Egypt and the new Syria: Concerns about the spread of revolution
Extreme fear and caution dominate Egypt’s ruling circles regarding the new Syria in the post-Assad era. This comes amid a campaign to discredit Syria’s new leadership, cast doubt on their intentions and spread fear among Syrians about an uncertain future.
Cairo appears to be one of the most hard-line Arab capitals in response to recentdevelopments in Syria, despite being geographically distant from Damascus. In contrast, countries like Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have made rapid moves forrapprochement. The latter two have already hosted Syria’s new foreign and defence ministersin Riyadh and Doha respectively.
Egyptian concerns are likely to deepen if the transitional government led by Ahmed Al-Sharaa and his team succeeds in establishing a bright new political system grounded in Islamic ideology. This would undoubtedly alarm Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, who harbours strong animosity towards Islamists and led a brutal military coup to oust themfrom power in mid-2013.
As of now, Egypt has not sent any officials to Damascus to meet Syria’s new leaders, nor has it invited them to Cairo. It seems that the Egyptian regime has yet to fully grasp the situationor recover from the shock of Assad’s flight.
Despite a month passing since ousted President Bashar Al-Assad fled on 8 December, Egypt’sengagement with Syria has been limited to a phone call between foreign ministers. In the call, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty urged his Syrian counterpart, Asaad Al-Shaibani, topursue a “comprehensive political transition led by Syrians without external interference, safeguarding Syria’s unity, stability and Arab identity.”
On a modest scale, Egypt sent its first humanitarian aid flight to Damascus last Saturday, carrying 15 tons of assistance. Meanwhile, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the European Unionannounced an airlift to provide substantial humanitarian support for Syrians.
Over the past four weeks, Egyptian media figures with ties to intelligence and securityagencies have launched fierce attacks on Al-Sharaa. Prominent MP and media figure MostafaBakry described the transitional government as a “gang of murderous terrorists” in a post on X. Similarly, broadcaster Ibrahim Issa warned on his show “Cairo Talk” about the “greatdanger” posed by the alleged presence in Egypt of Al-Sharaa’s family, particularly in 6th of October City to the west of the capital.
Moreover, Egypt’s aviation authorities recently restricted Syrian nationals from entering thecountry without prior security approval, including those holding European, American orCanadian residencies. These restrictions also included Syrians who are married to Egyptianswithout security approvals.
Such measures hint at intentions to limit the presence of Syrians in Egypt and possibly deportsome to Syria.
From Egypt’s perspective, Syria’s developments have undermined Al-Sisi’s efforts torehabilitate Assad’s regime, break his international isolation and close the chapter on ArabSpring revolutions, consolidating the status quo.
After more than 13 years, the resurgence of an Islamist movement in Syria has alarmedgovernments in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and the Gulf. They fear that Syria’s successfultransition might inspire renewed uprisings elsewhere in the region.
Two major developments intensify Cairo’s concerns: growing international acceptance of Syria’s new leadership due to its moderate and pragmatic approach; and Turkey’s unwaveringsupport for Syria’s post-Assad transition to ensure its stability.
However, Egypt’s ability to counteract the Syrian revolution faces significant obstacles. Thefirst is Saudi Arabia’s support for Syria’s transitional government, which complicates anypotential opposition from Cairo as it won’t want to lose a strong ally like Riyadh. The secondis that the collapse of Assad’s regime has weakened Iran’s influence, thus aligning Damascuswith US, European and Gulf interests.
Egypt has limited options given the dissolution of the Syrian army and deep-state institutions, alongside the armed revolution building new military and intelligence systems. This makes it difficult to replicate the counter-revolutionary scenarios seen in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia andSudan.
According to one Egyptian political analyst who requested anonymity, the UAE has manipulated Sudan through the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, and has, alongside Egypt, meddled in Libya by supporting the eastern forces led by General Khalifa Haftar. However, in Syria, there is little that counter-revolutionary regimes can use or manipulate, except for theKurdish card, which could cause problems within Syria, but which Turkey is already workingto neutralise.
Egypt is concerned deeply about the potential ripple effects of the Syrian revolution, especially amid its ongoing economic crisis, deteriorating human rights conditions, politicalstagnation and the loss of any popular support for Al-Sisi at the start of his third term in office, which extends until 2030.
Doubts and security concerns weigh heavily on Egypt, fuelled by the appearance of Al-Sharaaalongside one of the opposition figures who is hostile to the Egyptian regime. This is compounded further by the limited presence of Egyptians within Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, as well as the close relationship between Damascus and Ankara. These factors place Egypt in a political dilemma: whether to open up to the transitional administration and secure a footholdin the new Syria, or to maintain a cautious approach while waiting for assurances andguarantees from Syria to alleviate its concerns.
The matter will depend ultimately on key Egyptian conditions, mainly preventing the Syrianrevolution from spreading; avoiding interference in Egyptian affairs; refraining from aligningwith groups opposed to the Egyptian government, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Egyptian authorities classify as a “terrorist” organisation; and prohibiting the use of Syrian territory as a refuge for Egyptian opposition members.
Furthermore, Egypt might soon demand the extradition of Egyptian nationals convicted in absentia of “terrorist crimes”.
Experts believe that Turkey’s growing influence in Syria might push Egypt toward engagingwith Damascus. Stability in Syria could benefit regional security and open economicopportunities for reconstruction projects, valued at an estimated $300 billion, of which Egyptcan have a share.
Researcher Mohamed Abdel Ghani expressed optimism when he told me that Egypt’sconcerns over Syria’s ideological orientation may fade over time. The new Syrianadministration has emphasised the need to build strong ties with neighbours.
Foreign Minister Al-Shaibani said recently on social media that Syria seeks “strategicrelations with Egypt while respecting the sovereignty of both countries and avoidinginterference.”
Should the US remove Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham from its terrorist lists and lift sanctions on Syria, Cairo may have no choice but to engage positively with the new government in Damascus under arrangements possibly mediated by Ankara or Riyadh.
Thus, it is not in Cairo’s interest to sever ties with Damascus, nor is it politically pragmatic todelay rapprochement with the transitional leadership at a time when regional and internationalpowers are seeking footholds of influence in the new Syria. This approach also aims to ensurethe avoidance of a repeat of the Libyan crisis or the emergence of a new Sudan in the region.