A New Path to Middle East Security

How American Commitments in the Gulf Can Rebuild the Regional Order

 

On September 9, Israel shocked the world by bombing a villa in a residential neighborhood of Doha in an attempt to kill senior Hamas officials. It was the second time Qatar was struck this year. (In June, Iran launched missiles at a U.S. air base in the emirate in retaliation for U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran). As an important U.S. ally and a key conflict mediator, Qatar has generally been considered off-limits to the region’s belligerents. Moreover, Qatar has hosted Hamas leaders for years, with tacit American and Israeli approval, as part of its mediating role; the targeted officials were, in fact, negotiating, through Qatari channels, a potential hostage and cease-fire agreement for Gaza. If the strikes had resulted in more casualties or damage to Qatar, it might have destabilized the whole region, expanding the war to the Gulf and likely destroying any near-term prospects for a cease-fire.

Israel’s strike on Qatar was not successful, and this didn’t happen. But the attack did inadvertently achieve something equally consequential: it opened the door to what could be one of the most important shifts in U.S. Middle East policy in decades. Not only was U.S. President Donald Trump sufficiently angered that he pressured Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into agreeing to a cease-fire in Gaza. He also took the unprecedented step of issuing an executive order to reaffirm Washington’s commitment to its Gulf ally, asserting that an armed attack against Qatar will be considered “a threat to the peace and security of the United States.” This full-throated assurance of U.S. support is likely to set a new benchmark for security relationships between the Gulf countries and the United States.

In the context of sweeping changes in the regional balance of power, these moves pave the way for a new order in the Middle East. If it can be consummated, that order will be rooted in deeper U.S.-Gulf ties, the collapse of Iran’s regional power, and even closer coordination among friendly militaries. For the first time in a generation, the United States has an opportunity to build a durable security architecture for one of the world’s most violent regions. But the Trump administration must act quickly to take advantage of this rare moment by aligning expectations with its partners, solidifying the emerging security framework, and reinvigorating diplomacy. As Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman prepares to meet with Trump in Washington on November 18, the United States has a crucial opportunity to extend its new security pledge to Qatar to Saudi Arabia and the entire Gulf region. If the president and his team lose their focus, however, it could all crumble.

A RARE CALM

After two years of war, U.S. adversaries in the Middle East are weaker than they have been in decades. Even if the cease-fire in Gaza does not hold, by securing the return of all living Israeli hostages for only a partial Israeli withdrawal, the deal represents the effective defeat of Hamas. Meanwhile, Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs have been severely damaged; Iran’s ally in Syria, the Assad regime, has been overthrown; Hezbollah, Tehran’s proxy in the Levant, has been degraded; and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq have largely been cowed. As of now, the Houthis in Yemen are the only Iranian proxy or partner that continues to present a significant military threat, and the group’s leadership is under growing pressure from Israel. Iran could reemerge as a regional menace in the future, but its capabilities have been devastated. As a result, the Middle East is settling into a rare calm that is aligned with U.S. interests.

These changes are not only due to the wars that followed Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks. Some of the credit also belongs to the first Trump administration and to the Biden administration, which were more similar in their approaches to the Middle East than is often appreciated. Trump in his second term has taken a page from his predecessors by primarily working “by, with, and through” local partners. He summed up his strategy in a speech in Riyadh in May, in which he stressed the agency of Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Gulf states and Turkey, to run their own internal affairs and play a greater role in regional security—backed, when necessary, by decisive U.S. military operations. In return, partners in the Middle East have been offered new economic and security rewards.

Along with greatly increasing commercial and investment ties with the United States, Arab allies were given the opportunity for deeper diplomacy with Israel, as previewed by the Abraham Accords, the series of deals signed during Trump’s first term that normalized relations between Israel and several Arab countries. Such a concept, together with Trump’s commitment not to expend massive resources for nation building, also offers the American people a better deal—stability in the Middle East at a lower military cost and with more economic benefits to the United States. Since his return to office, Trump has followed through on this strategy by embracing Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Shara, a former terrorist; bombing the Fordow nuclear site in Iran; issuing an extraordinary security commitment to Doha; and cajoling Israel and Hamas into a cease-fire.

The seeds of this approach were planted during the Biden administration. During his campaign, U.S. President Joe Biden embraced a worldview that pitted democracies against autocracies and vowed to make Saudi Arabia a “pariah” over the kingdom’s assassination of a Saudi journalist. Once in office, however, Biden embraced—and even tried to expand—Trump’s Abraham Accords and, in 2022, publicly bumped fists with the Saudi crown prince. Biden’s 2022 National Security Strategy was, in many ways, similar to Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy. Both focused on competing with other great powers, including by building up the U.S. economy, strengthening the military, and using the armed forces decisively. In 2024, Biden became the first president to engage in direct combat in support of Israel, at times under fire, by directing U.S forces to shoot down Iranian missiles. The 2022 strategy also said that the United States would partner with “countries that do not embrace democratic institutions,” as long as they supported “a rules-based international system.” Biden put this sentiment into action by working with Netanyahu despite serious moral and political failures in Gaza, with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on NATO expansion, and with Gulf potentates on the region’s security architecture.

Biden’s and Trump’s Middle East policies have another thing in common: although garnering considerable support in Congress and among the public, they created tensions with core elements of their respective political bases. As the humanitarian crisis in Gaza grew, Biden was pilloried by segments of the Democratic Party, who turned against Israel. Trump has faced vocal opposition by many in the “America first” wing, who want to see the United States less involved militarily in the region. Nonetheless, both presidents remained committed to strong U.S. security engagement in the region.

NEW REDLINES

The Gulf states have become the fulcrum of the new regional order. In the absence of a strong U.S. response, the Israeli strike on Doha could have called into question Washington’s commitment to the Gulf and the broader Middle East. But the attack instead became a catalyst for Trump to reaffirm the importance of the Gulf to U.S. and regional security. In essence, it forced Washington to recognize that deterrence in the Gulf can no longer rest solely on a U.S. military presence, arms sales, and economic deals; it requires a more integrated and politically viable framework.

 

When Trump issued the executive order pledging to defend Qatar, he sent the entire Middle East the message that American redlines exist beyond Israel. He also communicated to Gulf partners that the perimeters of U.S. defense commitments in the region had widened, perhaps permanently. Consider the contrast with 2019, when Iranian proxies struck a major Saudi oil refinery. At the time, Trump did nothing in response—causing the Gulf states to lose some faith in the United States’ commitment to their security. With Trump’s executive order, they have reason to assume that a future such attack would yield a different result.

 

Trump’s assurance was not the first American commitment of its kind to the Gulf. In 2023, the Biden administration signed the U.S.-Bahrain Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement, which aimed to provide a framework for U.S. engagement in the region. The deal helped foster new U.S.-Bahraini economic and technological initiatives, joint military exercises, coordinated defense planning, and increased intelligence sharing. On mutual security, the agreement emphasized consultation and joint responses over an immediate, mandatory U.S. response to an armed attack, whether military or otherwise.

Although both the deal with Bahrain and the executive order on Qatar lack the legal clarity or institutional permanence of a treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate, their political implications are significant, although much more so for Qatar. For the first time since the 1991 Gulf War, the United States has explicitly linked its own interests to the security of a Gulf state. In doing so, Trump has set a new standard for the U.S. security relationship with Gulf and regional partners. Already, Saudi Arabia has indicated that when the Saudi crown prince visits the White House, it may seek a similar defense pact—a presidential order that an attack on Saudi Arabia would be considered an attack against U.S. interests.

That would be less ambitious than the formal U.S. security agreement the crown prince sought before the war in Gaza began. Under the Biden administration, the United States was in talks with Saudi Arabia about a Senate-ratified defense treaty that would likely have come in exchange for normalizing relations with Israel—effectively extending the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia. But that kind of deal has been postponed given the complexity of the postwar situation in Gaza. By contrast, as Riyadh and other Gulf partners see it, Trump’s executive order with Qatar delivers concrete U.S. protection and avoids long, messy negotiations that a Senate-ratified treaty or normalization with Israel might require. In other words, Trump’s response to the Doha crisis has the potential to serve as a foundation for a new security architecture in the region—provided the United States offers the necessary backing to make it credible.

READ THE FINE PRINT

For Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, Trump’s executive order has raised both hopes and questions. All three have interpreted it, perhaps rightly, as a clear indication of U.S. resolve to defend partners in the region against both state and nonstate threats. On the other hand, the assurance’s legal ambiguity has raised concerns among Gulf leaders about its durability and enforceability. A new U.S. administration in 2028, for example, could easily revoke it, although at great risk to the U.S.-Qatari bilateral relationship.

The Trump administration also has yet to fully articulate whether the Doha assurance marks a formal policy shift or an ad hoc improvisation. It is not clear, for example, how it would prevent a scenario like the one Qatar faced in September. In the event of a similar attack, would the United States stop Israeli missiles from striking Doha or simply notify Qatar of the attack more quickly? Would the United States take action to restrain Israel, its closest ally in the Middle East? History suggests that U.S. security commitments are less about combat responses to individual incidents and more about deterring large-scale aggression—such as the kind leveled against Kuwait in 1990—and promoting regional security environments that foster stability, predictability, and peace. When necessary, the United States has sometimes restrained it allies, such as when France and the United Kingdom attacked Suez in 1956 and Turkey threatened Cyprus in 1964 and 1974.

These tensions also reflect a deeper dilemma. In the past, Gulf partners have oscillated between seeking more U.S. protection and hedging by making alternative partnerships, such as with China and Russia. In September, for example, Saudi Arabia signed a defense pact with Pakistan. And although the new executive order could reduce the temptation to hedge, it would do so only if Washington makes clear that the assurance has real muscle. If Qatar’s expectations for a response to external aggression go unmet, the United States risks creating a dangerous middle ground in which Gulf countries feel that U.S. commitments are too strong to walk away from but too weak to prevent states from seeking alternative deals that might run contrary to U.S. interests. In that scenario, Washington could end up with responsibility without influence. It might be blamed for regional crises yet lack the leverage to shape how partners act. Managing these expectations will be a key test for the administration’s diplomatic prowess in the months ahead.

The new Doha paradigm also carries other pitfalls. Both the assurance to Qatar and broader U.S. posture and strategy in the region remain largely reactive rather than the result of deliberate coordination. The second Trump administration has yet to articulate a formal security doctrine for the region. There is also the risk of U.S. overreach. In the absence of clarity, Gulf partners could misinterpret the assurance as equivalent to NATO’s Article 5—which says that an armed attack on one ally will be considered an attack on all members. The mismatch in assumptions in Washington and in Gulf capitals could lead to scenarios in which the United States is dragged into regional disputes or, potentially worse, appears to retreat from its commitments in moments of escalation. To make its commitment to Qatar credible, Washington will need to institutionalize it in a way that balances deterrence with political and military flexibility.

WINNING THE PEACE

Despite these challenges, the United States has a rare opportunity to reshape the security of the Middle East. With adversaries degraded, partners empowered, and diplomacy active, Washington can mold the fledgling regional order in ways that would have been unthinkable even a few years ago. Building on new security assurances to the Gulf, the Trump administration could, for example, formalize multilateral defense pacts among Gulf states (and possibly Israel), expand the Abraham Accords into a broader regional political forum, or leverage security cooperation to further spur economic investment and integration with countries that want to be included in U.S.-aligned security arrangements. Gulf states have been frustrated with Israel for its war in Gaza and strike on Qatar. But they recognize that Israel has made the Gulf safer by degrading the military capabilities of Iran and its proxies. Gulf states are thus likely to want Israel on their side, albeit discreetly.

It is worth noting that the United States has had opportunities to remake the Middle East order before—in 1974, after the Yom Kippur War, and in 1991, after the liberation of Kuwait. In both cases U.S.-led coalitions defeated the primary instigators of regional conflict and followed up with major diplomatic initiatives, including the 1979 treaty between Egypt and Israel, the 1991 Madrid conference, and the Oslo accords. But the governments in the region were unable to permanently solidify peace during either period. Similar challenges remain ahead, and Washington and its partners in the region today should try to avoid a repeat of those experiences and turn the stability that has tentatively emerged into a new normal.

It is also a moment for the United States to reassess and redefine its own military posture in the Middle East. With a dwindling need for large-scale deployments, Washington can once again embrace strategic power projection by relying on rapid-response capabilities and forward basing, as well as expanding military interoperability and integration among regional partners. Equally important, the United States can use its renewed leverage to address continuing tensions in the region, including in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. For instance, the United States could use its new commitments to Qatar—and, possibly, Saudi Arabia—to encourage Doha and Riyadh to play a more active role in preventing militias from interfering in Iraqi state institutions or to contribute more to Lebanon’s reconstruction.

Without U.S. follow-through, the window to put the region on a better, more stable course may close and leave behind frustrated partners, emboldened adversaries, and lasting damage to American credibility. The United States has invested vast resources into stabilizing the Middle East, and it finally is confronted with a regional alignment that makes lasting security achievable. It would be a shame to let that go to waste.

 

Source: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/new-path-middle-east-security