As the World Is Rebuilt: On the Threshold of the Technopolitical Age

The gravest error in the ongoing debates on artificial intelligence (AI) is that we continue to regard it merely as a technological issue. Yet today, it is not technology alone that is changing; power relations, the strategic maneuverability of states, the political influence of corporations, and even humanity’s very place in the world are being redefined. The debate before us, therefore, is not so much an engineering question as it is a question of the principles upon which a new world order will be founded.

Today, the real question is not which AI model is more capable, but who will write the rules of the order these technologies will shape. The answer to this question will, to a great extent, determine the course of international competition in the years ahead.

Not Technology, but Power Relations

History shows that great transformations cannot be explained solely by the emergence of new tools. The steam engine made industrial society possible; yet it was not the machine itself that changed the world, but the system of production built around it. Nuclear technology, likewise, did not merely alter the course of warfare; it reshaped the entire balance of international politics throughout the Cold War.

Artificial intelligence now stands at the threshold of a comparable rupture. The issue is not how “intelligent” algorithms are, but how this capability is redistributing power relations among states, technology companies, and society. Today, the rivalry between Washington and Beijing is not simply about developing more advanced AI models. A broader struggle for strategic supremacy is unfolding, spanning everything from chips and data infrastructure to energy capacity and computational power. Supply chains extending from semiconductors to data centers are likewise becoming an integral part of traditional security policies.[1]

One of the most significant works in Türkiye to systematically address this transformation is the report titled Technopolitical Order Debates in World Politics and Türkiye, published by the National Intelligence Academy. The report’s principal contribution lies in its refusal to treat artificial intelligence (AI) merely as a matter of digital transformation or technology policy; instead, it examines AI through the intersecting axes of state capacity, international competition, social hierarchy, and the future of humanity. Given the scarcity of studies in Türkiye offering a conceptual framework on this scale, the report provides an important basis for debate.[2]

The Grammar of a New Era

One of the most striking concepts in the report is the metaphor of “grammar.” At first glance, it may appear to be a literary choice, yet it actually points to a powerful political claim. Grammar does not merely determine how words are arranged; it also shapes the way we think. When the grammar of an era changes, explaining the new world through old concepts becomes increasingly difficult.

This is precisely the challenge we face in today’s debates on artificial intelligence (AI). We continue to discuss the issue within the narrow confines of technology policy. Yet AI has already become central to state theory, international politics, economic competition, and debates on civilization. We are no longer speaking merely of a new tool, but of one of the fundamental elements shaping the political logic of the new era.[3]

Three Approaches, One Question

One of the report’s most significant contributions is that it does not reduce the debate on artificial intelligence (AI) to a simple distinction between “supporters” and “opponents.” Instead, it shows that the real divide arises not from the answers given to technology, but from the question that is asked first. Today, the global debate is largely shaped by three distinct approaches.

The first is technorealism. This approach views AI as one of the defining elements of geopolitical competition. From this perspective, the issue is not simply developing better applications; it is about strengthening the state’s strategic capacity and ensuring that it does not fall behind in the global struggle for power. This school of thought, associated with Palantir, regards Silicon Valley’s long-standing focus of its engineering expertise on consumer applications as a major strategic mistake.

The second is technopragmatism. Represented by Anthropic, this approach recognizes that AI simultaneously creates tremendous opportunities and serious risks. It therefore prioritizes the safe, auditable, and controlled development of powerful AI systems.

The third is technohumanism. Rather than placing the state or corporations at the center of the debate, this approach places the human being at its core. It evaluates AI in terms of human dignity, the common good, and social legitimacy. The encyclical Magnifica Humanitas by Pope Leo XIV is also discussed in the report as one of the most visible recent expressions of this approach.[4]

What distinguishes these three approaches is not that they view technology in fundamentally different ways, but rather their priorities. Technorealists ask, “How can the state become stronger?” Technopragmatists ask, “How can we make these systems safe?” Technohumanists, meanwhile, turn to a more fundamental question: “How can we protect the human being at the end of this transformation?”

One of the report’s greatest strengths lies in its treatment of these three approaches not as mutually exclusive and self-contained ideologies, but as three distinct lenses that illuminate different aspects of the same reality. Each reveals an important aspect of the problem; yet none, by itself, explains the whole picture.[5]

Türkiye: Neither at the Center nor on the Periphery

The significance of this debate is different for Türkiye. Türkiye neither participates in the race for artificial intelligence as one of the core producers of technology, like the United States or China, nor does it occupy the position of a purely regulatory actor insulated from security pressures. Regional security challenges, the pressures of economic competition, the need for greater efficiency in public services, and the imperative of institutional transformation are all unfolding simultaneously.[6]

At first glance, this may appear to be a disadvantage. Yet this very reality also presents a significant opportunity. Türkiye neither enjoys a security environment comfortable enough to rely solely on ethical principles nor occupies a position from which every issue can be explained exclusively through power politics. For this reason, rather than importing a ready-made model, it must develop an original approach that balances its own security needs with the values it represents.

This is not a matter of choice, but a strategic necessity.

In the forthcoming articles, we will examine these three approaches more closely. We will begin with technorealism, which emerged in Silicon Valley and is increasingly evolving into a new security doctrine. We will then discuss the human-centered critique advanced by technohumanism. In the final article, we will revisit this entire framework from Türkiye’s perspective and assess what kind of state capacity and what kind of technopolitical vision are required.

For the issue is not merely the development of more powerful artificial intelligence (AI) systems. The real question is who will determine the rules of the order to be established in the age of AI, and whether Türkiye will become a passive follower of that order or one of its founding actors.

As the international order is rebuilt, those who are absent from the table where the rules are written will inevitably be obliged to abide by those rules afterward.

Footnotes

[1] National Intelligence Academy, Technopolitical Order Debates in World Politics and Türkiye, Ankara, July 2026, pp. 5, 13–14.

[2] Ibid., pp. 5, 13–15.

[3] Ibid., p. 5. The report states that the “grammar” of global politics, the economy, and the socio-cultural order will be shaped by technopolitical debates.

[4] Ibid., pp. 30–31. The discussion of the encyclical presented here is based not on the encyclical itself but on the report’s account of it.

[5] Ibid., pp. 14–15, 18–33; see also Infographic 1 and Table 1.

[6] Ibid., pp. 36–40.