Center-Periphery Balance in Foreign Policy and Africa

In the context of foreign policy, Africa’s most fundamental characteristic is that it is the geography where the balance between the center (central government) and the periphery (non-central social groups) is most acutely felt. Alongside the continent’s vastness, its diversity—from ethnic communities to tribes, from languages to local affiliations—renders national politics and foreign policy extremely complex. The fact that nation-state building remains incomplete in many countries further elevates the importance of the relationship between the center and the periphery. On the continent, the center-periphery distinction is not only geographical but also decisive in terms of political representation, economic distribution, and social belonging.

Therefore, foreign policy approaches aimed at understanding the continent and building lasting relationships must be able to comprehend and respond not only to the official positions of states, but also to the expectations of peripheral communities. In other words, the reality that foreign policy is shaped by both inter-state relations and inter-societal balances must be placed at the core of these relations. The fundamental principle of such an approach requires bearing in mind respect for the sovereign rights of states while taking all these differences into account.

Türkiye in Africa

In recent years, Türkiye’s policy of opening up to Africa has gained remarkable momentum through steps such as increasing diplomatic representation, organizing humanitarian aid within a more structured framework, and expanding the reach of cultural institutions. However, despite this momentum, there is a strong perception that Türkiye’s foreign policy has not yielded the expected outcomes in Africa, particularly in the areas of crisis management and stability-building. The prevention of tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia is a significant indicator of Ankara’s capacity to offer solutions. However, despite both sides in Libya maintaining good relations with Ankara, the fact that state-building remains unresolved is a serious issue. The lack of a more active stance regarding the ongoing conflict in Sudan is another topic of debate.

Another important point is that relations with Africa are predominantly assessed in terms of figures and institutional presence. Numbers are certainly important, but they do not mean much on their own. What truly matters is the evaluation of independent impact assessments of the institutions established and the activities carried out, results-based management (RBM) indicators, and feedback mechanisms from local stakeholders. Such evaluations can provide a healthier framework. When the relevant analyses are taken into account, the potential of policies that take the center–periphery balance into consideration and engage with various layers of society to produce meaningful outcomes becomes evident.

Of course, engaging with various social segments in the host country may occasionally cause discomfort among administrators. However, this is a manageable issue and should not be considered a deterrent in itself. This is because, on the continent, the distance between the state and society is quite wide. Capitals often represent the interests of a narrow elite rather than the nation as a whole. Consequently, capital-centric relations are insufficient to generate a lasting social response in the rest of the country. Accurately interpreting the structural fragility caused by this situation is critically important for the future of African policies.

The Limits of Capital-Centered Diplomacy in Africa

In the majority of African states, capital cities were constructed according to the spatial priorities of the colonial era. These cities were generally established in coastal regions or in locations that were easily accessible to colonial administrations. As a result, they functioned as the “center,” while the vast remainder of the country’s territory remained the “periphery.” This structural inequality has largely persisted in the post-colonial period. State institutions, bureaucracy, diplomacy, and media have become concentrated in the center, while rural areas and regional power hubs have been excluded from political processes.

This situation renders relationships with external actors fragile. In many African countries, the de facto authorities shaping people’s daily lives are often not official state institutions, but rather traditional leadership structures, religious networks, regional militias, and local trade systems. Therefore, foreign policy cannot focus solely on elite political mechanisms located in capital cities—it must also take into account these multi-layered authorities that exert influence throughout the country. Such an approach can also significantly limit the negative consequences that may arise in the event of a shift in power at the center.

Defining national legitimacy solely through a capital-centered lens represents a narrow sphere of legitimacy, especially when considering Africa’s ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity. This produces serious vulnerabilities. Indeed, in countries such as Sudan, Libya, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, tensions between the center and the periphery have laid the groundwork for civil wars and separatist movements. These conflicts, in turn, have led to instability, disruptions, and unpredictability in foreign policy.

Therefore, establishing relations with a country in Africa cannot be limited to shaking hands with the head of state. To understand the country’s real dynamics, one must take into account local power centers, tribal leaders, religious communities, youth movements, civil society networks, and regional trade channels. Capital-based diplomacy reduces this complex, multi-layered structure to a single plane and thus fails to create lasting impact on the ground. Moreover, when a centralized approach is adopted—one that struggles to communicate with the host country or ignores local sensitivities—the structural problem in question deepens even further.

Other Actors’ Approach to Africa and Türkiye’s Difference

External actors active in Africa shape the center–periphery balance according to their own strategic priorities. China, for example, adopts an approach that prioritizes central governments through large-scale infrastructure investments, such as the railway projects in Ethiopia under the Belt and Road Initiative. However, it is also clear that these projects have drawn criticism in peripheral regions due to concerns over debt burdens and economic dependency. In response, China seeks to mitigate this backlash and strengthen its social base by engaging directly with the periphery through Confucius Institutes, local education scholarships, and cultural programs.

France, on the other hand, conducts a diplomacy based on post-colonial elite networks, as seen in the Barkhane Operation in the Sahel. Yet this approach creates an exclusionary effect, particularly among rural communities, and contributes to the rise of anti-French rhetoric.

The United States adopts a more security-oriented framework in African politics. While developing cooperation with states through AFRICOM, it also seeks to include local communities in the process through “local ownership” programs implemented via USAID. This dual approach aims to balance security-based policies with social development initiatives.

The European Union offers a more institutional model of engagement through development funds, rule-of-law initiatives, and agricultural and rural development programs. The EU’s Global Gateway initiative also enables interaction with both central and peripheral actors in areas such as infrastructure, energy, and digital transformation. In this way, the EU’s presence in Africa is situated within a more normative and institutional framework compared to other actors.

Unlike colonial powers, Türkiye generates notable social sympathy across the continent through humanitarian aid, social development projects, and instruments of cultural soft power—such as Turkish television series with large audiences. In Somalia, hospitals, schools, and military training facilities established by Türkiye foster a strong sense of trust among local communities; in Nigeria, the fact that young people view Turkish TV series as a means of cultural connection illustrates the breadth of this interaction. Nevertheless, African societies expect more from Türkiye than cultural affinity alone; they demand increased economic partnership, local employment opportunities, and projects aligned with the African Union’s 2063 Vision.

By transforming its social sympathy and flexible state–NGO cooperation capacity into systematic ties with local communities, Türkiye can clearly differentiate itself from other actors. This would allow Türkiye to offer a partnership model that is more compatible with Africa’s multi-layered socio-political dynamics.

Africa Policy: A Capital-Centered Approach

Since the early 2000s, Türkiye has achieved significant diplomatic and economic gains on the continent through its “Opening to Africa” policy. As frequently emphasized, the number of embassies, which stood at 12 in 2002, has now surpassed 44; Turkish Airlines flies to more than 60 destinations across Africa; TİKA has opened offices in numerous countries; and institutions such as the Diyanet, the Maarif Foundation, and the Yunus Emre Institute are actively operating—greatly increasing Ankara’s visibility on the continent. These figures clearly demonstrate the progress Türkiye has made over the past two decades in terms of diplomatic outreach and institutional presence. However, there is a widespread perception that this visibility is often shaped by a capital-centered framework.

Yet Africa’s political and social structure is filled with dynamics that limit the effectiveness of a capital-centric foreign policy. In many countries where state capacity is weak and local power networks are strongly prominent, critical political decisions are often determined not by official structures in the capital, but by regional militias, religious authorities, tribal councils, or local trade networks. Therefore, while it is certainly important for Ankara to strengthen its relations with friendly governments in Africa, establishing a lasting and deep influence also requires maintaining continuous engagement with various segments of society—not just central governments.

Türkiye holds significant advantages in this regard. In the historical memory of the continent’s peoples, there is no negative perception associated with Türkiye or its Ottoman past. Due to cultural proximity and humanitarian aid efforts, the current perception is largely positive in most countries. Thus, forming a socially deep network of engagement is relatively easy and provides Türkiye with a notable advantage over other external actors. However, for this advantage to translate into a tangible sphere of influence, there is a need for a more inclusive diplomatic architecture—one that goes beyond the capital-centered model and incorporates local communities, traditional authorities, and civil society into the process.

The Missing Leg of Soft Power: Social Access

Türkiye’s “Africa Initiative” program was initially designed around the opening of embassies, the provision of humanitarian aid, and the expansion of institutional presence. However, the program now needs to move into a new phase—one focused on building social access and local networks that will ensure the genuine and lasting impact of soft power. This phase is technically feasible, there is social demand for it, and the conditions are favorable. Therefore, Ankara must go beyond the limitations of capital-centered and institution-focused approaches and elevate its relations to a new level. One of the main problems here is the assessment that activities are being carried out without coordination among institutions and, in some cases, are limited only to engagement with central governments.

To institutionalize this transition, Türkiye could establish an Africa-focused “Soft Power Coordination Board.” This board would bring together TİKA, the Maarif Foundation, the Diyanet, the Yunus Emre Institute, AFAD, the Turkish Red Crescent, NGOs, local governments, and the private sector under a unified strategy—reducing fragmentation and systematizing social outreach. At the same time, the board could help prevent the waste of resources and the dilution of impact caused by the parallel implementation of field projects.

Soft power derives its meaning not merely from cultural or humanitarian activities, but from the ability to build relationships of trust with various segments of society. Türkiye has significant tools in Africa—TİKA, Diyanet, Yunus Emre, Maarif, AFAD, Red Crescent, and NGOs—all of which hold great potential. The issue is not to keep this potential confined to the permissions of central governments, but to transform it into concrete partnerships at the level of rural areas and local communities. Collaborations with local actors in areas such as education, agriculture, health, and entrepreneurship can ensure both economic development and the diffusion of political legitimacy to the grassroots. This approach increases social trust and guarantees the sustainability of soft power.

For instance, the popularity of Turkish television series in Africa is quite effective in generating cultural sympathy. However, whether this sympathy has translated into political trust and social influence has yet to be measured. Therefore, the current advantage remains limited unless it is transformed into a coordinated, multi-actor governance structure. In other words, while Türkiye does possess genuine soft power, it has not yet fully achieved the depth needed to strengthen local capacity and establish lasting cooperation networks among state institutions, local governments, civil society, and the private sector. Unless this gap is addressed, the social impact of soft power will remain temporary, and its long-term strategic effects will be limited.

A New Diplomatic Vision: Reading the Center and the Periphery Together

To make its presence in Africa sustainable and effective, Türkiye must reshape its diplomatic structure and field strategy. Several critical steps stand out in this regard. The first is engagement with local actors and regional specialization. Turkish foreign policy should move away from a one-size-fits-all “Africa as a whole” approach and develop strategies tailored to sub-regions such as the Sahel, East Africa, West Africa, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa. In this process, systematic engagement should be established not only with official institutions but also with local tribal councils, religious communities, regional trade networks, youth platforms, and women’s organizations. Regional analysis units and field-oriented expert teams will strengthen the flow of information from the center to the field.

The second is civil diplomacy and social outreach. Universities, municipalities, professional associations, and NGOs should be integrated into Africa policy, and institutionalized coordination between the state and civil society must be ensured. Media partnerships and publications in languages widely spoken across the continent should be supported. In addition, scholarship programs and joint curricula will contribute to community-based diplomacy. These kinds of approaches will deepen Türkiye’s visibility on the continent.

The third is a partnership perspective and an egalitarian approach. Türkiye must move beyond the role of a country that “helps” Africa and position itself as an actor that “co-produces.” Projects aligned with the African Union’s 2063 Vision and regional trade initiatives will facilitate the development of an egalitarian discourse and long-term shared interests. This approach enables the establishment of lasting relationships on both economic and political fronts.

The fourth is local expertise and diplomatic capacity. Mechanisms for interaction with African-origin advisors, academics, and field experts should be established. This will help ensure that Ankara’s policy vision aligns with local contexts. Diplomatic staff who are sensitive and responsible will increase the effectiveness of the proposed steps. Additionally, the development of feedback mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating activities in the field is of great importance.

Diplomacy Extending from Capitals to the Continent

Any external actor seeking to make a lasting impact in Africa must understand the continent’s multi-layered structure. Relationships built with capital cities are important—but they are not sufficient. True legitimacy lies in the bonds formed with the people and in the relationships of trust developed with local communities. Türkiye’s accumulated experience in Africa provides a strong foundation for initiating this transformation. By expanding its diplomatic vision from capitals to the field, from elites to society, and from protocol to partnership, Ankara can build a model that aligns with Africa’s socio-political dynamics.

This vision allows not only for success in foreign policy, but also for the establishment of a justice-based partnership with the peoples of the continent. By developing systematic ties with local communities, Türkiye can make an egalitarian contribution to Africa’s pursuit of development and stability. In doing so, Türkiye and Africa can together lead the way in constructing a new future, pioneering a community-focused diplomacy model for the Global South.

The fundamental principles of this partnership model are: transparency and an open, accountable approach in all projects and collaborations; mutual capacity building through education and cooperation programs that strengthen local competencies; and the creation of local employment opportunities so that projects provide direct economic benefits to communities. Institutionalizing these principles in Türkiye’s project designs in Africa will strengthen community-based legitimacy and generate a genuine soft power effect.