Democracy, capitalism and violence: All good things don’t go together
I want to thank colleagues at IEPRI for allowing me the privilege to participate in this most important anniversary seminar. …
If it was not already clear, the last ten years have given us plenty of evidence that the existence of formal democratic institutions (rules) and organisations is no guarantee against violence. Democratic forms of government are much more fragile than liberal or institutional theorists have argued. When the individuals and organisations that occupy positions of economic, ideological and military (or lethal) power – these are the dimensions of power that underpin any state as I argue in other work on “political settlements” – when those who command this power in a democracy do not act by the rules and principles of democracy, then the political power that is held by the state, exercised through its executive, legislative and judicial functions, can rapidly become autocratic and violent. This legitimises and provokes violence throughout society, as a means of addressing conflicts over property, access to resources and all those services that we understand as public goods. The very idea of who is a citizen becomes weaponised. It also legitimises violence against the state itself by those in society who are excluded and systematically discriminated against.
This is what is happening with the rise (or one might argue the re-emergence) of right populist politics in the US, Germany, France, Italy, the UK – in fact right across much of Europe. But these trends have, over the past ten years, increasingly characterised the polarised politics of low and middle income countries – in Brazil, Argentina, India, the Philippines, Colombia and many more. In many other developing countries, where the so-called “third wave of democracy” did not amount to more than hollow formal constitutions, military coups d’état have been welcomed by important parts of society in countries like Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Pakistan.
Why is this happening and what might be done to counter this evisceration of the idea and practice of democracy and the proliferation of violence as a means to gain and wield political power?
First, it is necessary to recognise there is nothing inevitable about a linear progression of societies to become increasingly democratic. Quite the opposite. The idea that economic and political change occur in tandem, that economic development and the spread of democratic freedom go hand in hand, never had a sound empirical basis. This was the thinking propagated by modernisation theorists in the US, but also the institutional theories of both the early and later Douglass North and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson. This expectation of a linear progression towards democracy also lies behind the unhelpful but apparently attractive recent use of the concept of “democratic backsliding”.
The spread of Democratic politics was not coterminous with economic development in most of those countries that achieved accelerated development in modern times – Germany of the latter 19th Century and early 20th Century, South Korea and Taiwan and China and Vietnam in the late 20th Century.
My late colleague, Thandika Mkandawire, was convinced that the pursuit of democratic freedoms and practices could and had to be a driver of development in Africa. This he argued not with the philosophical propositions of Amartya Sen and his notion of “development as freedom”, but from his own empirical research on just how deeply autocratic forms of government impeded development in the continent. He argued that the violence and anti-democratic character of colonialism, followed by the collaboration of many post-colonial African leaders with global capitalist interests, needed to be countered through building democratic nationalist coalitions – perhaps cross class coalitions – in pursuit of accelerated development.
The point here is central to what I want to argue today, that there is no spontaneous co-evolution of democracy and economic development as preached in liberal theory. Democracy can only emerge through conscious and purposeful political agency. I would argue that this is a terrain of ideological struggle – the painstaking battle over what is and is not legitimate. This takes on particular salience when we consider the contradictions between democracy and capitalism.
So the second aspect of democratic fragility is that there has always been a tension between the principles and freedoms of democracy and the practice of capitalism. This is not a new insight, but perhaps we need to be reminded. All those freedoms of democracy that are so rightly valued have always been threatened by capitalism:
- The freedom of fair and regular elections (that most desirable feature of democracy which allows the leaders of the state to be changed by society) – the democratic principle of people electing their government has long been threatened by money determining electoral outcomes (as true in the US as in the Philippines) reaching new heights with the tech billionaires of today whose money crosses many borders to fund political campaigns.
- The freedom of speech and the circulation of ideas so important to democracy is perpetually curtailed by the private ownership of all forms of media reaching extremes in social media today. The only counter to media being simply the mouthpiece of its private owners has been journalists themselves acting as professional associations within civil society to defend standards of independent journalism and free speech.
- The freedom of association, another pivotal characteristic of democracy, has existed in tension with the power of corporations to bust trade unions, rural organisations, environmental movements, or even solidarity movements like those opposing Israel’s annexation of Palestine, by brutal force or by buying legislation.
- The right of citizens to due process through an independent judiciary has been thwarted by the asymmetrical power of the wealthy to buy legal expertise – the Marcos family’s well-documented theft of national resources saw not one of them spend a day in jail while peasant activists were shut up in prison – and the Marcos family is now back in power.
The power of financial capitalists acting through bond markets to constrain democracy is in evidence all around us. This is what Andy Burnham is facing as he tries to renew the Labour government in the UK in the face of the challenge from the far right. We saw it in action in June here in Colombia, when finance capital gave their vote to Espriella, “the Tiger”, with his promised radical cuts in social spending.
Thirdly, democracy has been severely weakened in rich and poor countries alike by 40 years of neoliberalism. Gains made in taming private capital in the wake of the great depression and WWII, were radically reversed. Profound damage was done to the legitimacy of democratic principles as they were associated with the globalisation of capitalism. Social democracy almost everywhere capitulated to neoliberal programmes and actions. This has spawned widespread cynicism towards democracy, both because of the inequalities in income and life chances for large parts of populations in democratic countries, but even more the privileges amassed by practicing democratic leaders – the fortunes made by the Clintons, Blair, Schmidt and so many other democracy advocates after they left office. More than anything else this bred the cynicism towards democracy that opened the way to the rise of right populist politics.
The fourth reason for democratic fragility, and particularly important to our topic, is that democratic forms of government have never been immune to violence. Most of the wealthiest democracies were born of land-grabbing, genocide and colonial pillage – the scars of which last until today. The tyranny of the majority, so eloquently identified by the theorists and practitioners of democracy, is a constant danger to the peaceful practice of politics. The mobilisation of votes through identity politics has provided fuel to the exercise of violence against minorities and to minorities, who have been systemically excluded, exercising violence in self-defence or as the only means to be heard.
The violence unleashed through asymmetric lethal military power by capitalist democracies beyond their borders – the list is long including Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Guatemala, Chile, the Belgian Congo, Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Libya – provides a strong empirical basis to counter the idea that democracy is antithetical to violence.
What conclusions can one draw out of all of this? Let me offer a few reflections.
Today, the rise of right populist politics demonstrates the fragility of democracy and legitimises the pursuit of political goals through violence. While the rise of the MAGA movement in the US, of AfD in Germany, of Le Pen in France, of the Bolsonaros in Brazil are not a repeat of Nazi and Japanese fascism that led to World War II, the similarities are striking. One of the reasons why this has been possible is the weak critique of the fascist movements in the last century. The assumption that capitalism intrinsically promotes democracy is dead wrong and the history of those fascist movements proves this. The critique of the corporate power that collaborated with fascism was muted in the wake of the defeat of fascist regimes, in the rush to confront socialism. The companies that profited during the fascist period went on to become the behemoths in the economies of capitalist liberal democracies. Today it has become legitimate for the far right in Germany to use Nazi symbols and language. The deeper critical analysis of the history of fascism needs to inform the study of democracy and violence today.
People crave the predictability that peace can provide and will punish, when they have the chance, those who are perceived to perpetuate violence. The “perception” is key here. Ideological power is more important than many of us thought in the past. People crave simple explanations for complex problems, for why the world is the way it is. This is the basis for ideological power, an astute observation of Michael Mann, among others. Ideological power has its source in the desire of people to believe in something without the need for evidence. In the past we treated ideological power largely in terms of the grand battles between democracy and authoritarianism, or capitalism and socialism, largely ignoring the everyday fight over ideological power – this involves the fight over what is and is not legitimate behaviour. The fight over ideology, over legitimacy, needs much more attention in peace and conflict studies.
Years ago I published a paper about the Philippines entitled “The Survival of an Imperfect Democracy”. In it I argued that one of the most important implications of achieving at least a formal democratic constitution, like a formal peace agreement, is that this creates a terrain for people to organise to claim their rights. The outcome is not predetermined and depends in a major way on the agency of political actors and organisations.
But peace and democracy are highly vulnerable when conflict continues to be cast in what Hirschman called “indivisible” terms – “all or nothing” terms. When politics is waged on the grounds of identity – race, region, language, religion – there is little room for compromise. He argued that achieving peace becomes more possible when conflict is recast in “divisible” terms – “more or less” terms, dividing up a pie differently. This allows the space for negotiation and bargaining. Nothing more impedes peace or weakens democracy than framing conflict in indivisible terms.
Peace is precarious when it does not address the social, economic, security and ideological causes that led to, or sustained, violent conflict in the past.
If I have argued anything here, it is that democratic forms of government are not an “end state”. Those with economic, ideological and military/lethal power in a democracy need to constantly demonstrate a credible commitment to enforce democratic rules and principles or they will render those rules and principles illegitimate. Today, in rich and poor countries alike, democracy is in a precarious position.
Afterword
In the weeks since the conference three important positive manifestations of democratic mobilisation took place, proving the case that political organisation and agency are decisive in the face of the fragilities of democracy. On 25 October 2026, Brazilian voters defied all predictions and turned out in their millions for the second round of voting in the presidential elections re-electing President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeating the right populist Flávio Bolsonaro. On the same date in Serbia, the mobilised youth movement toppled the authoritarian regime of Aleksandar Vučić, electing to parliament not students themselves but professionals selected by them to challenge and roundly defeat the inheritors of Slobodan Milošević who controlled the parliament. However, lacking a disciplined political organisation, it is not at all clear whether they will be successful in bringing about a transformation of the authoritarian state.
On 4 November 2026, in mid-term elections in the United States, the Democratic Party dealt a serious blow to President Donald Trump and his MAGA movement, winning control over both chambers of the Congress making deep in-roads into states thought to be solidly Republican. In Texas, which has not seen a Democrat elected to the Senate in decades, James Talarico won a decisive victory despite the millions of dollars channelled to his MAGA rival by the billionaire tech magnate Elon Musk. In fact, political organisation was able to challenge big money politics also in Ohio by electing Democrat Sherrod Brown despite the millions spent by crypto billionaires opposed to Brown’s efforts to regulate their sector. So, while the power of capital to curtail and undermine democracy will not disappear, purposeful political organisation can curb it.
In all these contests and in other places, like in India, young voters have played an important part in mobilising for change. Their energy and aspirations can be mobilised to confront right populist politics and bolster democracy, but to be consequential they need political organisation and well thought-out programmes for change.
*James Putzel is Professor of Development Studies and served as the Director of the Crisis States Research Centre. He headed the Centre’s research programme on Crisis States, which was funded by the Department for International Development of the UK government. From 1996 to 1999, Professor Putzel was a member of the British Academy’s Southeast Asia Committee, a managing editor of the Journal of Development Studies from September 1999 until January 2001 and remains a member of the editorial board. He was a member of the advisory board of the Institute for Latin American Studies of the University of London between 1999 and 2002.
Source: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/internationaldevelopment/2026/11/12/democracy-capitalism-and-violence-all-good-things-dont-go-together/