self-serving pragmatism — of Ankara’s pivot as starkly as this turn from laureate to would-be executioner. Fourteen years later, Turkey has moved from reluctant participant to the decisive foreign actor on the ground, using Libya as a springboard for regional influence. 

 Turkey’s growing assertiveness in Libya quickly moved beyond diplomacy and prize ceremonies. By 2019, Ankara had deployed troops, drones, and military advisors to support the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), ostensibly to prevent the fall of Tripoli to another potential dictator — Khalifa Haftar, who was then being portrayed by Ankara in the same terms it once used for Gaddafi. What began as a security intervention soon became an instrument of leverage: Turkish companies secured lucrative contracts in reconstruction, ports, and energy, while military deployments signalled that Ankara could project power far beyond its borders. Even more striking was Turkey’s pragmatic engagement with Haftar’s camp: after years of being cast as a villain, Haftar’s inner circle was gradually courted, with his sons and senior officials visiting Ankara for discussions on reconstruction contracts and security cooperation. This dual strategy — armed support for one side while cultivating ties to the other — demonstrates Turkey’s willingness to hedge bets, extract influence, and maximize gains, regardless of previous moral or political alignments. Notably, Khalifa Haftar himself could land in Ankara anytime before the end of the year, further cementing the thaw in relations and highlighting Ankara’s evolving approach to Libyan leadership.

 Turkey’s deepening involvement in Libya is not merely a matter of military presence but also a strategic expansion of its geopolitical and economic footprint. In June 2025, the National Oil Corporation of Libya (NOC) and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for offshore oil and gas exploration in Libyan waters. This agreement underscores Turkey’s intent to secure energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, a region fraught with competing interests and help its policy of energy diversification already in progress. However, Turkey’s top priority from the Haftar camp now is to have the maritime deal ratified by his ally, the eastern-based parliament. This move would not only legitimize the agreement but also solidify Turkey’s strategic position in the region.

 Turkey’s Libya strategy combines alliance-building with strategic leverage. By supporting the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, Ankara secured a strong local ally while simultaneously using the government’s legitimacy to bolster its claims in disputes with Greece over maritime boundaries. The 2020 maritime agreement, which formalised Libya-Turkey EEZ claims, provided Ankara with a level of legitimacy in the Eastern Mediterranean that it had never previously enjoyed: Libya’s long Mediterranean coastline and strategic location give it disproportionate weight in regional maritime issues, while Ankara’s agreement with the UN-recognised GNU confers a form of de facto recognition to Turkey’s claims that it could not achieve alone. Beyond military support, Turkey’s engagement allows it to influence reconstruction contracts, ports, and energy projects, turning its Libyan presence into a multipurpose tool: a base of operations, a diplomatic lever, and an economic foothold. Notably, Turkey is now trusted even by conflicting parties: both the GNU and Radaa accepted its role as guarantor of a recently signed deal aimed at avoiding clashes in Tripoli. At the same time, Ankara maintains working ties with Moscow, carefully managing relations with Russia while competing for influence over Libyan factions. In doing so, Turkey has turned Libya into both a platform for regional influence and a shield against challenges to its maritime ambitions. Turkey’s multifaceted influence in Libya — as a guarantor, military actor, and economic partner — extends beyond bilateral deals, positioning Ankara as a key arbiter whose cooperation will be crucial for any external roadmap, including UNSMIL’s latest efforts to stabilize the country.

 With Ankara positioned as a key arbiter, the success of UNSMIL’s latest roadmap will depend in part on Turkey’s cooperation. Its military presence, economic leverage, and diplomatic role allow it to facilitate agreements between Tripoli and the eastern authorities or, conversely, slow their implementation if interests diverge. For European capitals, Turkey’s Libya strategy illustrates the limits of external influence: EU policy must account for a state capable of simultaneously supporting the GNU, hedging with Haftar’s camp, and asserting claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. For Libyans, the consolidation of foreign influence underscores the fragility of national sovereignty and the ongoing stakes of post-2011 power struggles, regardless of popular sentiment toward external actors. Libya has evolved beyond a civil conflict: it is a pivot for regional ambitions, a platform for projecting influence, and a litmus test of whether externally brokered roadmaps can be realized in practice.

 Taken together, Turkey’s Libya strategy illustrates a decisive recalibration of regional influence. While the EU, the United States, and the African Union invested heavily in Libya after 2011, their efforts have largely failed to produce the stable, unified state they envisioned. Ankara, by contrast, has advanced on multiple fronts: securing military influence, economic footholds, and diplomatic recognition, while managing ties with competing factions and external powers. Its presence now shapes political outcomes, maritime claims, and regional alignments, demonstrating how a strategically nimble actor can outmanoeuvre larger, more cautious players. Libya is no longer merely a domestic conflict; it has become a pivot for regional ambitions, a platform for projecting influence, and a test of whether external interventions can achieve their intended objectives.

Source: https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20251002-from-battlefield-to-boardroom-turkeys-grip-on-libya/