Comparing 20th Century Britain and 21st Century America
Dominance to Dilemma: The Rewards and Risks of Strategic Prioritization for 20th Century Britain and 21st Century America
Fitting for the sovereign of the seas, Queen Victoria’s 1897 Diamond Jubilee climaxed in a display of naval power. At the Spithead Review on June 26, an armada of 165 warships saluted Prince Edward. Against these brave proceedings, Rudyard Kipling struck a discordant note. “Far-called, our navies melt away; On dune and headland sinks the fire,” his Recessional prophesied. Naval intelligence confirmed his forebodings. 92 years after Trafalgar in 1805, British naval mastery was ebbing. In 1883, the British fleet possessed as many battleships as all others combined. By 1897, the ratio was 2:1 against it. Strategic insolvency threatened: British squadrons were too few, too far apart, and facing too many adversaries to protect vital interests, a situation greatly exacerbated by Germany’s pursuit of a battle fleet in the North Sea.
A decade later, Britain’s situation seemed to have improved markedly. Strategic prioritization reconcentrated a newer and larger battlefleet in home waters to counter Germany. Obsolete ships, outdated practices, and unaffordable missions were scrapped. Friendships were formed with the United States, Japan, France, and Russia. Prioritization, however, also brought risks. Abandoning the navy’s traditional diplomatic, commercial, and policing duties frayed the disparate empire. Embracing Japan diminished Britain’s relevance in the Far East. Alignment with the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance entangled Britain’s global interests with its allies’ continental priorities, a perilous combination in July 1914. Addressing why Britain gained and lost its naval dominance, how it regained security through prioritization, and what risks prioritization entailed are relevant as the United States today confronts similar opportunities and uncertainties.
Few states have lost less and benefited more from war than Britain after 1815 and America after 1945. Following Napoleon’s final defeat in 1815, Britain produced two-thirds of the world’s coal, half of its iron, and half of its cotton. Similarly, post-WWII, half of the world’s manufacturing, two-thirds of its gold reserves, a third of its exports, and half of its shipping were American. These economic advantages were further complemented by geopolitical developments. For 50 years after the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, only Britain enjoyed a significant network of overseas colonies and bases. Admiral Jacky Fisher boasted that London controlled the “five strategic keys [to] lock up the globe!”—Dover, Gibraltar, Cape Town, Alexandria, and Singapore. Similarly, by 1970, the United States deployed one million soldiers in 30 countries, maintained defense treaties with 42 nations, and supported 100 countries with military and economic aid. Like Fisher’s “five strategic keys,” Washington dominated four of George Kennan’s five “centers of industrial and military power:” the United States, Britain, Germany, and Japan (the fifth being the Soviet Union).
Neither 19th-century Britain nor postwar America were unchallenged. France alarmed Victorians by invading Algeria in 1830, launching the ironclad Gloire in 1859, and intervening in Spanish politics. Likewise, the USSR’s gains in Eastern Europe, its advances in nuclear weapons, and its “third world” adventurism bedeviled America. Challenges were real, but seldom acute. In the 19th century, though France held Algiers, Britain was able to use its Mediterranean dominance to support Greek and Italian independence, protect Turkey, and frustrate Egyptian, Russian, and French regional ambitions. Similarly, after 1947 the United States used its command of the Western European and East Asian “rimlands” of Eurasia to control most of the world’s maritime activity.
Assured of economic and geopolitical superiority, Britain and America chose to project power globally. The Royal Navy suppressed piracy, interdicted slave ships, responded to disasters, and “opened” (via cannonade) ports reluctant to trade. Over 100 British ships were deployed on foreign stations around 1850. Only 35 were retained for home waters. Similarly, during and after the Cold War, U.S. armed forces dispersed globally, providing deterrence, reassurance, and diplomatic/humanitarian support. The U.S. Navy became practiced at “showing the flag” to exert influence via imposing aircraft carriers. Whether in helping tsunami victims in Indonesia, destroying armored columns in Iraq, or protecting seaways from piracy, the U.S. military is as globally far-flung and flexible as its British predecessor.
In both cases, comparative economic decline bespoke the dangers of maintaining such an expansive strategic outlook. In 1875, Britain held a third of global manufacturing capacity, comparable to America’s share of the global economy in 2000. By 1905, Britain’s share had fallen by half, less than the newly-unified Germany. Today the United States constitutes a quarter of the world economy. The People’s Republic of China, just 3% of the global economy in 2000, now constitutes a sixth. Germany, which had no fleet in 1875, initiated construction of 19 modern battleships in 1897. Ten years ago, none of the world’s largest defense firms were Chinese. Now, four of them are, including the two largest.
A declining share of global production does not necessarily spell doom for great powers, but it does require prioritization. Britain initially resisted prioritization, neither reorganizing its navy to guard against growing threats nor employing diplomacy to reduce tensions. The results were grim. Already in 1884, the French approached the British in modern battleships. Alarmed, parliament in 1889 legislated a “two power standard” whereby the Royal Navy would remain larger than the combined fleets of the next two largest navies. Nevertheless, in 1894 the allied Franco-Russian fleets outnumbered the British in the Mediterranean and East Asia. The United States displaced British naval mastery in North America, while Japan approached parity in East Asia. In 1905, Germany doubled its projected fleet from 19 to 38 first class battleships. During the Boer War, the Royal Navy feared it could not transport troops to South Africa without denuding key stations. Once dominant, Britain was overstretched and isolated. Historian John Seely worried that, next to its larger rivals, Britain was like “sixteenth century Florence surpassed by the great-country states.”
The United States has also begrudged prioritization, preferring to not make a choice between the “peace” dividends from reduced defense spending and enjoying the influence that comes with a global range of commitments. The consequence of this in East Asia is parity in Sino-American power. In 2000, the United States operated 100 more warships than China. By 2030, China will operate 135 more warships than the U.S. Navy. PRC investments in ballistic missiles like DF-21D and DF-26, growth in its cruiser and destroyer fleets, and the doubling of its submarine and advanced fighter and bomber forces jeopardize American operations in East Asia, particularly around Taiwan. American weapons which would mitigate PRC advantages like the Constellation-class missile frigate and Virginia-class submarine are mired in production delays. In most simulations of a Sino-American clash in the Taiwan Strait, “the United States usually depletes its inventory of long-range anti-ship missiles within the first week.”
Britain overcame its strategic dilemma by economizing and intensifying naval strength. It could do so because, after 1901, it recognized that it could not afford the enmity of all the other great powers. To prioritize the threat Germany’s battlefleet posed to the home islands, politicians like Arthur Balfour and Edward Grey ameliorated relations elsewhere, entering into Britain’s first defensive treaty in decades with Japan, by renouncing isthmian canal rights to the United States, and by compromising on colonial claims with France and Russia. Strategists like Fisher reconcentrated strength in homewaters and expanded modern battleship construction. Diplomatic conciliation enabled Britain to reinforce the North Sea fleet with ships withdrawn from North America and East Asia. Fisher’s restructuring resulted in a newer, larger, and better trained force prepared for combat with Germany.
The United States announced a “pivot to Asia” in 2011. It named China a “peer competitor” in 2017. Since then, naval redeployments to the Pacific have occurred, as have diplomatic overtures like AUKUS. Yet U.S. prioritization of East Asia is at best incomplete. Past initiatives, like Franklin Roosevelt’s War Production Board, offer precedents for revitalizing defense production and closing the materiel gap with the PRC. Reviving shipyard subsidies could similarly restore shipbuilding. Still, as Britain found with its “Two Power Standard,” production increases absent strategic direction are insufficient. Fisher scrapped the Victorian navy’s beloved “gunboats” for modern dreadnoughts. The United States should prioritize newer weapons-systems relevant to conflict with China, even at the cost of discontinuing legacy systems. Britain acknowledged the necessity of entrusting some of its interests to the protection of allies. American prioritization of East Asia depends on encouraging Europe to develop sufficient industrial capacity and military integration to deter Russian aggression with reduced American support. This is likelier to be assisted by making concessions on trade policy than by asserting territorial rights to Greenland. Prioritization may incur steep costs for America as it did Britain. Prioritizing weapons-systems optimized for the Taiwan Strait could diminish U.S. ability to project influence and protect interests elsewhere. European deference to American leadership would decrease in proportion to the decline in European dependence on American security guarantees, as Britain found with dominions like Australia. These risks rest on a recognition that the postwar conditions which underpinned American primacy have attenuated. That recognition may be unwelcome, but it is fast becoming necessary.