Afghanistan: Iran’s Unstable Land Bridge

The Strait of Hormuz is no longer simply a geopolitical pressure point. Since the US naval blockade of Iranian ports and the disruption of commercial shipping through the strait, regional trade has already begun adjusting to a more fragmented and uncertain environment.

Roughly a fifth of globally traded oil passes through Hormuz, and the recent escalation sharply disrupted commercial traffic through the corridor. Shipping companies suspended or delayed transits, maritime insurers raised war-risk premiums, and shipping delays and disruptions spread across the Persian Gulf’s logistics networks.

Even as limited commercial movement resumes and the United States and Iran edge toward a deal reopening the strait, the crisis has exposed a broader strategic problem. Maritime access in the Persian Gulf can no longer be treated as fully reliable during periods of escalation. That uncertainty is already increasing interest in overland trade corridors linking Iran to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and neighboring markets.

The disruption extends beyond naval confrontation itself. Maritime insurers sharply increased war-risk premiums or withdrew coverage entirely for parts of the Gulf, while major shipping firms rerouted vessels around Africa or suspended transits altogether.

Afghanistan has already become part of this adjustment process. Repeated border disruptions with Pakistan in recent years have encouraged Afghan traders to diversify their routes of access through Iran and Central Asia, particularly via the Chabahar port in eastern Iran and western Afghan crossings. Afghan transit through Chabahar expanded significantly after repeated Pakistan-Afghanistan border closures, with Kabul increasingly promoting the port as an alternative trade corridor less vulnerable to bilateral political disputes.

Iran’s engagement with the Taliban has expanded pragmatically in areas such as trade, border management, and regional connectivity, despite continuing tensions over water disputes, refugees, and security concerns. Border clashes and disputes over the Helmand River have repeatedly exposed the fragility of the relationship, even as both sides continue cooperating economically.

That relationship remains limited and highly contingent. Cooperation gives Iran access to overland corridors, but not political reliability or strategic control. As maritime access becomes more uncertain, Iran is likely to place greater emphasis on overland trade networks linking it to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and neighboring markets. Regional reporting already suggests that prolonged disruption in Gulf shipping increases the strategic importance of alternative corridors, particularly for regional trade and sanctions adaptation.

Pakistan has also eased some transit restrictions in recent years to facilitate trade flows to Iran and Central Asia, reflecting a broader regional effort to diversify routes amid uncertainty. When maritime routes become uncertain, overland corridors gain importance despite being slower, politically more complex, and more vulnerable to disruption.

The Taliban has generally tried to avoid dependence on any single regional actor, balancing ties with Iran, Pakistan, Gulf states, China, and Central Asia. Greater Iranian reliance on Afghan corridors could increase Kabul’s bargaining importance, but not necessarily produce long-term political alignment.

But this shift will not happen in a neutral environment. The United States is already targeting the networks that sustain Iranian trade. Sanctions increasingly focus on intermediaries, shipping firms, financial channels, and third-country actors. Recent measures include penalties on foreign entities linked to Iranian oil flows.

Sanctions have pushed Iranian exports into indirect networks, front companies, and intermediaries. Sanctions do not eliminate trade. They reshape it by increasing costs, complexity, and reliance on less-visible channels. Trade in Afghanistan often relies on cash transactions, informal intermediaries, and fragmented cross-border networks, resulting in uneven enforcement.

Iranian oil offers a clear example. Despite sanctions, it continues to reach global markets through alternative channels. The same logic would apply to land routes. Pressure would increase, but trade flows would likely adapt through intermediary networks, indirect shipping arrangements, and informal financing channels.

At the same time, Taliban authorities would likely try to avoid actions that invite direct sanctions pressure. The Taliban has little interest in becoming the focal point of a sanctions campaign. Its economy is already constrained, and its access to the global system is already limited. It cannot afford escalation.

Afghanistan does not operate in isolation. Persian Gulf actors remain part of their external environment. If Iran becomes more dependent on overland routes, those corridors could gain additional strategic value for regional actors seeking influence over trade access, financing, and logistics. Rather than aligning exclusively with Iran, the Taliban has continued to balance relations with multiple regional actors.

Security makes this more fragile. Economic corridors require stability. Iran would expect tighter border control if it depended on Afghan routes. But Afghanistan has long been a space where regional rivalries play out indirectly.

Border enforcement and state control remain uneven across parts of Afghanistan, creating persistent vulnerabilities for any corridor dependent on long-term stability. This creates a different kind of problem for Iran. Land routes reduce reliance on maritime chokepoints, but increase reliance on political conditions.

Any long-term Iranian reliance on Afghan corridors would remain constrained by political uncertainty and the Taliban’s preference for strategic flexibility. The blockade of Iranian ports and the prolonged disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz suggest that the region is entering a period in which maritime access can no longer be assumed to remain stable during crisis escalation.

That does not mean overland corridors can replace Gulf shipping infrastructure. They cannot for the simple reason that land transport cannot equal the shipping capacity of maritime transport. Afghanistan’s own infrastructure, governance, and security limitations remain significant constraints, too.

But the crisis has already demonstrated that even partial maritime disruption pushes regional actors toward fragmented and politically complicated alternatives. Afghanistan is unlikely to become a stable trade corridor, but it may become a more strategically relevant one as states seek redundancy in an increasingly uncertain regional environment.

 

*Fatemeh Aman has written on Iranian, Afghan, and broader Middle East affairs for over 25 years and advised US and non-governmental officials. A former non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, a writer, producer, and anchor at Voice of America, and a correspondent at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, her work has appeared in Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, Jane’s Intelligence Review, and the Stimson Center’s Middle East Perspectives.

 

Source: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/silk-road-rivalries/afghanistan-irans-unstable-land-bridge