Activities of the NILI Spy Organization on the Palestine–Syria Front During World War I

At the end of the war, the British acknowledged NILI’s services and expressed their gratitude at every opportunity. NILI’s contributions made it easier for Britain to implement arrangements in favor of the Jews in Palestine, which it later took under mandate. The founders of NILI, the siblings Aaron and Sarah Aaronsohn, became legendary figures in the developments that led to the establishment of Israel and secured their place as important personalities in the Jewish world. The Turkish public, however, has not sufficiently come to know this “Trojan horse,” which affected the fate of the Ottoman Empire during World War I.

Celil Bozkurt*

January 22, 2026

 

Source: ATATÜRK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ DERGİSİ, Issue 88, pp. 89-114,  2014.

 

Abstract

During World War I, the Palestine–Syria Front, which determined the fate of the Ottoman State, also witnessed the intelligence wars of the great powers. Britain was among the states that most extensively and effectively conducted intelligence activities through various channels. The NILI spy organization, founded by Jews and active on the Palestine–Syria Front, became one of the most important intelligence sources used by the British in Palestine. NILI agents collected information on matters such as the number of soldiers in the Ottoman army, the chain of command, headquarters locations, and morale, and conveyed this information to the British Intelligence Service in Egypt. NILI’s contribution played a significant role in the British army’s determination of tactical strategy and in winning the war.

Introduction

Anti-Jewish sentiment, whose origins date back to ancient times, took on an institutional identity in Europe in the last quarter of the 19th century. Pressures and expulsions imposed on Jews, particularly in Germany and Russia, gradually affected the entire European continent. In many countries, Jews were isolated from society and deprived of most human rights. As a reaction to the intensifying anti-Jewish sentiment in Europe, the Jewish world introduced Zionism into world politics. According to Zionists, Jews could attain peace only by establishing an independent and national state in Palestine, which they regarded as their ancestral homeland. To this end, Zionists initiated a colonization movement in Palestine starting in the 1880s. In particular, Jews who received the financial support of the Jewish businessman Edmond de Rothschild purchased thousands of acres of land in Palestine and established many settlements there.1

The First Zionist Congress, convened in Basel in 1897 by Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian Jew, marked a turning point for Zionism. At this congress, Zionists systematized and concretized Palestinian policy for the first time. The congress decided to establish a “homeland” for Jews in Palestine under the guarantee of public law. In line with this goal, it resolved to organize the universal Jewish diaspora, strengthen national consciousness, and establish contacts with relevant governments.2 At that time, Palestine was a province of the Ottoman State. For this reason, Herzl came to Istanbul five times and made contacts with Ottoman statesmen. In exchange for Palestine, Herzl promised to pay all Ottoman State’s foreign debts and to curb the anti-Ottoman movements flaring up in the West. However, he failed to persuade the reigning Sultan, Abdulhamid II. While Abdulhamid kept the doors of the Ottoman Empire open to oppressed Jews, he excluded Palestine from this policy due to certain concerns. Moreover, he took strict measures to prevent Jews from entering Palestine and acquiring property there.3 Nevertheless, Zionists succeeded in bringing thousands of Jews into Palestine through illegitimate means. By 1908, the Jewish population in Palestine had tripled compared to 1876, the year Abdulhamid ascended the throne. During this period, Jews purchased 40,000 acres of land in Palestine and established 33 settlements.4

The outbreak of World War I in November 1914 became a ray of hope for Zionists’ plans for Palestine. The rival leaders of the war, Germany and Britain, entered into a competition to win over the Zionist movement in line with their own interests.

If an independent Jewish state were established in Palestine, Germany could deport the Jews to Palestine and use it as a sphere of influence in the East. In addition, by influencing Zionist circles in America, it could gain the financial and propaganda power of the Jews.5 Britain, on the other hand, needed to maintain control over Palestine, which had great geopolitical importance for the security of the land and sea routes to India. A buffer zone to be created there could neutralize a potential Turkish threat directed at the Canal and Egypt during the war. Britain could benefit not only from Zionism’s propaganda power in world politics but also from its function as a “Trojan horse” that would serve as a “fifth column” within Ottoman Türkiye. Furthermore, Jewish colonies that had managed to infiltrate Palestine despite all the prohibitions of the Ottoman State could make major contributions to the British offensive in Palestine.6

Although the World Zionist Organization remained neutral at the beginning of the war, over time it was drawn toward a pro-German position due to the dominance of Central European Jews within the organization. The Zionists’ preference for Germany was based on two main reasons. Firstly, Russia, the sworn enemy of the Jewish world, was also an enemy of the Central Powers. Zionists feared that if Russia won the war, the Jews living there would completely lose their right to life.

Second, Palestine, which was the Zionists’ objective, was Ottoman territory, and the Ottoman Empire was an ally of Germany. Moreover, the brilliant victories won by the Allies at Gallipoli and Kut al-Amara against the Entente Bloc had put them one step ahead in the war.7 However, the efforts of Haim Weizman, a Russian Jew residing in England, shifted the initiative away from the German-dominated World Zionist Organization to London. According to Weizman, if Britain won the war, the Ottoman Empire would collapse and Palestine would become an independent territory. If the Zionists could prove that they were the natural allies of the British during World War I, they would be able to impose the arrangements they desired in Palestine after the war.

In this direction, a Jewish unit was formed under the leadership of a Russian Jew named Vladimir Jabotinsky. Trained in Cairo under the command of Colonel John Henry Patterson, the unit was sent to the Gallipoli Front on April 17, 1915, to fight against the Turks. The legion, consisting of 500 soldiers, 750 mules, and 20 officers, went down in history as the “Zion Mule Corps.”8 Subsequently, at the beginning of 1917, another “Jewish Legion” was formed, again under Jabotinsky’s leadership. This legion, consisting of five thousand men, was placed under the command of General Allenby, who was stationed in Egypt, in February 1918.9 Many Jews living in Palestine who were Ottoman citizens voluntarily joined this legion.10 The “Zion Mule Corps” and the “Jewish Legion” were symbolic for the Zionists, yet they were important steps in the process leading to the Balfour Declaration. Taking into account the contribution of the Zionists, the British Government announced in a letter written by Foreign Secretary James Balfour in November 1917 to Walter Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community, that it viewed favorably the establishment of a “national home” for the Jewish people in Palestine, provided that the religious and civil rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine were respected, and that it would support this endeavor.

The letter, known as the Balfour Declaration, became one of the major causes of the historic Arab–Israeli conflict. This was because Zionists, interpreting the term “national home” in the declaration as the establishment of a “state,” always regarded the declaration as a guarantee of an independent Jewish state.11

The greatest support the Zionists provided to the British during the war came through their intelligence activities on the Syria–Palestine Front. The NILI spy organization, established by Jews in Palestine in 1915, supplied the British with vital information about the Allied forces deployed in the region. Having a significant impact on the course of the battles fought in the area, the NILI organization is not sufficiently known in Turkish public opinion. This study will examine the details of the NILI espionage organization’s founding, activities, and impact on the war.

1. Establishment of the NILI Spy Organization

NILI was founded by the Jewish botanist Aaron Aaronsohn.

Born in Romania, Aaron took refuge in the Ottoman Empire with his family in 1882 due to the surge of anti-Jewish sentiment in Eastern Europe. Aaron and his family were settled in the Zikhron Ya’akov colony, established by Rothschild to the south of Haifa.

When Aaron turned 18, he was sent to France on a Rothschild scholarship to attend an agricultural school. During his years of education, Aaron embraced Zionist ideas aimed at expanding Jewish colonization in Palestine and establishing a Jewish homeland there. After graduating, he was appointed as an agricultural expert to the settlement of Metulla, operated by Rothschild and located on the hills of Galilee near the Lebanese border. However, when his Zionist ideas were noticed by Ottoman administrators, Aaron was exiled to a farm in Anatolia. Returning to Palestine in 1910, Aaron established an agricultural experiment station in Atlit (The Jewish Agricultural Experiment Station). By discovering wild wheat in Palestine for the first time, Aaron gained worldwide fame. Through this achievement, he frequently traveled to America and Europe for scientific purposes and, in the process, established contacts with leading figures of Zionism.12

Aaron believed that world Jewry, which was subjected to severe antisemitic pressures in many countries, could attain peace only by establishing an independent state.

The location of this state, according to Aaron, had to be the lands of Palestine, which Jews had transformed into a religious phenomenon as the “Promised Land.” In Aaron’s view, the strict settlement and property restrictions imposed by the Ottoman State on Jews in Palestine made this impossible. An independent Jewish state could only be established in a Palestine freed from Ottoman sovereignty.13

The Ottoman Empire’s entry into World War I against the Entente Powers as an ally of Germany constituted an opportunity for the Zionists. The rapidly expanding war brought Turkish and British forces face to face in the Middle East. According to the Zionists, a possible British victory would mean that Palestine would pass out of Ottoman control and come under British authority. In this way, the restrictions on Palestine could be lifted and the region opened to Jewish settlement. From then on, all Zionist efforts would concentrate on ensuring a British victory and contributing to it as much as possible.

Unlike other Zionist strategies, Aaron adopted an approach aimed at capturing the fortress from within by the British. Accordingly, providing the British with regular intelligence about the Ottoman forces controlling Palestine could facilitate the British invasion of the region. In this direction, Aaron established his own intelligence organization in Palestine, known as NILI.14 The name of the organization derives from the acronym NILI, taken from the Hebrew password “Netzach Israel Lo Ishakare,” meaning “The eternity of People of Yisrael will not fail,” which its agents used among themselves.

The organization’s activities in Palestine were carried out by Aaron’s sister Sarah,15 Naaman Belkind from the settlement of Rishon LeZion, and Yosef Lishansky, a former member of HaShomer who had founded an intelligence organization called Hamagan in southern Palestine. Naaman Belkind operated on the front opened in Rishon LeZion, a Jewish settlement in southern Palestine. His brother, Eytan Belkind, served in the office responsible for combating locusts within the Fourth Army of the Ottoman State, headquartered in Damascus on the southern front. Using his position within the army, Eytan engaged in intelligence activities in Transjordan and Hauran in favor of the British.16

2. Activities of the Organization

At the beginning of the war, Aaron was appointed as an adviser to Cemal Pasha in the Fourth Army and was assigned to the office responsible for combating locust infestations.17 He was provided by the Ottoman police with a “travel permit” in order to conduct scientific research.

Thanks to this, Aaron established contacts with high-ranking military and civilian authorities in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. He also found opportunities to travel easily to European countries such as Berlin, Vienna, and Switzerland. Using his closeness to Cemal Pasha, Aaron obtained the defense plans of the Ottoman Empire’s Arab provinces in June 1916 and shared this vital information with British intelligence in London.

He also promised that he could solve the water problem that the British army was experiencing in Palestine and Syria by showing them the water resources located in the region. Attracting the attention of the British, Aaron entered into intense negotiations over Palestine with British statesmen such as G. H. Fitzmaurice and Mark Sykes. He emphasized that he could provide intelligence support to the British during the war on the condition that they would recognize Jewish sovereignty to be established in Palestine after the war. Having finally convinced the British, Aaron was assigned to the British base in Cairo to coordinate intelligence activities to be carried out by Jews in Palestine in favor of Britain. After Aaron left Palestine, the espionage activities of NILI began to be directed by his sister Sarah.19

NILI became the most important voluntary espionage organization used by British intelligence during World War I. At the senior level, NILI had 23 active members.20

The organization consisted mostly of amateur young people between the ages of 24 and 27. Rapidly expanding, it developed a vast spy network numbering in the thousands. While its espionage activities were initially limited to Atlit, they soon spread across a wide area encompassing all of Palestine and Syria.

NILI began collecting intelligence on many issues, such as the number of soldiers in Ottoman units stationed in Palestine and Syria, the condition of the fronts, logistical and support structures, positions and movements of units, and the state of roads and railway lines used by the troops. Motivated by the ideals of the “Promised Land” and an “independent Israel,” the organization made use of young and attractive Jewish women to gain access to Allied officers. Female agents, through the relationships they established with military authorities, were able to obtain vital information about the Allied armies.21

Some officers within the Ottoman army secretly supplied intelligence to NILI. Among them was a Turkish officer named Second Lieutenant Bahaaddin Efendi, who cooperated with Belkind and Lishansky. Bahaaddin Efendi later deserted the front under the alias Shabetay and fled abroad.

There he joined Prince Sabahattin and became involved in publishing a newspaper addressed to the army.22 In particular, Jewish officers sympathetic to NILI maintained close relations with the organization. For example, Nahum Wilboschwitz, who was responsible for water affairs in the Fourth Army in Damascus, occasionally passed on information he gathered during his travels to Jordan and Hauran to NILI agents.23 On the other hand, some non-Turkish officers in the Ottoman army exchanged information with NILI in return for bribes. Engle notes that these officers were separatists who harbored hatred toward Ottoman laws. For instance, the information sources of Naaman Belkind, one of NILI’s senior officials, were Albanian-origin officers in the army.24

NILI was also able to easily establish contact with Jewish organizations living in neutral states during the war. Jews who came to Istanbul from abroad for various purposes provided support to the organization’s espionage activities.25

Sarah Aaronsohn, the highest authority of NILI in Palestine, at times traveled for intelligence purposes to cities with intense military activity such as Jerusalem, Haifa, Tiberias, Nazareth, and Damascus. During these journeys, Sarah gathered information on matters such as the movements of the Turkish army, the condition of the units, and the morale of the population. On one such occasion, Sarah embarked on a 12-day journey across Palestine together with Yosef Lishansky and obtained important information, particularly in the popular hotels of Jerusalem and Damascus frequented by young officers.26

The intelligence collected by NILI agents dispersed across the Palestine–Syria Front was gathered at the Agricultural Experiment Station in Atlit, which functioned as the British intelligence base in Palestine. This intelligence was delivered on certain days by Sarah and other leaders of the organization to the British Intelligence Office in Egypt.

NILI maintained contact with Egypt through various methods. Initially, the organization used a courier system. This system was established after one of NILI’s pioneers, the Zionist Absalom Feinberg, made contact with British intelligence in Egypt.

Important information was handed over in the form of written reports to British agents who came to the region. Highly sensitive information was regularly delivered to the British patrol ship Monegam (which the spies called Menachem), which docked along the Jaffa coast. The spies signaled the Monegam by hanging laundry on the balcony of the Agricultural Experiment Station. White laundry indicated that the coast was safe and the route was clear, while colored laundry signaled the presence of Turkish patrols on the shore and that contact was not possible.27 On the nights when the ship arrived, Sarah organized tea and gambling parties, inviting important figures from the Turkish units stationed in the area in order to distract their attention. The spies descending to the shore were transported to the ship with the help of Arab boatmen. In this operation, the spies acted in cooperation with Arab collaborators. Once aboard, the spies handed over the intelligence they carried in leather bags to British officials. In return, they received various documents, newspaper reports, and large amounts of gold to be used in their activities. Dangerous moments were also experienced during these exchanges. For instance, on one occasion a German submarine commander came ashore at Atlit and, while returning to the coast, noticed the Monegam moving away. However, due to the foggy weather, the German commander was unable to identify the ship.28

This system was employed in late 1915. However, bad weather conditions and mistakes caused the system to fail. In such cases, the organization’s agents risked extremely dangerous journeys by rowing boats to the Egyptian coast to establish direct contact with British intelligence. Information that was not urgent was placed in bottles containing notes written in Hebrew and thrown into the sea to be collected by the Monegam.29

In addition to espionage activities, NILI also conducted propaganda operations against the Ottoman State. NILI agents in England and the United States disseminated anti-Turkish propaganda developed in Arnold Toynbee’s propaganda unit in London, attempting to draw the United States into the war on Britain’s side. In this context, the organization fed world public opinion with fabricated stories about alleged Yishuv oppression carried out by the Ottoman State in Palestine. Toward the end of 1917, the organization collaborated with Armenian agents to spread rumors that Cemal Pasha was preparing a coup against the Ottoman government and had made an agreement with the British to that effect.30 The organization’s propaganda activities were also effective on the Palestine–Syria Front, where Turkish–British battles were intensifying. NILI agents employed the most subtle techniques of psychological warfare to create panic among the war-weary people of Palestine, undermine public morale, and incite the population to revolt against the government.31

NILI’s espionage activities were met with backlash from some influential Jewish organizations in Palestine. Chief among these was the HaShomer (Hebrew for “guardian”) Society. Founded in Palestine in 1909 as a workers’ movement, HaShomer provided security for the agricultural activities of Jews settled in Palestine. At the same time, it was the first defense organization established by Jews in Palestine against their opponents. It later formed the basis of the Haganah, which became the nucleus of the Israeli army.32 HaShomer believed that NILI’s espionage activities carried out on behalf of the British put Jewish settlements in Palestine at risk. Although HaShomer harshly warned NILI’s leaders on this matter and eventually pursued a policy aimed at eliminating NILI, it did not succeed.

3. Measures Taken by the Ottoman State

During World War I, the opposing powers were aware that success on the fronts depended on obtaining reliable intelligence about the enemy and determining military tactics accordingly. For this reason, with the outbreak of war, an intense intelligence struggle began in both Entente and Central Powers territories. This situation forced the belligerents to confront an irregular element as well: espionage.

One of the fronts where spies were particularly active was the Syria–Palestine Front, where Ottoman–British battles took place. In line with intelligence reports received from the region, the Ottoman State duly warned Turkish units against this insidious enemy. In one such instance, the Ministry of the Interior sent a telegram to the Jerusalem Mutasarrifate warning about secret organizations operating in Palestine and Syria and requesting that their activities be investigated.33 In another communiqué marked “urgent and highly confidential,” sent to the provinces of Syria, Beirut, Aleppo, and Adana, as well as the mutasarrifates of Mount Lebanon, Teke, and Menteşe, the same ministry reported that a spy organization led by an Englishman named Mister Omblus was collecting information about the southern coasts of Anatolia and the Ottoman forces stationed in Syria and Palestine. This organization had two branches in Egypt composed of Arabs and Jews, and a third branch in Cyprus. Members of the organization, landed on the coasts by private vessels, transmitted to British intelligence in Egypt the information they obtained from Zionist Jews, Christian Arabs, and Muslim Arabs opposed to the government.34 Another notable British intelligence structure in the region was the intelligence bureau established in Kalas. The bureau was headed by a British first lieutenant named Breson. The spies trained there traveled to Istanbul via the Babadağ-Constanta route. From there, they dispersed either along the İzmir-Beirut-Damascus route or the Istanbul-Aleppo-Damascus route. Ottoman authorities took some security measures regarding these spies. They emphasized the need for strict searches of passengers traveling on the Palestine-Syria route, particularly increasing controls along the coastal areas.

They also demanded careful inspection of passengers arriving by northern railways and overland routes, paying particular attention to travel documents.35

For the Ottoman State, determining under which law spies captured before the war should be tried constituted a major problem. In addition, there was the obligation to comply with the 1907 Hague Convention, which regulated international rules to be observed during warfare. Acting accordingly, the Ottoman General Staff requested that its embassies in London, Berlin, and Paris send copies of the laws applied in their respective countries to combat espionage. Subsequently, as a result of the deliberations of the Council of State (Şura-yı Devlet) and the Council of Ministers (Meclis-i Vükela), a Provisional Law on the Disclosure of Military Secrets, Espionage, and Treason in Wartime was promulgated on October 29, 1914. This Provisional Law, consisting of 21 articles, bore the signatures of Minister of the Navy Ahmed Cemal Pasha, Minister of Justice İbrahim Bey, Minister of War Enver Pasha, and Grand Vizier Mehmed Said Pasha.36

The Provisional Law explained in detail the circumstances under which espionage would arise and the penalties to be imposed in return, including capital punishment, exile, imprisonment, penal servitude, and fines. Article 14 of the law, which defined the death penalty, contained the following clause on espionage in its fifth paragraph: “To commit espionage, that is, to communicate or maintain relations with the enemy for the purpose of increasing the enemy’s power, or to attempt to obtain information for the benefit of the enemy, or knowingly to receive and employ a spy.”37 Following the promulgation of the law, spies captured in Ottoman territories began to be tried by courts-martial (divan-ı harb), which were special tribunals established under extraordinary conditions such as wartime.

In Palestine, Jews who retained the nationality of foreign states and thereby acquired immunity engaged in various espionage activities in violation of Ottoman regulations. Receiving intelligence to this effect, Fourth Army Commander Cemal Pasha confiscated the weapons of many individuals living in Jewish colonies in Palestine toward the end of 1916. However, the Jews managed to evade the authorities by burying most of the weapons underground.38 Turkish authorities declared that Jews must acquire Ottoman citizenship and submit to Turkish laws, otherwise they would be expelled from the country. Despite this, Jews who insisted on retaining foreign nationality were expelled from Palestine.39 Local administrators frequently warned Jewish communities to expose spies and not to protect them. In one such instance, the district governor of Jaffa gathered the Jewish population at the Ramla Mosque and delivered a forceful speech, urging them to assist the authorities in combating espionage.40

Jews who periodically came to Palestine from foreign countries were also part of anti-Ottoman espionage activities. The Ottoman State imposed strict security measures on Jews traveling to and from Europe via Istanbul. In this context, a group of 30 Jews returning from Jerusalem to Austria was detained in Istanbul on suspicion of espionage. These families were interrogated under tight security, and their departure was delayed by 30 days.41 In addition, some Jews who resided abroad while their families lived in Palestine were deported from Palestine on suspicion of espionage. One such case was the Aspira family, residing in Jerusalem. The head of the family, Aşrek Aspira, lived in The Hague and frequently came to Palestine under the pretext of family visits, acting as a courier. Considered to have been proven a spy, the Aspira family was forced by Cemal Pasha to relocate outside Palestine and Syria. At the family’s request, they were exiled to Eskişehir. As the Aspira family held Austrian nationality, the embassy of that state requested Cemal Pasha to halt the exile. In response, Cemal Pasha pointed out that the embassy might make a similar intervention in Istanbul and drew the attention of government officials there, stating that the family should not even be kept in Eskişehir but instead be expelled abroad, thereby ensuring that “the country would be rid of yet another deeply rooted element of subversion.”42

When the British army under the command of General Allenby advanced from the Sinai Peninsula toward Palestine in March 1917, the Ottoman State decided to evacuate certain cities due to security concerns for civilians. In March 1917, Gaza was evacuated, followed by Jaffa in April. In a detailed report submitted to the government, Fourth Army Commander Cemal Pasha provided important information regarding the evacuations. According to his statement, “the evacuation of Jaffa and Gaza was carried out in a very calm and orderly manner.” The evacuation applied to all residents; Muslims, Christians, Jews, and foreign nationals alike. Those engaged in production, such as farmers, factory owners, and members of agricultural schools, were exempted from evacuation. The evacuees were permitted to go anywhere they wished outside the Sanjak of Jerusalem.43 Transportation of the population was carried out free of charge by military trains. The protection of the remaining houses and properties was entrusted to “special committees” selected from among the populace.44 Meanwhile, the most controversial aspect of the evacuation involved the Jews, who were resettled in other Jewish villages in the districts of Jaffa, Tiberias, Haifa, and Safed. Due to “provisioning difficulties,” the authorities did not send anyone to the coastal areas.45 Cemal Pasha explained that Jaffa and Gaza were particularly “war zones” and that the purpose of the evacuation was “purely for military reasons,” namely to establish a defensive line against a possible enemy offensive and to spare “non-combatants” from the effects of war.46

Falih Rıfkı (Atay) Bey, who served as Cemal Pasha’s private secretary, stated that one of the reasons for these evacuations was that “Jewish Palestine had become a nest of spies.” Saying, “Carrying statistics to the Baghdad headquarters across the desert on a Hama camel was certainly not as easy as sending messages to an English torpedo boat by rowboat from the Palestinian coast,” Falih Rıfkı Bey made a concise reference to the espionage activities of NILI agents.47

During the evacuations, NILI supplied the world public with fabricated reports claiming that Jews were being persecuted, that they were on the brink of a massacre similar to that of the Armenians, and that their remaining property was being looted by Arabs. These reports were used against the Ottoman State by the “Secret War Propaganda” apparatus directed in London by Foreign Office official Lord Bryce and his young assistant Arnold Toynbee.48 The Ottoman State condemned these allegations and categorically rejected them. Cemal Pasha argued that these fabricated reports were invented by the British and French “in order to forget the very sharp slaps the British army had twice received in front of Gaza and to eliminate the favorable impression created in neutral countries in our favor.”49

NILI’s claims were denied by residents of Palestine, primarily Jews, as well as by members of other religions and religious leaders. A Jewish individual who was the Jerusalem representative of the Society of Friends of Palestine, influential in Frankfurt and Berlin and well known in Europe, sent a rebuttal telegram to newspapers in Frankfurt, Budapest, and Amsterdam denying reports of persecution against Jews.50 Similarly, Beril, an American Jew and representative of Baron Rothschild, sent rebuttal telegrams to Genoa and Berlin; Mr. Zadsi, Director of the Jaffa Agricultural School, to London; three Jewish village headmen to Budapest; the director of the Rishon LeZion Jewish factory to Genoa; and the mayor of Tel Abib (Tel Aviv), Hanma, sent rebuttal telegrams consisting of six sections to various locations.51 In addition, the Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem sent a 21-part rebuttal telegram to Chief Rabbi Nahum Efendi in Istanbul, as well as to various individuals and newspapers in Vienna, Budapest, Frankfurt, and Rotterdam.52 The Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem also sent a rebuttal telegram to the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul, denying reports that Turks were persecuting Christians and Jews in Palestine.53 Doctor Ton, an Austrian subject, likewise sent rebuttal telegrams to various addresses in Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw, Zurich, and Budapest, denying allegations of oppression and persecution attributed to the Turks.54 These rebuttals made by members of different religious communities in Palestine under the supervision of Cemal Pasha may be perceived as propaganda obtained under pressure. However, General Clayton, deputy to Allenby, also rejected these allegations in 1918

Reports prepared by the consulates of certain states likewise admitted that the allegations were unfounded.55

4. The Dismantling of the Organization

Although the Ottoman State suspected Jewish involvement in espionage activities, it was unable for a long time to obtain concrete evidence directly linking them to NILI. Engle and sources that cite him trace the collapse of the NILI to the capture by the Turks of one of the carrier pigeons used by Sarah. According to this account, a pigeon caught among the birds of a police chief in Caesarea, a few kilometers from Atlit, with a document written in Hebrew attached to its leg, marked the beginning of the end for NILI.56 Sheffy, however, believes that even if the document had been deciphered, it could not by itself directly point to NILI. In his view, the evidence that exposed NILI was uncovered by Aziz Bey, head of the Counter-Espionage Unit of the Fourth Army. Aziz Bey captured two Arabs of British nationality who were residing illegally in Palestine while they were attempting to flee by sea, and found NILI propaganda papers on them.57 On the other hand, Captain Cevat Rıfat Bey, who served in the First Branch of the Eighth Corps attached to the Fourth Army in Damascus and for a time also managed the corps’ intelligence, provides different information regarding the exposure of NILI. According to his account, the coastal region from İskenderun to Nazareth was under gendarmerie control. The most dangerous area behind the front lines was between Haifa and Nazareth. A repetitive and uniform coastal surveillance report that was constantly placed on his desk caught Cevat Rıfat Bey’s attention. The report stated that an English cruiser (most likely the Monegam) was seen every day around 5:00 p.m. appearing and disappearing between Jaffa and Haifa. Suspicious of this unusual situation, Cevat Rıfat Bey reported it to the Nazareth Regional Command and requested a covert investigation in the area. Shortly thereafter, a spy named Abraham Habon was captured in the village of Zammarin while walking along the shore and signaling with matches at dusk. This marks the beginning of the unraveling within NILI.58

The spies captured by the Nazareth Regional Command were sent to Damascus for interrogation. During the initial questioning conducted there by Lieutenant Colonel Fahri Bey, no information could be obtained from the spies despite all efforts. The spies were then interrogated again by a new commission composed of Major Durmuş and Legal Adviser Halil Rıfat Bey, under the supervision of Cevat Rıfat Bey. It was during this interrogation that members of NILI’s leadership, Naaman Belkind and Yosef Lishansky, were identified for the first time.59 Belkind had been captured by Bedouins in a skirmish near Beersheba and handed over to Turkish authorities. Subsequently, Lishansky, for whom a reward had been offered, was also captured as a result of an operation by Turkish soldiers. Belkind and Lishansky were urgently taken to the Fourth Army Headquarters in Damascus for interrogation.60

Cevat Rıfat Bey, who oversaw the interrogations in Damascus, provided very important details about the process. Stating, “Acting according to conscience, we refrained as much as possible from coercion and pressure,” Cevat Rıfat Bey noted that the process remained inconclusive for a long time. Thereupon, on the advice of Dr. Nedim Bey, Chief Physician of the Eighth Corps, it was decided to employ suggestion and hypnosis during the interrogations. With the approval of Neşet Ömer Bey, Head of Medical Services of the Fourth Army, the renowned psychologist Abdi Muhtar Bey from the Beirut Faculty of Medicine was assigned to the task.61 As a result of these interrogations, important information was obtained regarding the NILI organization and its activities. The dialogue below, which took place between the interrogation committee and a spy named Abraham Blum, is striking in that it illustrates how NILI spies were enchanted by dreams of Zionism and the Promised Land:

– I did not commit treason. I carried out my duty.

– Did you fulfill your duty by acting hostilely towards us? That is, by stabbing in the back the heroic sons of a nation that embraced you and allowed you to live in freedom and prosperity without expecting anything in return, and then attempting to beg for freedom and independence in return for the victory you would achieve for the enemy forces?

– These lands are territories promised to us by God. We do not eat anyone else’s bread. We live by our own bread and our own wealth. We are working to let our oppressed and destitute nation live freely in the sacred lands of Palestine.

– Then why do you attempt to beg our enemy for the abundant favors that we have bestowed upon you? What justification can you offer for this?62

Through these interrogations, Turkish intelligence reached many NILI spies spread throughout Palestine. The spies crowded into Damascus prisons caused severe overcrowding, forcing the authorities to use even small mosques and prayer houses as detention facilities. So much so that the Governor of Damascus, Tahsin Bey, concerned about the overcrowding in prisons and the daily arrival of new spies sent to Damascus, felt compelled to inform the Eighth Corps of the situation.63

The interrogation of Belkind and Lishansky proved highly illuminating both in exposing NILI’s leadership and in uncovering other separatist Jewish organizations that had taken root in Palestine. Aaron and Sarah were finally identified through this process. Lishansky made striking confessions regarding the HaShomer organization, which he had helped to found.64 Following the interrogations, Turkish forces launched a night raid and captured Sarah. Without allowing Turkish intelligence the opportunity to interrogate her, Sarah found a way to commit suicide with a pistol.65 Aaron, however, could not be captured, as he was in Egypt serving with British Intelligence.

Engle, in describing Sarah’s death, uses a highly dramatic and Israel-heroism–oriented language that glorifies her. According to his account, Sarah and her family members were subjected to heavy pressure and various forms of torture for days by the District Governor of Haifa, Hasan Bey. Emphasizing that Sarah heroically resisted the torture, Engle states that she entered her bedroom under the pretext of changing her clothes and, after leaving a final letter to NILI, committed suicide with a pistol.66 Cevat Rıfat Bey, who closely followed the process of Sarah’s capture, provides entirely different information regarding her death. According to his account, Sarah was captured in her home while sleeping, wearing a Zionist symbol around her neck. She greeted the Turkish soldiers who came to take her with such composure and politeness that she even offered them drinks. The Damascus headquarters ordered the Nazareth Regional Command to send Sarah urgently under the escort of two officers. Sarah was put on a train bound for Damascus under the supervision of Captain Necmeddin and Lieutenant Muzaffer Bey. While the train was passing through Wadi Shahab, Sarah left her carriage under the pretext of going to the toilet and threw herself onto the Shahab cliffs, committing suicide.67

The courts-martial in Damascus and Jerusalem handed down various sentences against NILI spies, including the death penalty. Members of the organization’s leadership, Naaman Belkind and Yosef Lishansky, were executed by hanging in accordance with the verdict of the Damascus court-martial.

Of the 60 people arrested in connection with these individuals, 14 were sentenced to various punishments, while some of the remainder were released and others were sent to Istanbul to be assigned to military units.68 According to Kandemir’s records, of more than a thousand detainees imprisoned in Damascus, 333 were sentenced to death and around two hundred were given various other punishments. Furthermore, court-martials at the front executed by firing squad numerous spies captured behind Salt and Gaza.69 According to Cevat Rıfat Bey, “If it had been necessary to arrest every culprit, it would have been necessary to set all the villages of Palestine ablaze from end to end. For this reason, only the most hardened ringleaders were punished.”70

The death penalty was applied not only to NILI agents but also to Christian subjects of the empire found guilty of espionage.71 Among them were volunteer soldiers72 in the Ottoman army and state officials73 serving in local administrations.

Another punishment imposed by the courts-martial was exile. Some individuals associated with Zionism were exiled to cities in Anatolia such as Konya and Eskişehir.74 During these exiles, certain foreign consulates attempted to intervene to halt the punitive decisions. However, Cemal Pasha’s determination left little room for such foreign interference.75

NILI continued its activities in Palestine until early 1918. Despite the intensive efforts of Ottoman intelligence, many NILI spies managed to escape to Cairo via the Sinai Desert. These Jews were organized within Britain’s “38th Royal Fusiliers Battalion.” They were later joined by the 39th (American) and 40th (Palestinian) Battalions. Eventually, all were united under the “First Judean Regiment” and fought against the Turks in Allenby’s final Palestine campaign.76

With the support of British and French naval forces, General Allenby launched an intense offensive toward Palestine via Gaza on October 27, 1917. On October 31, Beersheba, located on the left flank of the Ottoman Army, fell into British hands.

Following this, the Ottoman army evacuated Gaza on November 5, and on November 7 Gaza was captured by the British. As British forces advanced, Ottoman forces began to retreat. The British captured Jaffa on November 15 and then moved toward Jerusalem, where they encountered resistance from Ottoman troops. After reinforcing their forces for a period, the British advanced on Jerusalem once again on December 8 and captured the city on December 15. Subsequent developments resulted in the complete loss of all of Palestine, and Ottoman armies began a rapid retreat toward Damascus.77

 NILI’s contributions to British military power were acknowledged with gratitude by the British after the war. General Macdonough of the British War Office stated that Allenby relied heavily on the information provided by NILI in achieving victory in Palestine and shaped his war strategy accordingly. Likewise, Captain Raymond Savage, Allenby’s military secretary, emphasized in an interview with the New York Press in 1924 that the intelligence supplied by many Jewish youths, most of them were native Palestinians, was highly effective in enabling Allenby to complete his campaign. Engle, for his part, stressed that all Jews were grateful to NILI and compared Sarah to Joan of Arc, saying, “She was not a sophisticated person like Joan of Arc. Yet she was the heroine of all heroic women.”78

 One of the members of the Zionist Commission that went to Palestine in 1918 was Aaron Aaronsohn. The Jews of the region reacted strongly against Aaron, accusing him of endangering Jewish settlements in Palestine through espionage. However, disregarding these reactions, Aaron continued working on the infrastructure of an independent Jewish state. He later moved to London, where he sought to persuade the Jewish diaspora to return to Palestine through contacts he established among Britain, France, and the United States. Appointed as Dr. Weizmann’s assistant in 1919, Aaron attended the Paris Conference and went to London to prepare a report on determining the borders of Palestine. However, the military aircraft Aaron boarded on his return to Paris crashed over the English Channel, bringing about the end of both Aaron and NILI.79

 Conclusion

The First Zionist Congress, convened in Basel in 1897, marked a turning point in the Zionists’ plans for Palestine. With the decision taken at the congress to establish a state, Zionists began migrating to Palestine, which was under Ottoman rule, and founding colonies there. Despite the strict measures taken by the Ottoman State, Jews succeeded in increasing their numbers in Palestine and expanding their land ownership. World War I became a ray of hope for the Zionists’ objective of taking control of Palestine. The Zionist movement foresaw that if the Ottoman State collapsed at the end of the war, Palestine would become independent and an independent Jewish state could be established there. Acting in this direction, Zionists took sides with the Entente Powers during the war through the legions they formed and the financial resources they provided.

The NILI spy organization, founded in 1915 by Aaron Aaronsohn, became one of the important factors that influenced the fate of the Palestine–Syria Front, where the Ottoman–British struggle took place. NILI spies provided the British with a significant advantage by delivering the military and strategic information they gathered about the Ottoman army to British intelligence in Egypt. The British army, which halted Turkish forces during the Canal Campaign and later succeeded in occupying all of Palestine, benefited to the fullest extent from NILI’s intelligence. NILI was also effective in shaping the anti-Ottoman image that emerged in world public opinion during the war. By distorting the evacuations carried out by the Ottoman State in Gaza and Jaffa, NILI spread the false claim that the Jewish population was being persecuted and was on the brink of a massacre similar to that of the Armenians. These reports, used by the British Propaganda Ministry, were quite effective in damaging the Ottoman image in the eyes of neutral states.

NILI’s espionage activities were not supported by all Jews settled in Palestine. Some Jewish settlements reacted against NILI, believing that it endangered the future of Jews in Palestine. This situation demonstrates that certain Jewish communities in Palestine remained loyal to the Ottoman State during the war. After the war, the British acknowledged NILI’s services and expressed their gratitude at every opportunity. NILI’s contributions made it easier for Britain to introduce arrangements in favor of Jews in Palestine, which it later took under mandate. The founders of NILI, the siblings Aaron and Sarah Aaronsohn, became legendary figures in the developments that led to the establishment of Israel and secured their place as important personalities in the Jewish world. The Turkish public, however, has not sufficiently come to know this “Trojan horse,” which influenced the fate of the Ottoman Empire during World War I.

 

*Celil Bozkurt, Assist. Prof. Dr., Düzce University, Düzce/Türkiye

 

Source: ATATÜRK ARAŞTIRMA MERKEZİ DERGİSİ, Issue 88, pp. 89-114,  2014.

 

Endnotes:

• For information on the first Jewish settlements established in Palestine with the contributions of Rothschild, see: Ran Aaronsohn, Rothschild and Early Jewish Colonization in Palestine, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, pp. 53-87.
• David Vital, The Origins of Zionism, Oxford 1975, pp.367-368.
• For information on the measures taken by Abdul Hamid II against Zionism in Palestine, see: Mim Kemal Öke, Siyonizm’den Uygarlıklar Çatışmasına Filistin Sorunu, Ufuk Kitapları, 4th Edition, Istanbul 2002, pp. 72-80.
• Aaronsohn, Ibid, p.276.
• Isaiah Friedman, Germany, Turkey and Zionism 1897-1918, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1977, pp.200-201.
• Öke, Ibid, pp.229-230.
• Öke, Ibid, p.204.
• Joseph B. Schechtman, The Life and Times of Vladimir Jabotinsky: Rebel and Statesman: The Early Years, Silver Spring, Newyork 1986, pp.203-207.
• Schechtman, Ibid, pp. 271-277.
• Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Hariciye Nezareti Siyasi Kısım (HR.SYS). 2456/21.
• Jonathan Schneer, The Balfour Declaration The Origins of the Arab-Israel Conflict, Random House, Newyork 2010, p.341.
• Anita Engle, The Nili Spies, Frank Cass, London 1996, pp. 17-29.
• Schneer, Ibid, p. 171.
• Engle, Ibid, p. 99.
• An Ottoman archival document mistakenly states that Sarah was the daughter of Aaron Aaronsohn. The document states that Sarah was the wife of a Jew named Hayim Abraham in Istanbul, and also the mistress of Yosef Lishansky, who managed the Zionist farm in Athlit. According to the text, Abraham had close ties to Zionism, and evidence of this was found in a letter belonging to the HaShomer Society. Therefore, Abraham was closely monitored by the police in Istanbul, and his brother Isaac, who was in Vienna, was also being followed by the Viennese police. See: Ziya Uygur, Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerinde Filistin Sorunu ve Siyonizm, İstanbul 1998, p. 138.
• Yigal Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, 1914-1918, Routledge, Newyork 2013, p.161.
• Alexander Aarohnson, Türk Ordusuyla Filistin’de: Bir Yahudi Askerin 1. Dünya Savaşı Notları, (Interpreter: Necmettin Alkan), Selis Kitaplar, İstanbul 2003, pp. 66-67.
• Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye (DH.EUM). 28/12.
• Schneer, Ibid, pp.172-173.
• Sheffy, Ibid, pp. 163-168.
• NILI’s female spies were frequenting prestigious hotels in cities like Jerusalem, Damascus, and Beirut, where Allied officers were concentrated. The Fast Hotel in Jerusalem and the Damascus Hotel in Damascus were favorite haunts of female spies. Some of these women had attracted attention with their beauty and had become legends among the people. Journalist Feridun Kandemir, who visited Aleppo and Damascus in 1937 during the height of the Hatay issue, notes that Simi Simon, a NILI agent, was still remembered there and that his legendary beauty continued to be talked about. See: Feridun Kandemir, Fahreddin Paşa’nın Medine Müdafaası Peygamberimizin Gölgesinde Son Türkler, Yağmur Yayınları, 10th Edition, İstanbul 2009, pp. 328-331.
• Uygur, Ibid, p.138.
• Sheffy, Ibid, p. 162.
• Engle, Ibid, p. 164.
• Sheffy, Ibid, p. 1614.
• Engle, Ibid, pp. 103-108.
• Engle, Ibid, pp. 91-92.
• Riyad N. Er-Reyyis, Osmanlının Çöküş Döneminde Arap Casuslar, (Interpreter: D.İhsan Batur), Selenge Yayınları, İstanbul 2006, p.139.
• Teacher Fuat Gücüyener, who served as the commander of the 2nd Company, 1st Battalion, 32nd Regiment on the Palestine Front, personally witnessed such an incident. According to his account, while observing the coast of Jaffa with binoculars, his attention was drawn to a bottle shining among the waves about 500 meters offshore. The bottle was retrieved by Second Lieutenant Halet Bey, Commander of the 1st Camel Cavalry Squadron, who swam to safety. A strip of paper with Hebrew writing on it is found inside the bottle. This document is then sent to the regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hasan Basri Bey, in Al-Arish to be deciphered. See: Ş. Fuat Gücüyener, Birinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Tanıdığım Kahramanlar, Gücüyener Yayınevi, İstanbul 1956, pp.128-130.
• Stanford J. Shaw, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Yahudiler, (Interpreter: Meriç Sobutay), Kapı Yayınları, İstanbul 2008, pp. 375-376.
• Dahiliye Siyasi Kısım (DH.SYS). 27/2. Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, University of California Press, 1996, pp. 135-145.
• For information on the espionage and armament activities of the HaShomer Society in Palestine, see: BOA. Dahiliye Şifre (DH.ŞFR). 569/56.
• DH.EUM. 54/7.
• DH.ŞFR, 85/1777.
• Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Seyr-ü Sefer Müdüriyeti (DH. EUM. SSM. 20/17. Narrator, Abdullah Lüleci, 1. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Osmanlı Devleti’nde Casusluk Faaliyetleri (1914-1918), Unpublished doctoral thesis, Sakarya Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2014, pp. 153-154.
• Lüleci, cit., p. 190

For the 15th paragraph of Article 14 of the Provisional Law, which defines the death penalty and explains the circumstances requiring it, see: Lüleci, cit., pp. 191-192.

• Engle, Ibid, pp. 43-44. According to Alexander Aaronsohn, who served in the Ottoman army during World War I, Jews hid their weapons out of fear that they would be defenseless against Arabs who harbored hostile feelings towards them and that they would lose their last remaining strength. See: Alexander Aaronsohn, Ibid, p. 51
• Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Türk İnkılap Tarihi, Cilt 3, Kısım 3, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, Ankara 1991, p.384.
• DH.ŞFR. 572/79.
• DH.EUM.86/43.
• HR.SYS.2267/68.
• Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivi (ATASE), Birinci Dünya Harbi (BDH). Klasör (K).173. Dosya (D).746. Fihrist (F).018.
• BDH. K.173. D.746. F.018.01.
• BDH. K.173. D.746. F.019.01. According to Shaw, the evacuated Jews moved to the neighboring Jewish settlements of Petah-Tikva and Kfar-Saba. Some settled in established Jewish communities in Galilee, particularly in Tiberias and Safed; others moved to Jerusalem and Damascus. A small number of Jews went to Egypt and sought refuge in the Jewish communities there. See: Shaw, Ibid, pp. 377-378.
• BDH. K.173. D.746. F.019.
• Falih Rıfkı Atay, Zeytindağı, Pozitif, İstanbul 2004, p. 71.
• Shaw, Ibid, p. 379.
• BDH. K.173. D.746. F.019.
• BDH. K.173. D.746. F.020.
• BDH. D.173. D.746. F.020-06.
• BDH. D.173. D.746. F.020-08.
• BDH. D.173. D.746. F.020-04.
• BDH. D.173. D.746. F.020-02.
• For example, the Swedish Consul General in Istanbul reported the following to the American government shortly before the British occupation of Jerusalem: “The initial reports, spreading throughout the world via Egypt, of the evacuation of the Jewish civilian population and the mistreatment of Jews in Palestine were greatly exaggerated. All the Jews in Jaffa were forced to leave the city. Allied citizens residing in Türkiye were allowed to settle in Jerusalem; however, most of the population was forced to relocate to colonies and the Tiberias region. Under the existing circumstances, such a swift evacuation should have caused more hardship and suffering. However, according to reliable reports from Constantinople, apart from the inherent difficulties and hardships of the event, the Jews had not revolted and had not been mistreated. It was impossible to speak of anything resembling a massacre. As for the situation in Jaffa, a suburb of Tel Aviv, it had been partially spared from destruction because it had been occupied by the Germans. Colonies in the outskirts of Jaffa, such as Richon-le-Sion and Petach Tikvah, were not evacuated, and the Rabbi of Jaffa currently resides in Petach Tikvah. The great hardships faced by the Palestinian Jewish population are a result of the high cost of living and scarcity of food resources. To this we can add the decline of export-based businesses in the region and the decrease in aid sent to the region from Jews around the world…” See: Shaw, Ibid, pp. 379-380.
• Engle, Ibid, pp. 167-168; Öke, Ibid, p. 259.
• Sheffy, Ibid, p. 162.
• Cevat Rifat Atilhan, Filistin Cephesi’nde Yahudi Casuslar, 2. Edition, Üstün Eserler Neşriyatı, İstanbul 1947, p. 20.
• Atilhan, Ibid, pp. 32-34.
• Engle, Ibid, p. 181.
• Atilhan, Ibid, pp. 35-41.
• Atilhan, Ibid, pp. 51-52.
• Atilhan, Ibid, p. 44.
• For Lishansky’s confessions regarding the HaShomer organization, see: Uygur, cit., pp. 123, 137.
• Uygur, Ibid, p. 138.
• Engle, Ibid, pp. 192-201.
• Atilhan, Ibid, p. 42.
• Uygur, Ibid, p. 136.
• Kandemir, Ibid, p. 333
• Atilhan, Ibid, p. 61
• For the death sentence handed down to Ilyas Bin Habib Sanduka by the Jerusalem Court of Justice for the crime of “treason against the army and revealing military secrets,” see: BOA. Dosya Usulü İradeler Tasnifi (İ.DUİT). 174/22.
• For the death sentence issued by the Jerusalem Court-Martial against Yakub Robenson, son of Abdullah Gevilyan, who served as a volunteer in the Ottoman army, for the crime of “obtaining information on behalf of the British government,” pursuant to Article 14, paragraph 5 of the Treason Law, see: BOA. İ.DUİT.173/90.
• For the death sentence of Jaffa customs officers Beshara Walad-i Isa al-Juni and Fisherman Hussein bin Mehmet Haml for espionage, see: BOA. Bab-ı Ali Evrak Odası (BEO).4348/326037
• DH.EUM. 20/60.
• HR.SYS.2267/68.
• Shaw, Ibid, p. 377
• Cemal Kamal, Birinci Dünya Harbinde Filistin Cephesi, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi, Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, Ankara 2004, pp. 152-157.
• Engle, Ibid, pp. 101-102.
• Engle, Ibid, pp. 227-228.

 

Resources:

Archival Documents.

Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (BOA).

Bab-i Ali Documents Office (BEO).

BEO.4348/326037.

Ministry of the Interior, General Security (DH.EUM).

DH.EUM. 20/60.

DH.EUM. 28/12.

DH.EUM. 54/7.

DH.EUM. 86/43.

Ministry of the Interior, General Security, Directorate of Travel and Transportation (DH.EUM.SSM).

EUM.SSM. 20/17.

Ministry of the Interior, Political Section (DH.SYS).

DH.SYS. 27/2.

Ministry of the Interior, Cipher Office (DH.ŞFR)

DH.ŞFR. 569/56.

DH.ŞFR. 572/79.

DH.ŞFR. 85/1777.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Political Section (HR.SYS)

HR.SYS. 2456/21.

HR.SYS. 2267/68.

HR.SYS. 2267/68.

File-Based Classification of Imperial Decrees (İ.DUİT)

İ.DUİT. 174/22.

İ.DUİT. 173/90.

Archive of the Presidency of Military History and Strategic Studies (ATASE)

First World War (BDH)

BDH. K.173. D.746. F.018.

GÜCÜYENER

SCHECHTMAN, Joseph B., The Life and Times of Vladimir Jabotinsky: Rebel and Statesman: The Early Years, Silver Spring, New York, 1986.

SHAFIR, Gershon, Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1882–1914, University of California Press, 1996.

SHAW, Stanford J., Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Yahudiler, (Interpreter: Meriç Sobutay), Kapı Publications, Istanbul, 2008.

SHEFFY, Yigal, British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914–1918, Routledge, New York, 2013.

SCHNEER, Jonathan, The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab–Israel Conflict, Random House, New York, 2010.

UYGUR, Ziya, Osmanlı Arşiv Belgelerinde Filistin Sorunu ve Siyonizm, Istanbul, 1998.

VITAL, David, The Origins of Zionism, Oxford, 1975.

 

Dissertations:

LÜLECİ, Abdullah, 1. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Osmanlı Devleti’nde Casusluk Faaliyetleri (1914-1918), Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Sakarya Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2014.

KAMAL, Cemal, Birinci Dünya Harbinde Filistin Cephesi, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Ankara Üniversitesi, Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, Ankara, 2004.